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NOTE ON IRANIAtî AND GREGORIAN CALENDARS AND CURRENCY 
The Iranian solar year, with approximately 621 years lag 
behind Gregorian calendar starts at the beginning of spring 
(March 21). Thus the Iranian calendar year 1340, covers the 
period between March 21, 1961 to March 20, 1962 of the 
Gregorian calendar. The following table relates the Gregorian 
to the Iranian calendar years for the period 1960-1975: 
Gregorian Calendar 
March 21-March 20 
1960-1961 
1961-1962 
1962-1963 
1963-1964 
1964-1965 
1965-1966 
1966-1967 
1967=1968 
1968-1969 
1969-1970 
1970-1971 
1971-1972 
1372-1973 
1973-1974 
1974-1975 
Currency: 
Iranian Calendar 
1339 
1340 
1341 
1342 
1343 
1344 
1345 
1346 
1347 
1348 
1349 
1350 
1351 
1352 
1353 
The currency of Iran is Rial. Throughout this study a 
fixed rate of exchange between Rial and U.S. dollar has been 
assumed: $1.00 = Ris» 68= 
1 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture in Iran^ 
Agriculture has an important place in the Iranian economy.. 
It employs about 40 percent of the country's labor force and 
price and production levels for agricultural products have a 
direct bearing on the level of living of over 50 percent of 
Iran's population who live in rural areas. In the year 1351 
(March 1972-March 1973) the farm sector accounted for 16 per­
cent of the gross national product of Iran indicating that 
GNP per worker in agriculture is less than 1/3 of the national 
average. 
About 5.3 percent of the country's area is currently 
under cultivation. According to official government statistics 
about 60 percent of this is nonirrigated while 40 percent is 
irrigated land. However, not all the irrigated land receives 
the same amount of water. The IBRD mission estimates the 
"fully" irrigated land as comprising only 5 percent of the 
total land under utilization. Thirty-four percent of the land 
is categorized as "partially irrigated" and 60.5 percent as 
^"Agriculture" includes farming, forestry and fishing 
and stock breeding. 
2 
dry land farming.^ 
The production level of wheat, barley, lentils, chick 
peas and other crops from this large percentage of dry land 
farming area makes the total product of Iran's agricultural 
sector extremely vulnerable to the changes in weather condi­
tions. Production of various crops fluctuates violently 
2 from year to year. This variation in production level, on 
the one hand, makes life quite difficult for the farmers whose 
standard of living is accordingly varied from year to year. 
On the other hand, fluctuation in total wheat production makes 
planning difficult, as estimating the amount of imports of 
farm products needed for maintaining a given level of consump-
^The total size of the country is about 165 million hec­
tares. Presently about 8 million hectares of it are under 
cultivation in any one year, with about 11 million hectares 
lying fallow. It is estimated that some 40 million hectares 
of land in Iran could become suitable for farming if adequate 
water were available. Even without provision of more water, 
however, more land could become suitable for farming than is 
presently utilized (41, pp. 6-7). 
^For instance, production of wheat — by far the most im­
portant crop in Iran, increased by 11% from 1962 to 1963 and 
decreased by 13% in 1964. In 1968 production increased by 
10% over 1967 but decreased by 11% in 1969 (43. Annex 14, 
Table 2.4). See also (42, Annex I, p. 1). Wheat production 
in 1350 (1972) was 18% less than that in 1349 (75, p. 267). 
Although the area under wheat in 1350 was 4% more than that 
in 1349 (75, p. 30). 
3 
sumption is virtually impossible.^ The yearly fluctuation in 
2 
the amount of agricultural imports in Iran is indeed large. 
Crop production accounts for about 71 percent of total 
value added in the farm sector. Livestock operations ac­
counted for about 27 percent and forestry and fishing for 
1.5 percent (17, p. 25). Major crops include wheat, 
3 
barley, rice, cotton, sugar beets, potatoes and feed crops. 
Major livestock activities include production of mutton, 
4 beef and veal, dairy products, poultry, wool and silk. 
A major characteristic of Iranian agriculture is the low 
yields per unit of land and man hours of nearly all produced 
although probably the output per unit of purchased 
A hypothetical example illustrates this point. During 
the 3 year period of 1349-51, the average annual production 
of wheat in Iran amounted to 4.15 million tons, and the 
average annual import of wheat to 598,000 tons. If, in an 
"average" year, domestic production of wheat should fall 
by 15%, maintaining the previous consumption level requires 
an increase in imports of 622,000 tons. Thus a 15% decrease in 
wheat production results in an increase in imports by more 
than 100%. 
2 
For instance, import of wheat decreased from 755,535 
tons in 1345 to 65,293 tons in 1346. In 1349, net import of 
wheat increased by more than 8 times over 1348, and in 1350 
it increased by more than 42 times over the previous year. 
^In the year 1352, the area of cultivation for these crops 
were: in 1000 hectares—wheat 5565, barley 1446, rice 344,-
cotton 307, sugar beets ISO, potatoes 108, feed crops 450 
(75, p. 301). 
^In 1350, output of these products were, in 1000 tons: 
red meat (mutton, beef and veal) 303, milk 1900, poultry meat 
55, wool 35, and silk 3.3 (17, p. 29). 
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input and fossil fuel is high. Table 1 shows the average 
yield per hectare of major crops in Iran. 
Table 1. Average yield of major crops in year 1350, tons/ 
hectare (72, pp. 84-86 and 5, p. 7) 
Crop Irrigated Nonirrigated Total 
Percent on 
Irrigated 
Land 
Wheat 1.3 .42 .65 26 
Barley 1.2 .41 .58 21 
Rice 2.5 — 2.5 100 
Cotton n.a. n.a. .61 n.a. 
Sugar beets n.a. n.a. 23.8 n.a. 
As Table 1 shows, the yields for nearly all crops are quite 
low by world standards.^ 
X 
The following data compares the yields of selected crops 
in Iran with other parts of the world. This table is extracted 
from the F.A.O. Production Yearbook of 1972, and thus the 
figures for crop yields in Iran are different than those given 
above. All figures are tons/hectare (87). 
Crops Iran U.S.A. Europe Asia World Average 
Wheat 0.9 2.2 2.9 1.25 1.63 
Barley 0,7 2.3 3.2 1.3 1.8 
All Cereals 0.33 3 • 9 3.0 1.5 1.8 
Rice (Paddy) 3.2 5.2 4.0 2.3 2.2 
Cotton 1.7 1.5 1.9 0.77 1.1 
Tobacco 1.2 2.3 1.3 0.97 1.2 
Sugar beet 2.5 47.5 37 28 30.2 
Potatoes 7.7 26.2 18.8 9.2 12.7 
The yields are particularly low for cereals, where the yields 
in Iran are lower than the average yield in all of Asia. 
5 
What is even more surprising is the low yield of the ir­
rigated land. The only explanation for the low yield of the 
lands categorized as irrigated may be found in the definition 
of the "irrigated" land used in arriving at these figures.^ 
The trends in the yields of various crops over the past 
decade have been mixed. The average yield for wheat and 
barley in 1350 were lower than what they were in 1339, while 
2 that of rice increased during the same period. 
The rate of growth of the agricultural sector in Iran has 
been low in the past decade, and partly as a result of this 
the share of the farm sector in the country's Gross National 
Product has been declining rapidly. Table 2 shows this trend 
for selective years through 1351. While more recent data is 
not available, the trend observed in Table 2 had undoubtedly 
continued with accelerated rate in the years 1352 and 1353 
(1973 and 1974).^ 
^See p. 1. 
^(72, pp. 84-85). The yield of wheat in 1339 was .72, 
that of barley was .67 and that of rice was 2.1. Similar 
figures for cotton, oil seed and sugar beets were not listed. 
^It would not be unreasonable to estimate that share of 
agriculture in the GNP has dropped well below 10%. In 1351, 
Iran's GNP amounted to about $17.4 billion at current prices. 
(14; p= 142). In 1352, the oil revenues alone amounted to 
over $20 billion. Thus GNP more than doubled in one year. If 
agricultural sector had a growth rate of 4% in 1352-53, its 
share still would amount to less than 8% of total GNP. This 
however, is not relevant to our discussion. While oil revenue 
did increase in the period of 1339 to 1351 by a substantial 
amount, the drop in farm sector's share in the country's GNP 
had other reasons as well. 
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Table 2. Share of value added for various sectors in the GNP^ 
Year Agriculture 
Industries 
and 
Minesb Oil Services 
Net Foreign 
Earnings 
Excluding 
Oil 
1339-41 30.3% 18.4% 12.2% 39.9% - .8% 
1342-46 25.2% 21% 15.4% 39.8% -1.4% 
1347-50 19.9% 22.7% 18.7% 41.2% -2.5% 
1351 16% 23.4% 19.5% 43.5% -2.4% 
^Source: All years, except 1351 from (17; p, 8), for 
1351, (14, p. 141)o 
^This includes industries and mines, constructions, 
water and power. 
Most of the rapid decline in the share of the farm sector 
in Iran's GNP is, of course, explained by the more rapid in­
crease in the other sectors, notably oil. But this explana­
tion is incomplete. A principal source of this decline may 
be sought by looking at the agricultural sector itself. 
In the past decade, the farm sector in Iran has had the 
smallest rate of growth among all major sectors. In one year 
the rate of growth of this sector was negative (see Table 3). 
Moreover- in nearly every year, the rate of growth of agri­
culture has been less than half of that of the gross national 
7 
products.^ This has caused food imports to rise, and agri­
cultural prices to rise faster than the general price 
level^ (14, p. 55 and 66). 
Table 3. The rate of increase in the value added in various 
economic sectors. Selective years (at constant 
costs)^ 
Year Agriculture Oil Industry 
and Mines Services GNP 
1339 2% 11.7% 8.2% 5% 4.7% 
1342 1.7% 6.3% 13.5% 5.2% 5.7% 
1345 3.5% 15.4% 12,8% 8.7% 10.4% 
1348 3.1% 14.1% 9.2% 11% 9.3% 
1350 -3.7% 18.9% 18.2% 15.8% 13.1% 
1351 8% 13.3% 14.8% 17.2% 14.6% 
1351 
^Source : For 
(14, p. 140). 
the years 1339 to 1350 (17, p. 6) , for 
^At this point a word about agricultural data in Iran is 
in order. The statistics relating to the farm sector in Iran 
is — to say the least — inaccurate. There is a tendency on 
the part of the officials to inflate the production figures. 
In as much as this bias is inherent in all figures, and for 
all years, the relative trends may not be as inaccurate as the 
figures for a particular year. What is even more troublesome, 
however, is the inconsistency between the data about the farm 
products as collected by different ministries. For instance, 
"...average production of wheat over 1967-69 is reported as 4.7 
million tons by the Ministry of Agriculture, but only 4 million 
tons by the Central Bank. From 1962 to 1963 wheat output in­
creased by 11% according to Central Bank, but declined by 10% 
in the Ministry of Agriculture's estimates...", (43, Annex 1, 
p. 1). Thus the data presented in this chapter must be con­
sidered in this light. 
2 
Also see (41, p. 4), "... food prices have been the fast­
est rising cost items in the cost of living index". 
8 
For a number of reasons the farm sector in Iran has al­
ways failed to achieve the rate of growth envisaged by the 
economic planners. The Third Development Plan (1341-1346) 
had set as its goal an increase in the agricultural output of 
4% per year. The actual rate of growth, however, turned out 
to be 2.5% (09, p. 29). Considering the fact that during the 
same period the country's population increased at an annual 
rate of 2.7%, (69, p. 14) then the per capita production of 
farm products actually decreased during the Third Development 
Plan.^ 
The Fourth Development Plan (1968-1972) had as its goal 
for the farm sector an annual rate of growth of "at least 
5%" (70, p. 42). According to the figures released by Bank 
Markazi (Central Bank), the actual growth rats amounted to 
2 3.9% per year (14, p. 65). The Fifth Development Plan (which 
1. 
"Using the production indices prepared by the USDA, the 
IBRD group reaches the same conclusion for the period 1957-69, 
where it is concluded that "...(considering) the... good and poor 
crop years, food production has barely kept pace with and prob­
ably has fallen short of, population growth " (42, Annex 1, p. 2). 
The actual performance of the farm sector in Iran has been 
worse than what is indicated by these figures= "The growth 
record of agricultural output during the past decase has been 
poor. À combination of adverse weather conditions during the 
early I960's and extremely favorable weather in the late 1360's 
is largely responsible for the 4-5% annual growth reported in 
official statistics. Available economic indicators consistent­
ly point to low growth of farm output..." (41, p. 4). The IBRD 
economists have estimated the rate of growth of farm output as a 
whole, during the decade of 1960, to be 2.5% per annum, which is 
less than the annual rate of growth of the population (41, pp. 
4-5) . 
9 
runs from 1973 to 1978) has sen an annual rate of growth of 
5.5% for the farm sector. It remains to be seen whether or 
not this expectation will materialize, although early indi­
cations are not promising.^ 
The slow rate of growth of the farm sector has created 
many problems. One of these has been the country's ever in­
creasing need for imports of farm products. 
Until relatively recently, Iran was more or less self 
sufficient in agricultural products (18, p. 133). Since the 
mid sixties, however, domestic production of most crops has 
fallen short of domestic consumption, thus creating a widening 
gap between local consumption and production of farm products. 
While imports of agricultural products fluctuate a great deal 
from year to year - to a large extent in response to weather 
conditions - the upward trend has been unmistakable in recent 
years. The net imports of farm products in Iran has been 
growing at a rapid rate. 
In the decade of 1957-67, Iran's exports of farm products 
^Wheat production — which is a reasonable index of over­
all performance of the farm sector, if merely for its im­
portance in the total crop production — seems to have dropped 
in 1975. Iran's imports of wheat in fiscal 1975 is projected 
at 1.3 million tons,, more than twice that of fiscal 1974. 
Although this figure is a projection, by August of 1974, Iran 
had purchased more than 1 million tons of wheat from the 
United States (27, p. 5; 11, p. 5). 
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as a whole increased by an annual rate of 2 percent.^ During 
the same period, imports of agricultural products increased by 
about 7 percent (42, Annex 2, p. 9) annually. Between 1968 
and 1972 — duration of the Fourth Development Plan — the net 
imports of farm products increased by more than six times, 
from rls. 1.3 billion in 1968 to rls. 8.5 billion in 1972 
(14, p. 66). During the five year period of this plan, Iran's 
net imports of farm products amounted to rls. 18.4 billion 
(14, p. 66). These figures leave no doubt that Iran is be-r 
2 
coming increasingly dependent upon imports for her food. 
Table 4, and Figure 1 show the foreign trade aspect of 
Iran's farm sector quite clearly. As indicated by Figure 4, 
Iran changed from a net exporter to a net importer of agri­
cultural products in 1349. The import gap, furthermore, is 
(42, Annex 2, p. 9). It must be noted that only a few 
products were responsible for this increase in exports. Over 
the 11 year period of 1957-67,- export of cotton increased by 
81%, that of hides and leather by 220% and pistachios by 
121%. 
^Baldwin, writing in 1966, says that "Iran has normally 
enjoyed a favorable trade balance in agricultural products? 
except in years of crop failure, it exports more food and 
fiber than it imports" (6, p. 74). And again that "The 
country is fortunate in that it does not normally have to im­
port its staple foodstuffs, especially wheat, the lead­
ing grain" (6, p. 64). The situation has changed a great deal 
since the time of these statements. A combination of in­
creasing demand and slow growth of output has made the country 
a net importer of farm products. Import of wheat, for instance, 
has averaged more than 600,000 tons a year since 1350. Rice 
and barley are also imported heavily. 
Table 4. Value of imports and exports of farm products, 1346-1351 (in million 
Rials) (Sources 5, pp. 9-11) 
1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 
Exports ; 
Livestock products 1,597 
All crops 6,822 
All farm products 8,419 
1,509 1,847 1,706 2,227 2,927 
8,187 9,020 9,657 10,546 13,651 
9,696 10,867 7,363 12,773 16,578 
Imports I 
Livestock products 1,883 .'2,196 
All crops 5,876 5,248 
All farm products 7,759 8,444 
Net Exports (X-m); 
Livestock products 
All crops 
All farm products 
2,638 3,561 3,437 5,422 
6,697 9,817 16,943 19,333 
9,335 13,378 20,380 24,755 
-286 -687 -791 -1,855 -1,210 -2,495 
+946 +1,939 +2,323 -160 -6,397 -5,682 
+660 +1,252 +1,532 -2,027 -7,607 -8,177 
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increasing quite rapidly. 
Considering the recent turn of events, with the oil ex­
ports of the country in excess of $20 billion, it might seem 
irrelevant to call attention to rising agricultural imports. 
Total net imports of agricultural products to Iran in 1972 
amounted to only $125 million (14, p. 66), which could be 
considered negligible at 0.006% of foreign earnings. The 
foreign exchange earnings of Iran in the last two years could 
easily cover many years and a considerable increase in food 
imports. 
This line of reasoning, plausible as it may seem on the 
surface, misses the agricultural development issue. Has 
the growth performance of the farm sector in Iran been up 
to its reasonable potential? The improvement and develop­
ment of potential in the agricultural sector and rural 
areas of Iran should be enhanced not precluded by what has 
happened in the oil sector. In all likelihood the long 
run future prices of agricultural products will be higher 
and in the short run will continue to increase in line 
with world-wide inflation. In 1974, for instance, Iran paid 
twice as much for a ton of wheat purchased from the United 
States as what she paid in 1973 (27, p. 5). The cost in 
foreign exchange of Iran's widening gap between domestic 
production and domestic use of food will thus be much 
greater in 20 or 40 years than it is in 1973-74. It is 
14 
dangerous to use the exhaustible resource of oil to finance 
a permanent and growing food deficit. 
In addition to the question of balance of payments, 
the slow improvement of the farm sector is an important in­
hibition for the development of the economy in general and 
leads to a deterioration in the relative position of rural 
residents in particular. The slow rise in total output and 
low labor productivity in agriculture directly limits the 
living level of more than half of Iran's population who 
live in the rural areas. Their standard of living is much 
below that of urban dwellers at the present time.^ If there 
is any desire on the part of the policy makers to narrow 
the gap between urban and rural income, then one of two 
(18/ pp. 139-140). Income distribution data are not 
available for Iran. Some sort of indirect estimates, how­
ever, is possible. Assuming that 50% of the population 
derive their livelihood from agricultural activities, the 
per capita GNP in the farm sector amounts to "Is. 12,097 
or roughly about $183. (GNP information from 14, p. 142.) 
The GNP per capita for the nonfarm sectors amounts to rls. 
55,097 or roughly about $835. (All figures for 1351.) 
Thus the ratio of per capita GNP between the people living 
off of agriculture to those outside of it is 1 to 4.5. 
Obviously, this figure does not reflect the exact ratio of 
income between rural and urban centers. It does, however, 
give us a very rough estimate of the actual case, A Plan 
Organization study (unpublished) calculates the ratio of 
the consumption expenditure of urban dwellers to that of 
rural residents as being about 3 to 1. The same study 
concludes that this disparity has been widening in the past 
decade and unless some measures are taken to counter it, 
it will continue to widen in the future. 
15 
1 
alternative policies must be pursued. Either workers 
must be transferred from farm to nonfarm occupations, or 
the farm sector must expand more rapidly productivity and 
employment than it has done in the past. 
Finally, there is the argument for balanced growth. It 
seems that no country can hope to have improvement for all 
its people if the sector in which most of its population is 
engaged remains of low productivity and stagnating in total 
output. The slow growth of the output level of the farm 
sector in Iran can act as a brake on the growth of other 
sectors, particularly transport, manufacturing and services. 
There are many reasons for the slow growth of the Iranian 
agriculture. Though there is no consensus on the causes of 
the poor performance of the Iranian farm sector, nearly 
everyone agrees that the problem does not stem from lack of 
A 
potential. Being mainly concerned with the impact of wheat 
price policy upon product substitution and relative factor 
use, this study does not attempt to explain the causes of 
the sluggish growth of the Iranian farm sector. This is a 
subject which deserves an entirely separate study and must 
1 
All development plans have specified more equal distribu­
tion of income as one of their objectives. See (66, pp. 2-3). 
It seems however, that in implementing the objectives of the 
plans, this goal has been relegated to a subordinate position. 
2 See, for instance (41, p. 5). 
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incorporate an analysis of the social and political structure 
of the country. 
Prices and Price Policy 
During the decade of 1960-70, prices of most farm products 
in Iran was above that of world market prices. This made im­
port of farm products quite attractive. The foreign exchange 
earnings of the country - almost exclusively from oil export -
made large volume of imports tolerable. In some cases the 
government pursued a deliberate policy of subsidizing im­
ports to keep food prices low. This had a discouraging ef­
fect upon agricultural investment. 
In general, the agricultural sector was experiencing 
terms of trade vis-à-vis the world that were unfavorable to 
output expansion. It seemed reasonable to import many farm 
products at a lower cost than could be possible to produce 
them domestically. "Comparative advantage" seemed to indi­
cate that Iran should take resources out of agriculture and 
employ them in the other sector, especially oil. But this 
is patently impossible. The oil sector = by far the most im­
portant sector in Iran's economy - presently employs less 
than 0.6 percent of the country's labor force. There is no 
way for the oil sector to create jobs for the workers 
presently engaged in farm activity. Furthermore, the con­
cept of comparative advantage is static in nature, and does 
17 
not take into account potential gains that could accrue to 
an economy by investing in a sector which is presently -
due to a number of reasons - at a comparative disadvantage 
with respect to the other sectors. 
To put agriculture in better balance with the world, 
prices of agricultural imports and exports could be increased. 
This will encourage investment in Iran's agriculture. It 
also creates additional jobs for the rural unemployed and 
helps to reduce the country's unemployment problem. There 
are however several factors which must be considered before 
a judgment can be made on the plausibility of such a policy. 
First of all, it is not clear that the agricultural trade 
deficit would decrease if prices were raised. The supply 
increase response to higher prices may be small, or near 
zero. The demand reduction response to higher prices may 
also be near zero. Alternatively, the agricultural output 
response may be large. Investment in output increasing 
capital in agriculture and the adoption of agricultural 
techniques - costing more but also producing more - might 
increase substantially. If so, then the increase in agri­
cultural prices might stimulate the output expansion and 
productivity of the farm sector. These, however, are 
questions which cannot be answered a priori. Research is 
needed to estimate, among other things - the price respon­
siveness of the farmers in Iran. 
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Another important point to be considered, is that a 
general rise of agricultural product prices is impossible 
to tolerate because of the low level of living of the masses 
of the workers. The workers real wages are presently at 
the subsistence level and cannot be further reduced. 
The price increase to consumers, especially low income 
consumers, might be "passed forward" through wage increase 
demand by the workers. If the wages of low income workers 
rose sufficiently to offset food price increases, the re­
duction of food consumption would be slight but would take 
place mostly in high income elastic "luxury" items such as 
meat and confectionary goods. It must be noted, however, 
that increases in the worker's wages cannot be taken for 
granted as the bargaining power of the workers is very weak, 
to say the least. 
This study is concerned with a particular aspect of the 
question of increased agricultural prices as an agri develop­
ment policy conducted by the Iranian government. To be more 
specific, one of the objectives of this study is to assess 
the plausibility of the policy of wheat price increases -
absolutely and relatively - in Iran. The hope is to 
identify expansion potential, its shortcomings, and its side 
effects, such that its implications could be compared with 
alternative policies. The data used for this analysis have 
been collected by interviewing some 47 farm "units" in Northern 
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Iran (see Chapter II). It also involves a study of bread 
consumption and expenditure by urban workers of different 
income levels. 
These interviews will be used to bring out some of the 
crucial problems of output expansion obstacles confronting 
these Iranian farmers. Obstacles such as lack of credit, 
high cost of credit, uncertain markets, lack of competition 
in markets, shortage of water for irrigation, shortage of 
labor, etc. will be discussed in some detail, each in sepa­
rate chapters. Some of these obstacles may be partially 
overcome by higher product prices, while others may require 
fundamental changes in the farm sector. All of the farm 
problems discussed refer to the existing situation in Northern 
Iran. It is possible that in some cases the conclusions 
drawn may be relevant for other parts of the country as well 
but since no investigations were conducted outside Gorgan 
and Gorgan Plain no generalization can be made to the whole 
country. It is hoped that this study, small as it is, will 
throw some light on a part of the issue of "farm prices" and 
development in Iran. It is also hoped that this clarifi­
cation of the nature of the impact of wheat price changes 
could lead to more accurate speculation on the consequences 
of alternative price policies on other crops and in other 
areas. 
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CHAPTER II. THE INTERVIEWS 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the 
impacts of absolute and relative increases in the price of 
wheat in Iran, upon several economic variables. To the ex­
tent that a higher price of wheat increases the total land 
devoted to its production, the level of production of other 
crops - especially those which compete for land and other 
factors of production with wheat - must be reduced by wheat 
price increases as well. Also, to the extent that wheat has 
lower labor requirements per hectare than the competitive 
crops, a substantial increase in the price of wheat reduces 
the level of employment in the farm sector. This reduction 
in total employment in the farm sector will in turn affect 
income distribution in the rural areas. 
To analyze quantitatively the effects of wheat price 
increases upon the economy, one needs information about the 
nature of the wheat supply curve. Information is also needed 
about those crops, the production of which are most likely 
to be significantly affected by increases in the absolute 
and relative price of wheat. 
It is virtually impossible to estimate the supply 
equation for wheat by aggregate time series data and the usual 
statistical methods. There exists little variation in the 
price of wheat over time because wheat prices are controlled 
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by the government, and have been kept almost constant for 
the past decade. Furthermore, the published data on 
domestic wheat acreage, output, and prices received by the 
producers are at best inaccurate, and at worst nonexistent.^ 
To try to derive the supply equation for wheat as a function 
of prices by regression analysis is thus judged to be in-
feasible. 
Still, if the price of wheat were raised there would 
be an effect. What would this effect be? To answer this 
question, it was decided to interview a number of farmers 
in one part of the country and - confronting them with a 
hypothetical set of wheat prices - solicit their projected 
estimated "supply response". This method is not perfect 
and may be criticized as inaccurate or unreliable. To begin 
with - and this is the most important problem - farmers may 
behave differently when confronted with a given price situa­
tion in reality than when the same situation is depicted to 
them by mere words. Farmers do not usually decide on a 
course of action at a moment's notice. An important decision 
such as what to produce and by how much is usually reached 
after days and even weeks of contemplation as well as dis­
cussions with other farmers. This process of deliberation 
is particularly drawn out when a drastic change in the crop 
^(75, p. 301) where "areas under different crops", are 
listed. In the eleven year period between 1339-1350, the 
data is not available for wheat in seven years. 
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routine is contemplated. A farmer who has for many years 
grown a particular combination of wheat and cotton does in­
deed think about many things besides an increase in the price 
of wheat, when he is contemplating an increase in wheat 
acreage. Caution is especially likely by the poor farmers 
for whom a bad judgment may be tantamount to financial ruin 
and starvation. 
Secondly, projected survey responses acquired by inter­
views are at best rough estimates. The sample is small and 
there is much variation among farmers. Several efforts were 
made, however, to increase the accuracy of farmers' esti­
mates. Every farmer - the village farmers in a group and 
the commercial farmers on an individual basis - were given 
ample time to discuss and analyze different aspects of the 
hypothetical situation before giving an answer. The village 
farmers - who were interviewed in numbers ranging from 5 to 
20 - were encouraged to talk things over among themselves 
in detail before responding to each question. Of course 
these techniques were time consuming and since research 
time was limited, the total number of farmers who could be 
interviewed was not as large as one might have liked. 
Thirdly, only the more willing and articulate farmers 
could be interviewed. Occasionally one would confront a 
farmer who did not wish to be interviewed. Mors often, in 
the village interviews, the responses of a few more articulate 
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farmers seemed to influence other farmers' responses. It could 
be said that the more articulate farmers respond more quickly 
to price changes, and thus the price responses gathered by 
these interviews may be biased. There is, however, no simple 
way to avoid this problem. 
In the final analysis, however, the interviews proved 
very fruitful and much more satisfactory than at first imagined. 
By direct conversation with farmers many problems in supply 
response were discussed and clarified, which could hardly 
have been recognized by studying even good secondary data. 
The Secondary Objectives of 
the Interviews 
While the primary motive for the interviews was to ac­
quire an estimate of the farmers' reactions to wheat price 
variations, a considerable amount of other information was 
also gathered by these interviews= The general purposes of 
the interviews may now be summarized as follows: 
1. To estimate the absolute and relative production 
responses of the farmers to increases in the price 
of wheat. 
2. To compare these responses and determine the effect 
- if any - of the type of the farm operation and 
its size (i.e. commercial vs. the village farms), 
upon the price responsiveness of the farmers= 
3. To understand the present production economics of 
agriculture in this area. This includes gathering 
information on the present crop pattern, yields, and 
production techniques. It also includes questioning 
the farmers on the limiting resources, such as water, 
credit, labor, etc. 
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The Area of the Study 
The area covered by this study is known as "Gorgan va 
Dasht".^ Its area is about 23,614 square kilometers, located 
in the northeastern part of Iran. It is bounded on the north 
by the U.S.S.R., on the west by the Caspian Sea, on the east 
by the Khorasan province, and on the south by the Alborz 
mountains. 
Though its size is only l/69th of the total area of the 
country, Gorgan and Dasht produces a much larger proportion 
of the country's total farm products. It produces more than 
60% of the country's cotton (53, Table 1), and it is a major 
producer of wheat, barley, soybean, sunflower, tobacco, 
and rice. This region is without a doubt the most techno­
logically progressive agricultural area in Iran. Wheat and 
barley production is almost totally mechanized (with the 
exception of some small village farms). Tractors are used 
for planting in nearly all farms, irrigation is often 
with the help of pumps and tube wells, and wheat is harvested 
2 by combine harvesters. Fertilizer is used in larger 
quantities per hectare than in other parts of the country. 
^Meaning Gorgan and its plain. 
2 
It is still more profitable to harvest cotton by hand. 
Cotton harvesters are very expensive whereas labor is quite 
cheap. At the peak of the harvest season - when wage rates 
are at their highest level - in 1352, the wage rate was 150 
Rials per day in this area ($2.20). 
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Higher yields are achieved by farmers in Gorgan and the plane 
region than in any other part of the country. The area 
selected for this study, therefore, is very significant in 
Iran's agriculture, but is not "average" or typical. Thus 
the response to price increases may be greater in this region 
than elsewhere in the country. 
This region was divided into five subregions, according 
to their soil types and the present - as well as potential 
use to which these soils are - or may be put. 
Each of these "subregions" are represented in our survey 
by at least five "commercial" farms and three "villages". 
These terms are used frequently in this study and have 
specific meanings (see Appendix d). 
The sampling procedure 
For each of the five subregions, the following procedure 
was used to obtain a representative sample of the farmers 
to be interviewed. A detailed map of each subregion had to 
be obtained. These maps contain the names of all villages 
in the region as well as the names of the large farmers of 
the area.^ These names were written on pieces of paper and 
^These maps show the ownership of the farm lands. Thus 
if a particular piece of land belongs to the village X, this 
is indicated on the map. Similarly, the land belonging to 
individual farmers (large farmers, of course) are listed on 
the map, under the owner's name. 
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placed in two containers, one holding the village names and 
the other containing the names of the large farmers in the 
area. 
From the container with the village names, six names 
were drawn one by one. the first three were the villages 
which were to be interviewed. The other three villages were 
designated as "alternates", to be interviewed if interviews 
in any one of the first three villages proved impossible. 
Similarly, ten names were drawn from the container 
holding the commercial farmers' names. The first five to 
be interviewed, and the second five as alternates. 
The Farm Problems^ 
A principal objective of the interviews, was to provide 
an understanding of the economics of the farms operated by 
this area's farmers. The farmers were asked to discuss the 
problems, or obstacles, which they considered particularly 
crucial to their operation. By implication, they mentioned 
what they thought prevented them from accomplishing their 
objectives. 
Ranking the problems proved to be difficult. The large 
farmers were interviewed one at a time and listed their prob= 
The word "problem" is used to convey a specific meaning. 
In particular, a condition is considered a problem, if it 
limits the production activity of the farmers. 
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lems without ambiguity. The small village farmers who were 
interviewed as a group, had several reasons for differences 
of opinions about the ranking of various problems. Naturally 
some purely personal differences which exist, among the 
members of any group, was present here, which made ranking 
of the problems difficult. More importantly, however, the 
technical problems actually faced by farmers in a single 
village were not uniform. Sometimes, for instance, half 
the villagers considered the shortage of water as the most 
pressing problem, while the other half actually possessed 
water rights from the nearby river and disagreed. To by­
pass such problems, the following definition was adopted. 
A problem was defined to be "prevalent" in a village if 
it affected a majority of the farmers in the village. Table 
5 presents the findings of the survey with respect to the 
percentage of the commercial farmers and villages who said 
each of the six conditions were serious farm problems for 
them. ^ 
In the next four chapters, the more important problems 
listed in Table 5 will be discussed. It may be noted in 
^It must be mentioned that the villagers - and for that 
matter even the commercial farmers - refused to discuss any 
problem which could be considered "political". Thus problems 
such as widely unequal distribution of land, possession of 
water rights, etc. were not discussed. 
Table 5. Percentage of commercial farms and villages in which each of the 6 problems were 
reported as prevalent^ 
Availability and 
price of 
Improved Seed, 
Fertilizer and 
Insecticides 
Commercial 68% 20% 88% 96% 36% 20% 
Village 70% 95% 20% 100% 50% 45% 
^The above table should be read as follows: e.g. 88% of the commercial farmers interviewed 
considered labor shortage (at peajc seasons) as a serious problem for their operation at the 
present time, while only in 20% of the villages in which interviews were conducted this was 
considered a pressing problem. 
Shortage Avall^ility 
Type of Insufficient Insufficient of Marketing erms 
Farmers Hater Credit Labor Problems 
Machinery 
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passing, that - as Table 5 shows - the village farmers seem to 
face more problems than the commercial farmers. As judged by 
their own statements, all of the problems except the "shortage 
of labor" are more prevalent among the village farmers than 
their large, commercial counterparts. 
Before discussing the extent and significance of the 
problems listed in Table 5, it may be useful to discuss the 
one problem which is a reflection of all of the problems 
to be discussed later; that of the low yield of various crops. 
Yields 
Though the average yields for most crops are higher 
in Gorgan and the plain than in other parts of Iran, they 
are still quite low relative to the "potential" yields of 
the land. Furthermore, the low "average" yield in this 
region is subject to wide variation which cannot be wholly 
attributed to variation in the quality o£ the land, or the 
variation in the climate, or any other physiological or 
biological factors. It is not unusual to find two farms, 
with similar soil types, to give widely different yields. 
The factors accounting for such variations in the yields from 
two farms, with similar soil properties, are the level of 
technology applied to the farm, fertilizer use, application 
of insecticides and adequate irrigation facilities or 
practice, just to name the more obvious ones. Table 7 
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Table 6. Actual yields of major crops in Gorgan and the 
plain in 1973 and comparison with "potential" 
yields of this region, and average yield in Iran 
and "similar countries" (tons/Ha.)^ 
Crops 
Present 
Yield 
(Gorgan) 
Potential 
Yield 
(Gorgan) 
Average 
Yield 
(All Iran) 
An Average 
of Good 
Yields 
in Similar 
countries 
Cotton 1.64 3.5 0.61 4.0 
Wheat 1.5 4.0 0.65 5.5 
Barley 0.92 3.0 0.58 4.0 
Rice 2.42 4.0 2.5 5.5 
Oil Seed 0.74 2.5 0.7 4.0 
Tobacco 1.6 1.8 1.2 2.0 
Source; For all columns except column 3, see (58, 
Vol. 1, p. 9, Table 3). For column 3, ses Chapter 1, p. 4, 
herein. 
suirinarizes the data gathered on yields of the most important 
crops in this region, cotton and wheat. 
Table 7 indicates the significant range of yields which 
exist between farms, of the same type, in the same soil 
area. The difference between the lowest and the highest 
yields are indeed large. This is partly due to variation 
in soil within a classification of the "soil types", and 
partly to the differences in farming methods, water avail­
ability and application, and the level of technology used, 
in various farms in the same subregion. While the soil 
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Table 7. Average yields of cotton and wheat in various subregions of 
Gargan and the plain, and variation in yields in each sub-
region® 
Area 
Type 
of Wheat yields tons/ha. Cotton yields tons/ha. 
Farm Lowest Highest Average Lowest Highest Average 
Commercial 1.8 2.4 2.1 1.8 3.0 2.3 
X 
Village 1.1 2.3 1.9 1.3 2.6 1.9 
II 
Commercial 
Village 
1.3 
0.8 
2.8 
2.3 
2.2 
1.6 
1.4 
0.5 
2.8 
2.5 
2.1 
1.6 
III 
Commercial 
village 
1.8 
1.0 
4.3 
2.6 
2,6 
2.0 
1.3 
0.6 
3.8 
2.4 
2.5 
1.7 
IV 
Commercial 
Village 
1.5 
1.6 
3.8 
2.8 
2.5 
2.1 
1.6 
0.8 
2.6 
2.1 
2.3 
1.6 
V 
Commercial 0.6 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.1 
Village 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.5 1.2 0.8 
^Source: Farm interviews. 
properties are quite uniform within a given subregion, the 
amount of water available in each farm need not be the same. 
This is the most important reason for the observed yield 
differences between various farms of the same "type" in each 
subregion. Other, secondary, factors accounting for such 
yield variations include the farmers judgments and abilities 
to use fertilizers, insecticides, land improvements, etc. 
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Table 7 also reveals another significant point. The 
yields of the commercial farms, for both crops and for all 
subregions/ are consistently larger than the yields asso­
ciated with the village farms. The differences in yields 
between the commercial and the village farms are indeed 
statistically significant. 
An analysis of variance was conducted to test the statis­
tical significance of the observed yield differences between 
the commercial and village farms.^ The hypotheses to be 
tested were "there is no significant difference between the 
yields for wheat (or cotton) derived from the commercial and 
the village farms". For cotton the t value derived was 
2.498. The "critical value" of t for a = .025 is t = 2.36.^ 
Thus the above hypothesis is rejected at .025 level of sig­
nificance. Thus it may be concluded that there is a strong 
evidence suggesting that the yields of cotton received by 
commercial farmers is larger than the yields received by 
village farmers, using similar farm lands. 
A similar test was conducted for wheat yields. The 
multiple regression was run with the yields as the 
independent variable, and using a system of "coding" to sepa­
rate the "area effects" and the effects of the "farm types". 
^With n = 44, k = 10, we have n-k = 34 degrees of free­
dom. The t value for 34 degrees of freedom is t = 2.36 for 
a = .025. 
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t value derived was t = 1.867. The "critical value" of t 
for a = 0.1 is t = 1.697.^ Thus the above hypothesis is 
rejected at 10% level of significance. Thus what we said 
in regard to cotton yields may be repeated - though less 
strongly - for wheat yields as well. 
The fact that yield differences between the commercial 
as opposed to the village farms are more pronounced in case 
of cotton than wheat, has a simple explanation. 
A commercial farmer is, by and large, a profit maxi-
mizer. In deciding "what to produce" he considers such 
factors as the costs of the inputs, the expected yields and 
the price he expects to receive for each crop. If cotton 
production seems to be the most renumerative enterprise, he 
will devote his land to cotton, that is of course if the 
land is suitable for cotton production. 
During the last few years, price of cotton has increased 
tremendously. In 1352, cotton prices in Gorgan was twice 
that in 1348. The price of wheat, on the other hand, being 
government controlled, remained virtually constant. An in­
creasing number of farmers switched to cotton production. 
The price of cotton relative to that of wheat was so at-
^With n = 40, k = 10, the degree of freedom is 30. The 
t value listed in the "tables" for a = .1 is t = 1.697. 
2 Price received by farmers who sold their crop at har­
vest time. 
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tractive that nearly every commercial farmer who had a land 
suitable for cotton production devoted his land entirely to 
cotton. Only the lower quality farm lands - which were ut­
terly unsuitable for cotton production, were used for wheat. 
This explains the relatively low yields of wheat associated 
with the commercial farms. 
The situation is totally different for small, village 
farmers. Most of the small farmers grow some wheat. In many 
cases this is contrary to the objective of profit maximiza­
tion, as the lands used for wheat could be devoted to cotton 
production and yield higher returns. Thus on the basis of 
"profit maximization", it makes no sense for each village 
farmer to use part of his land for wheat production. 
Nevertheless, considering the prevailing conditions in 
the rural areas, the village farmers' decisions has a logical 
basis. The small farmers don't feel "secure" with cash 
crops. Traditionally, they have grown their food supplies 
on their land and marketed only what was left. If there was 
no market for wheat in some years, the surplus grains were 
stored and consumed - or sold - the next year. The absence 
of a buyer meant only that the farmer would have to abstain 
from purchasing such items as cloth, watches, bicycles, or 
anything that must be purchased with cash. It would not, 
however, mean starvation. 
With cotton, the farmer does not have any such assurance 
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against starvation. "I cannot eat cotton", a farmer asserted 
when asked why he is growing one hectare of wheat on a land 
which could give him two or three times as much profit if 
devoted to cotton. "I always grow one hectare of wheat for 
my family's consumption, the other 3 hectares I use for cotton 
and barley", he explained.^ 
The fact that the village farmers receive a relatively 
large yield for their wheat can be explained by the fact that 
they do not grow their wheat on the lowest quality land. When 
a majority of small farmers use a portion of their small 
holding to grow wheat, then considering the village as a unit, 
it cannot be maintained that the lower quality land in the vil­
lage is used for wheat production, even if each farmer uses his 
worst piece of land for wheat. Thus there is a difference in 
the quality of the land used for wheat production by the vil­
lage farmers and the commercial farmers. 
Therefore, while the yields for both crops are higher in 
the commercial farms than in the small, village farms, the 
This phenomenon has a number of significant implications. 
The fact that each small village farmer will grow some wheat, 
regardless of its price and the price of other crops, indi­
cates that - at least in the villages - there is a minimum 
amount of land devoted to wheat production. The supply curve 
for wheat is so to say, totally price inelastic at some level 
of wheat output. It must be noted, however, that this is only 
true so long as the present "fear and uncertainty" of the 
village farmers, in respect to an available market, continues. 
If they are assured of a reasonable price for other crops, as 
well as of a quantity of wheat that they could purchase for 
their consumption, the need for the present behavior disappears. 
36 
difference is greater in case of cotton than that of wheat. 
But the more important point, emphasized by Table 7, 
still remains; What are the factors accounting for the sig­
nificantly higher yields for both cotton and wheat, associated 
with commercial farms, as opposed to the small village farms? 
The most important factor enabling the large farmers to 
get larger yields from their lands is their greater financial 
ability. This enables them to improve the quality of their 
land by various means such as land leveling and drainage. 
They can afford to spend large sums of money on such re­
munerative projects as digging new wells and building drainage 
and irrigation channels. They usually possess the most 
modern farm equipment. They apply fertilizer and insecticides. 
They are also in a position to hire workers and supervisors = 
in sufficient numbers - to perform various farm tasks whenever 
these tasks need to be performed.^ They also sell their crops 
at higher prices than the small village farmers. All of 
these have a positive impact on the efficiency of the land use 
and thus raise the yields. 
^In the past few years, it has become increasingly diffi­
cult to find temporary farm workers at the prevailing wage 
rate. This point will be discussed below. Furthermore, the 
above argument should not be taken to mean that the commercial 
farmers are perfectly efficient and that every large or medium 
size farmer actually does all of the things mentioned above. 
What is important is the relative efficiency, and the relative 
ease with which commercial farmers - as compared with small 
farmers - can and do - undertake these yield increasing steps. 
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In contrast, the small village farmer is in no position 
to take most of the above mentioned, yield increasing steps 
in his farming. The village farmer is by definition a small 
farmer and almost invariably quite poor. Not only is he 
unable to obtain credit to spend the sums necessary for the 
yield increasing projects mentioned above, it is not even 
economically feasible for him to do so. 
Digging wells, constructing irrigation canals, purchasing 
tractors and combines, all represent examples of yield in­
creasing projects which are large scale and beyond the fi­
nancial resources of any individual small farmer. Further­
more these projects are lumpy or indivisible and so costly 
that - in view of the small size of the farms - are by no 
means profitable for any single small farmer. The village 
as a whole could, of course, afford to undertake large invest­
ment projects, and this would undoubtedly prove profitable 
for all of the farmers. Such joint ventures, however, are al­
most nonexistent in this region. 
In the villages where a source of water exists (a river, 
or ghanat, or a well dug by the government or the villagers 
themselves), each farmer gets a share of the water for his 
land. Nearly in all cases this is not sufficient for high 
yield irrigated farming. Most of the village farms, there­
fore, are faced with a chronic shortage of water. 
As for tractors or combines, the small farmers either do 
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without them or rent them. In either case the crop yields are 
affected negatively. Some of the small village farmers still 
use the centuries old animal drawn plows. Aside from the 
enormous amount of manpower which is required by this method 
of plowing, the quality of such tilling is poor. The culti­
vation is shallow, the land is not turned and seeds are not 
well covered. Since only the surface of the earth is tilled, 
the roots have little room for activity. 
Renting tractors is also prevalent. But those who rent 
tractors must usually wait until the owners of the tractors 
have finished plowing their own lands. In some cases this 
means plowing the land quite late in the season which may de­
lay the planting operation and reduce yields for the small 
farmers. 
Though fertilizers, insecticides, and pesticides are used 
by soïTiê of the siTiall village farmers, the extent of their use 
are quite limited. These "supplementary farm inputs" are 
rather expensive and a large number of the small village 
farmers cannot afford to purchase them. As it will be dis­
cussed in a later chapter, a majority of these village farmers 
lack the financial means to support their families for a full 
year, after having put aside a sum for the most essential 
costs of their farm operation. Not having access to other 
sources of credit, they are forced into selling their crops 
long before the harvest season - at a large discount - to make 
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ends meet. As it will be shown in another chapter, the ef­
fective rate of interest paid by these farmers frequently 
exceed 200% a year. Obviously there are very few cases where 
the use of "supplementary inputs" can increase the productiv­
ity of the farm enough to warrant paying the full costs of 
inputs including the cost of borrowing at such rates of 
1 
interest. The large commercial farmers can borrow money 
much more cheaply - from 8-15% rate of interest - and have much 
more incentive to use these supplementary inputs and thus 
receive higher yields. 
Finally, it must be noted that the village farmer has 
less incentive to increase the efficiency of his farm than a 
commercial farmer. Due to the prevalent "green selling" among 
the small village farmers, the actual price received by the 
farmers is invariably lower for the village farmers than 
2 that received by the commercial farmers. Surely such 
high input costs and low output prices are negative incentives 
which reduce the village farmers' efficiency in production. 
This input-output price ratio is yet another factor causing 
the observed yield differences between the "village" and 
"commercial" farms. 
1(81, pp. 162-174). Schultz discusses other reasons for 
the reluctance of "traditional" farmers to use modern farm 
inputs. 
2 See Chapter III on credit problems. 
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The preceding discussions have several important price 
policy implications. The low relative price of wheat - which 
is the consequence of the government policy - has probably 
caused a reduction in the yields of both wheat and cotton. 
Because of high relative profitability of cotton a large amount 
of land not highly suitable for cotton production is sown to 
cotton. The cotton price provides a return sufficiently large 
to make cotton profitable relative to wheat even with low 
yield for cotton. It seems likely that an increase in the 
price of wheat will bring wheat into more competition with 
cotton. Low yielding cotton will be replaced by wheat and 
this will increase the yields for both wheat and cotton. 
Perhaps more important than the yield increase from 
wheat price increases is the credit and price policies implied 
by the large yield differences between the large and the small 
farmers. Substantial yield increases are possible on the 
small farms if they are supplied with "supplementary" farm 
inputs, more and cheaper credit, etc. These points will be 
further elaborated in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER III. THE CREDIT SITUATION 
The distinction between a "commercial" and a "village" 
farmer is most pertinent in the availability and terms of farm 
credit. The commercial farmers require larger amounts of 
credit, acquire it from different sources, and by and large 
for different purposes, than is» the case for the small 
village farmers. It is thus necessary to discuss the credit 
problems of these two types of farmers separately. 
Beside simplifying the problems, this two-fold analysis 
of credit has other advantages as well. It reveals the weak­
nesses, as well as the strength, of the Iranian credit system 
more accurately. For, as it will be shown in this chapter, 
the effectiveness of the present credit system is much greater 
for the commercial farmers than for the small village 
farmers. Furthermore, this type of analysis will identify 
the areas where improvements are most urgently needed, thus 
helping te set credit improvement priorities. 
The Commercial Farmer 
"Everyone in this area can remember a time when all 
farmers or nearly all of them had to sell their crops "green" 
thus sharing a part of their profits with the merchants. 
-"Green" selling means sailing the crops before it is 
harvested. See "green transactions" below, pp. 50-57. 
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Things are quite different today." This statement was made 
by the president of a large commercial bank in Gorgan, who 
has been observing the farmers' financial activities in this 
area for a long time. His assertions were corroborated by 
many other people, some of them fanners themselves, as well 
as by this writer's personal observations.^ Of some 30 com­
mercial farmers interviewed for this study, only two had sold 
their crops "green" last year (1352), and they both admitted 
that they were motivated to make the "green" deal more by an 
inclination to avoid the risk of large price declines than by 
an urgent need for production or consumption credit, which 
2 is the primary motive in green selling by the small farmers. 
The significance of the above statement is tremendous. 
Selling green is a transaction which is usually very profitable 
to the green buyer, and one a farmer likes to avoid if at all 
Probably not all corsnsrcial farmers in Iran are this well 
off. In other parts of the country, where land is not as pro­
ductive, I was told, even large farmers are forced to sell 
green. Nevertheless, I believe that in all parts of the 
country, the large farmers have better access to credit and 
much less need to sell green than their smaller, village 
counterparts. 
2 In nearly all cases, a farmer sells green to acquire 
credit. In some cases, however, a farmer may find "future 
prices" attractive and sell prior to harvest time to assure 
himself of a reasonable profit. As will be cleared below, 
however, this has very little similarity with the great 
bulk of green selling undertaken by the poor farmers. The 
large farmer may sell green to avoid risk in exceptionally 
uncertain years, while the small farmer sells green to acquire 
credit. 
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possible. Green selling is resorted to when all other at­
tempts at finding credit have failed. Thus while the absence 
of green selling does not indicate a platora of credit avail­
able to the commercial farmers, it nevertheless signifies that 
alternative sources of credit, more desirable than green 
selling, are available to commercial farmers. What are 
these options? 
A commercial farmer in need of credit has a number of 
sources of credit to which he can apply for loans. These 
sources are: 
a. The Agricultural Development Fund of Iran 
b. The Commercial Banking system 
c. The Agricultural Cooperative Bank 
d. The private money lenders 
e. The green buyers 
These are briefly described below; 
a. The Agricultural Development Fund of Iran (ADFI); 
This is a government owned corporation, set up in 1968 to 
help finance large agricultural investment projects of the 
private sector. The minimum amount of a loan extended by 
the fund was set at Rls. 5 million (roughly $70,000). This 
is a large amount by any standard. In practice, however. 
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the loans extended by the ADFI were much larger.^ Lately, 
for a variety of reasons, the minimum amount of a loan has 
been drastically reduced. The fund now extends loans of as 
little as Rls. 50,000 ($9000). Thus while in the early years 
of its operations, the ADFI was of help to only very large 
2 3 farmers, ' presently its services can be used by nearly all 
farmers of "commercial" type. 
To quality for these loans, the farmer must present col­
lateral (usually land) of a value at least equal to the amount 
of the loan, as well as a plan for use of the loan. The 
interest charged is 8% with a long term repaying schedule and 
varying grace periods. An increasing number of commercial 
farmers are using this "bank" as a source of long term credit, 
partly because the interest rate is 8% and the deferred payment 
^During the first three years of its operation (1347-
1349), the fund extended 50 loans totalling Rls. 1208.3 mil­
lion, Thus an average loan amounted to Rls. 20.4 million or 
$300,000. In the year 1350, the average loan of the fund 
decreased, but not significantly. It amounted to Rls. 19.77 
million, equivalent to roughly $290,000. See (12, p. 58 and 
13, p. 42). 
2 
- Some of the early recipients of these loans may be 
better described as industrialists or merchants, because of 
their proportionately large nonfarm activities, even though 
among their enterprises were included large farms. 
3_ 
The minimum size of a loan extended by the fund is set at 
Rls. 2,000,000. But this is only a technical limit. The fund 
now extends loans of as little as Rls. 500,000. These smaller 
loans, however; are extended through Bank Melli Iran, though 
the decisions are made by the ADFI's officials. 
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opportunities are generous and valuable.^ The only short­
coming of the ADPI as a source of long term credit to large 
commercial farmers/ is the fact that available funds are not 
sufficient to satisfy their needs. In the year 1350, for 
example, only 6.5% of the total "institutional" credit going 
2 
to the agricultural sector, came from the ADFI. 
b. The Commercial Banks; In recent years commercial 
banks have mushroomed everywhere in Iran. The number of 
bank branches increased by more than five times between 1964 
and 1972, and continues to increase. In Gorgan area I counted 
14 different banks, some with numerous branches. None of 
these banks, however - with the exception of the government 
owned agricultural cooperative bank - have any special pro-
3 
visions for lending to the farmers. The farmer is treated 
exactly as other bank customers. In other words, there are 
no "farm loans" as such. To boErOW money, the farmer, like 
any other applicant, must meet the bank's requirement. 
"Last year, 1973, when the ADPI was charging 8% interest 
on its loans, the Commercial Banks' rate was 12%, and private 
money lenders' rate was much higher. This has induced many 
wealthy urbanités to borrow from the ADFI and engage in large 
scale farming or livestock (or poultry) operations. 
^This figure was calculated from (13, p. 42 and 5, p. 8). 
^The Bank Melli Iran, a government institution and the 
largest commercial bank in Iran, participates in the ADFI and 
operates in its behalf. But this could not be considered Bank 
Melli's policy because all the decisions for granting the loans 
are made by the ADFI and not by Bank Melli officials. 
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Generally, these requirements include: 
a. having an account with the bank 
b. having a net worth substantially higher (3 or 4 
times larger) than the amount of the loan requested 
c. having a reputable merchant, or a "good credit risk" 
bank customer as a co-signer. 
Stringent as these conditions may be, a commercial farmer 
usually has no problems satisfying them. A commercial farmer 
in Gorgan is usually a bank customer. He has many friends, 
merchants or other farmers, etc. - eligible and willing to 
co-sign a loan for him.^ Finally, being a large farmer, he 
usually has enough assets to serve as security for a loan to 
operate or improve his farm. 
Thus it may be concluded that a commercial farmer in 
Gorgan could, in nearly all cases, borrow all of his short 
term credit needs from the commercial banks in his area. With 
his credit needs satisfied, the commercial farmer chooses not 
to sell his crops green, and thus receive a higher total value 
for his crops. Only those without access to cheaper sources 
of credit are forced to sell green or pay the exorbitant 
interest rates of the money lender or the green buyer. In this 
area, rarely a commercial famer needs to seek other short 
term credit sources than the commercial banks or the ADFI. 
1 
He, in turn, is eligible and willing to co-sign loans 
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It must be emphasized that the present stage of relative 
abundance of short term credits for commercial farmers in 
Gorgan is a recent development. More than 90 percent of the 
commercial farmers interviewed asserted that they were forced 
to sell green, or borrow from private money lenders, as recent­
ly as four or five years ago. None of the farmers in this list 
felt that they are forced to seek nonbank credits anymore. 
If they do sell green now, it is not because they are in need 
of credit. It seems some commercial farmers sell green because 
they find the "green" sell rate higher than their own subjective 
price and yield expectation and desire to take advantage of it.^ 
^What is said above should not be taken to mean that all 
is well as far as the credit situation of the commercial 
farmers is concerned. Undoubtedly there are many commercial 
farmers who do not receive credit in the amount-or the terms-
they consider desirable. Moreover- and this point cannot be 
over-emphasized-our discussion above is only with regard to 
short term credit, money borrowed for current farm operations 
and repaid at harvest time. All we are saying is that this 
type of credit.- which waa previously furnished by the private 
money lenders or the green buyer, is now provided by the com­
mercial banking system, at lower rates of interest. The ex­
panding banking system, thus, has replaced with more adequate 
and lower cost loans, those former lending institutions, and 
so far as the farmers in our samples are concerned, this re­
placement has been more or less complete. The significance of 
this development can be appreciated by observing the situation 
of the village farmer, for whom such replacement has not 
occurred. 
Now the long term credit needs of a commercial farmer is 
an entirely different matter. Commercial banks, as was msn?= 
tioned before, do not make "farm loans" as such. Thus a farmer 
cannoê rely on the commercial banks to borrow for an irrigation 
project which requires huge amounts of capital and takes many 
years to construct. For such purposes, about the only "institu­
tional" source of credit available to a .large farmer is the 
ADFI. Limited as the ADFI's funds definitely are, many farmers 
may have to borrow from private lenders, or more likely, forget 
about the project altogether. 
48 
c. The Agricultural Cooperative Bank of Iran; This is 
a government institution, set up to make loans of various 
duration to farmers.^ The loans are made either directly to 
the farmers or are given to the rural cooperatives, which in 
turn lend the money to the village farmers. The loans may 
be short term (annual), intermediate (up to six years) or 
long term (up to 15 years). The interest charge is 6% on 
all loans, plus an additional fee of 1% for the first year 
only. To qualify for the loans, the farmer must either put 
up collateral or an acceptable co-signer. 
Clearly, most commercial farmers easily qualify for the 
loans of the Agricultural Bank of Iran. Few of them, however, 
take advantage of this opportunity. There are a number of 
reasons for the reluctance of the commercial farmers to use 
this source of credit. 
To begin with, the loans extended by the Agricultural 
Cooperative Bank of Iran are too small to interest most com-
^The origin of this bank dates back to the year 1309, 
when it started as a part of the Bank Melli Iran (National 
Bank of Iran). In 1312 "The Agricultural and Industrial Bank 
of Iran" was set up as an independent government bank. This 
bank may be considered the parent of the present Agricultural 
Cooperative Bank of Iran. Since 1312 this bank has changed 
its name 5 times, the last one in 1349. 
^In the year 1971, roughly 67 percent of the loans ex­
tended by the Agricultural Cooperative Bank of Iran went to 
the village cooperatives. The village cooperatives lend this 
money to their members, i.e. village farmers. Thus only 
33 percent of the ACBI's lending funds are available for non-
cooperative member farmers, including commercial farmers (13, 
p. 41). 
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mercial farmers.^ While the bank does occasionally lend large 
sums of money/ this is the exception, rather than the rule. 
Furthermore, as we mentioned before, the short term credit 
needs of the commercial farmers are satisfied by the com­
mercial banking system, which operates with far less 
bureaucracy than the ACBI. Only to acquire long - or medium-
term credit does a commercial farmer have any reason to go to 
the Agricultural Bank. Yet that does not seem to be happen­
ing either. Roughly 99 percent of the people who borrowed 
money from the ACBI received loans of less than Rls. 100,000 
or $1470 (11/ pp. 126-127). Thus nearly all the borrowers 
were village farmers or small commercial farmers. Very few 
large commercial farmers would go through the bureaucratic 
channels of the Agricultural Bank to borrow such relatively 
small amounts of money. 
We may therefore conclude that while a commercial farmer 
rarely borrows from the ACBI, he nevertheless is in a posi­
tion to do so. 
A commercial farmer, having exhausted all of the above 
mentioned possibilities for acquiring credit,- and still needing 
more, can obtain funds through green selling or borrowing from 
^During the five years from 1340 to 1345, the banks 
loans averaged about $159.00 (66, p. 91). Presently, the 
average size of the loan is higher than this, but not high 
enough to interest eoramercial farmers in general. 
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private money lenders. In either case, the effective rate of 
interest he must pay depends upon the size of his farm - or 
more generally upon his overall wealth. The larger his 
holdings of various assets, the less the interest rate charged 
by the money lenders and the higher the price of his "green" 
crops. 
In addition to these sources of credit, commercial farmers 
usually obtain credit from the machinery dealers. This source 
of credit is totally absent for the small farmers. 
The Village Farmer 
Green selling, while practically a thing of the past 
for the large farmer, is still a viable institution in the 
villages. With very few exceptions, green transactions 
were being carried out - in varying degrees - in every village 
I visited last year. Though not every small farmer is forced 
to sell his crops green every year, the vast majority of 
village farmers do sell green more often than not. 
What is green selling? 
Green selling - or salaf as it is locally called - means 
selling the crop before it is harvested,- at a discount." 
^Sometimes the crop is sold even before it is planted. In 
that case, of course, the price of the crop is accordingly 
lower. In general one can assert that, other things being 
equal, the earlier the deal is made, the lower the price of the 
crop, or to say it another way, the higher the discount in 
question. 
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Despite its superficial similarity with the concept of "future 
transactions" prevalent in the United States, green selling 
is an entirely different phenomenon. This will become clear 
later on as the nature of green transactions is discussed. 
While there exists several types of "green" transactions, 
the major feature of all of them are more or less the same. 
Below a variant of green transaction prevalent in the area of 
this study will be discussed. 
The farmer in need of credit finds a prospective green 
buyer, usually a merchant« They sign a contract according to 
which the farmer is bound to deliver a sperific quantity of 
the crop (of a specific quality) during the harvest season. 
The farmer, in return for his pledge of future delivery, re­
ceives the price of his crop presently.~ 
The buyer, as a hedge against unforeseen circumstances -
such as poor crops, death of the farmer, or his unwillingness 
to deliver for any reason - asks for a check from the farmer. 
The amount of the check is equal to the money received by the 
farmer as well as an additional sum to cover interest, risk, 
etc. For instance, let us suppose that the price of "green" 
cotton agreed upon in June is $250/ton. Upon the signing of 
the agreement the farmer receives this price for every ton of 
cotton he promised to deliver. At the same time he gives the 
^How this price is determined will be discussed below. 
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buyer a check - dated several months hence - for $300/ton. 
Now come harvest time, the price of cotton most probably 
will be different than what both parties had predicted. What­
ever the price of cotton however, both parties have a legal 
right to ignore the original agreement about crop delivery 
and consider the check as the real issue in question. To use 
our previous example, suppose the price of cotton at harvest 
time rises to $350/ton. In that case the farmer stands to 
gain by abstaining from delivering his crop. The buyer in 
that case,- unhappy as he may be, will cash the farmer's check 
and thus receive his "loan" back with an interest. Conversely, 
should the price of cotton drop appreciably below that en­
visaged by the buyer (say to $250/ton), he can refuse the crop 
and simply cash the farmer's check he holds in his vault. 
It must be mentioned that a® an "unwritten law", both 
parties are expected to abide by their original pledges. 
This means that it is "expected" of the farmer to deliver his 
crop, and of the buyer to accept it no matter what the price 
happens to be at harvest time. Altering one's word, legal as 
it may be, is not good business practice= But as it is the 
case for all such unwritten laws in business dealings, once 
the financial rewards are sufficiently high, they are simply 
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ignored.^ It is therefore safe to assume that the difference 
between the amount of money received by the farmer when he 
sells green, and the amount for which he writes a check, 
represents the "interest" on the "loan". 
This is a very important point. By observing a few of 
these "green" contracts, one can get an estimate of the rate of 
interest paid by the small farmer on his "loans". This is 
what was done in this study. Many farmers who had sold green. 
^Another variant of green transaction differs at this very 
point with the above version. This variant is as follows: 
The buyer pays money to the farmer in return for his 
agreement to deliver a specific quantity of the crop (of a 
specific quality). There is no provision for a substitute 
payment, as was the case in the version discussed in the text. 
Obviously, in this type of "green" transaction the risk 
is higher. At the.same time, however, there is a possibility 
for huge profit for the buyer, and in a sense also for the 
seller. 
In general, green buyers engage in this type of green 
transaction only when future prospects are unusually bright. 
Thus in 1973, a year of rising prices, an extremely large 
volume of green transactions in Gorgan area was of this 
variant. The result was that the greer: buyers reaped huge 
profits. Two years before, a very small part of green trans­
actions were of this sort in the Gorgan area. 
2 It must be noted that in the transaction just described 
there is no risk to the buyer, simply because he has a hedge 
against extreme price declines. The least he can gain is 
the amount specified on the check. Thus the difference be­
tween the money paid to the farmer and the amount specified 
on the check is the minimum amount of interest charged. 
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as well as a few who were in the business of buying green, 
were interviewed. The rate of interest the farmers had to pay 
on these transactions ranged from exorbitant to shocking1 
Last year - the year 1973 - was a wild year for farm 
prices everywhere in the world. In that year the price of 
cotton increased by more than 140 percent. This was a year 
when the farmers did not deliver their crops and paid up their 
checks instead. Most of the people who could legally abstain 
from delivering did so, their "word" notwithstanding. But, 
of course,- as was mentioned before, this was also the year 
when "green" contracts were quite emphatic about crop delivery. 
No substitute was acceptable. The unsuspecting village farmer 
who could not - in his wildest dreams - have foreseen such 
high prices, had accepted the deal. In all likelihood the 
buyers themselves had not expected prices to go as far as they 
actually did. 
What was the result of all this? For farmers everywhere 
in the world, including commercial farmers in Gorgan area, 
this was a greatly rewarding year. For most of the village 
farmers in Gorgan area, however, it was a year full of regrets. 
Many or the village farmers interviewed had sold their cotton 
for $180/ton in June, only to see cotton prices rise to a 
staggering $540/ton at harvest time. Thus they had actually 
paid about 200% "interest" for a money they had kept only 
three months, making an interest rate of 800% a year! 
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Such cases are of course exceptions rather than the rule, 
reflecting an exceptionally volatile year for farm prices. 
What was turned out to be the norm, however, was not much 
more comforting. 
I was lucky enough to be confided in by a green buyer who, 
being a relatively small merchant, had most of his dealings 
with small farmers of the neighboring villages.^ He said that 
1 
Green buyers are usually merchants. They are actually 
the same people who buy the crops at harvest time as well. The 
size of their operations determines their business counter­
parts. Thus a small merchant deals with a small farmer, and 
a large merchant with large farmers. In general, one observes 
three types of green buyers in Gorgan area. 
a. The village bonakdar: In most villages there usually 
exists one or more of these local shopkeepers who act as green 
buyers and usurers as well. They sell their goods (sugar, tea, 
etc.) to the farmers on credit, to be paid back at harvest time. 
At the same time they also lend small amounts to farmers who 
need money - with interest of course - as well as buying "green" 
crops from the farmers. The interest charged by these bonakdars 
is exorbitant, to say the least. A rate of 200% is not unusual. 
Being politically influential at the village level, these 
people exert great power over the small farmers. Should a 
farmer fail to pay up his debt (or crop), his land is confis­
cated (see 29, pp. 382-383). 
b. The travelling green buyers and usurers: As the name 
implies, these people conduct their businesses by travelling 
from village to village. One could perhaps call it a mobile 
green buying unit. They arrive in a village in their jeeps or 
on their bikes, bringing a variety of goods needed by the 
farmers - groceries, household utensils, etc. - as well as some 
cash. These are then distributed to the villagers in need of 
cash or commodities. The farmer is thus indebted to these 
travelling peddlers. He may pay back his debt in cash - with 
interest = or in kind (that is his crops)= Just how the debt 
is repaid depends upon mutual agreement. In either case the 
farmer pays an interest rate in excess of 100%, sometimes even 
twice that. 
c. The city merchants: These are the most important group 
of green buyers. They operate on a larger scale and usually 
charge lower (footnote continued on following page) 
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early last summer he "plunged" into the market and bought 
"green" crops to the limits of his financial ability. Having 
sensed the future price increases to some extent, he had asked 
for a deal in which crops were to be delivered, and no substi­
tutes were accepted. Nevertheless he had also bought a great 
volume of "green" crop in the usual fashion (described earlier 
in the text). 
He bought cotton at $270/ton and asked for a check from 
the farmers. The amount of the check requested varied ac­
cording to the farmer's reputation, net worth, and the like. 
The rates, though by no means uniform, had definite limits. 
The following table is constructed on the basis of this 
merchant's deals during the year 1352. 
Minimum Rate Cotton bought ($270/ton) Effective rate 
Charged the best The amount of check re- of interest 
customers, i.e. large quested = $314/ton Yearly rate = 49% 
village fairmers, old 
customers, etc » 
Maximum Rate Cotton bought ($270/ton) Effective rate 
Charged the unknown. The amount of check re- of interest 
"average" village quested = $360/ton (4 months loan) 
farmer Yearly rate = 99% 
(Footnote continued from previous page) interest rates. Mem­
bers of this group range from small merchants = with one of 
whom I have interviewed, to super large merchant-exporters. 
These merchants, in addition to their own substantial funds, 
use bank credits to buy green crops from the farmers. They are 
also the ultimate buyers of the green crops bought by smaller 
green buyers. The village bonakdars, as well as the travelling 
buyers resell their crops to one of these merchants, receiving 
a fee for their services (29, pp. 382-387). 
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Between these two extremes, there was a great number of trans­
actions at "intermediate" rates of interest. 
A question that immediately comes to mind is this: Why 
does a village farmer sell his crops green, and thereby pays 
such exorbitant rates of interest? The answer is quite simple; 
he has no choice. He would not sell green if he were able to 
avoid it. He cannot avoid it because he has very few alterna­
tive sources of credit. Having failed to acquire the amount 
of money he needs in any other way, he resorts to green 
selling." To see this, let us briefly examine the alternatives 
open to a small village farmer when he needs credit. 
The Agricultural Development Fund or Iran (ADFI) can 
It must be noted that "not borrowing" is not an option 
open to the small farmers. Farming on a very small scale, his 
annual income is not very large. Out of this he must pay off 
previous loans, buy the necessary inputs for next year's 
crops, and pay for his family's living expenses. 
Nearly in all cases, his income does not stretch to the 
next harvest season. Since he must pay for the "production 
expenses" to assure himself of a means of livelihood, and 
since he must pay off old debts, or risk losing his land, he 
is left with a sum insufficient to support his family for a 
year. The need to borrow, therefore, is as urgent as the need 
to survive. 
It is well to remember that prior to the Land Reform, 
the credit needs of these village farmers (peasants) were sup­
plied by the landlord. The landlord furnished the seeds, 
water, fertilizer, etc. and also forwarded a sum to the peasant 
to enable him to make ends meet till the next harvest. 
With the land distribution program the farmer has lost 
this source of credit. Not only must he pay for the cost of 
production himself, he must also pay a part of his revenue as 
payments on the land he has bought from the landlord (41, p. 
13). With no landlord to forward him an advance, he must 
borrow from other sources, or sell his crops green. 
The farmer will reap the full benefits of his ownership 
of the land he farms, only if he is helped financially to the 
extent that he no longer is forced to borrow at usurious 
interest rates just to stay alive. 
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readily be eliminated as a supplier of credit to the village 
farmers. The small farmer's credit needs, in most cases, 
are not for well planned agricultural investments, and even 
if they were, they would not be large enough to interest the 
ADFI's officials.1 
Similarly, the commercial banking system - as it exists 
today in this area - may also be eliminated as an important 
source of credit for the village farmers. Recalling the 
requirements of these banks for extending a loan, it is im­
mediately realized that a villager has many difficulties in 
meeting them. Having his home in the village in which there 
is usually no bank, the village farmer has no account in any 
bank. Neither does he know a reputable bank customer or a 
merchant well enough to be able to furnish a co-signer for 
his loan. Thus the commercial banking system - so helpful 
to the commercial farmers in this area - is of very little 
2 help to the village farmers. 
Then there is the Agricultural Cooperative Bank of Iran, 
or its village representative, the Rural Cooperatives, which 
^Part of the money needed by the small farmer is for 
consumption purposes. Surely a village farmer cannot apply 
for such a loan to the ADFI! 
^In recent years Bank Saderat Iran, the largest privately 
owned commercial bank in Iran, has opened up branches in large 
villages and small towns. The extent of this bank's effective­
ness as a supplier of credit to the small farmers, however, 
is quite limited. 
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according to the government data exists in about half of the 
villages in Iran, and receive nearly all of their lending 
capital from the Agricultural Cooperative Bank of Iran.^ 
A great number of village farmers borrow from the Rural 
2 Cooperatives. They pay an interest of 6% a year on these 
loans. The greatest shortcoming of these loans are their 
small amount. The maximum amount of a loan extended by these 
cooperatives is specified at Rls. 20,000 (about $300). But 
the average loan is much less than that? a mere $93.0 per 
borrower in 1348 (43, Annex 10, p. 4). The loans are simply 
too small to keep the villagers away from the green buyers' 
doorsteps. In nearly every village in which interviews were 
conducted for this study, the complaint was the same? too 
much hassle for too small a sum. Though bureaucracy is less 
in the Rural Cooperatives than the ACBI's offices, many 
farmers admitted that they did not even bother to apply for a 
loan from the Cooperatives or the ACBI. They reasoned that 
even after all of their efforts to get the loan, the amount 
they would receive would not suffice for all of their expenses 
and they would have to go to the green buyers anyway. So 
•^In 1350, about 94% of the loans extended by the Rural 
Cooperatives came from the ACBI (13, pp. 41-42). 
2 
In 1350, about 47% of all members borrowed from their 
Rural Cooperatives (13, p. 42). 
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they just sold green and saved themselves the trouble!^ 
The small size of these loans, and the lengthy procedure 
that a farmer must go through to acquire it, is a serious 
problem. Any rural development policy which fails to provide 
for a substantial increase in the size of these loans (and of 
the total loanable funds as well) is bound to fail. As 
things stand presently, not only must a farmer have collateral 
or a co-signer in order to qualify for a loan from these gov­
ernment institutions, but he must spend a long time "going 
after" his applications. Even then he does not receive as much 
as he has asked for, or as much as he must necessarily have to 
make it through the year. To avoid this frustrating ex­
perience, as well as avoiding the loss of many working days, 
the villager goes to his neighborhood Bonakdar, or the town's 
merchant. He makes "one stop" at the green buyer's store. 
There he is well received, is offered « cup of tea,- and is 
back in the village - with all the money he had asked for -
before the day is out. For this he will have to pay at 
harvest time. 
That the ACBI or the Rural Cooperatives do help the 
farmers to some extent is clear. That they have failed to 
^Going through the bureaucratic procedures of receiving 
a loan from the ACBI, or the Rural Cooperatives, is a frus­
trating experience, to say the least. This "red tape" is of 
course present - though in varying degree - in all other 
government offices. 
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provide him his needed credit is equally obvious. One needs 
only to observe the lucrative businesses of the green buyers 
and money lenders to realize the extent of this failure. The 
fact that their businesses are prospering despite their 
exorbitant interest rates reflects the farmer's lack of 
better alternatives.^ 
The village farmer is thus faced with grim alternatives. 
He cannot borrow from "institutional" sources of credits to 
the extent that he needs it. He has no choice but to pay the 
exorbitant rates asked by the private money lenders or to 
accept the deals offered him by the green buyer. Moreover, 
the poorer the farmer, the more limited his choices of credit 
sources, and the higher the rates of interest he must pay for 
his loans. 
The present credit situations of the small village farmer 
is undesirable both from a moral as well as an "economic" 
standpoint. Not only is it unfair for a poor farmer to have 
to share the greater part of his meager profits with the city 
^It is estimated that between 3/4 or 2/3 of all loans 
obtained by Iranian farmers are supplied by "noninstitutional" 
sources of credit, i.e. by private money lenders, traders, 
etc. (43, Annex 10, p. 1). Noting that the commercial 
farmers have much easier access to "institutional" credit 
sources, it is reasonable to conclude that for the small 
village farmers, "noninstitutional" sources account for a lot 
more than 3/4 of the credit they receive. 
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merchants, it is also unsound from a purely "economic develop­
ment" standpoint. 
The villager, seeing his living condition deteriorating 
no matter what farm prices happen to be, gradually loses his 
incentive, as well as his ability, to invest in his farm. If 
he is not getting enough to eat, he obviously is not in a 
position to invest in yield increasing projects. It is well 
recognized that one of the most important kinds of incentives 
for a yield increase is favorable farm prices. But this is 
not enough. The crucial point is that "the people on the land 
must be the principal beneficiaries of favorable prices " 
(21, p. 247). 
In the area covered by this study, the small farmers "on 
the land" are not the "principal beneficiaries" of farm price 
improvements, whereas the commercial farmers surely are. This 
could be part of the reason for the significantly higher yields 
per hectare obtained by the commercial farmers over that ob­
tained by the small village farmers in this area.^ 
Since there are many factors affecting crop yields and 
since most of these factors are not the same for commercial 
and village farmers, this conclusion cannot be proved to be 
true for this area. One can say, however, that the observa­
tions in this area do not disprove the general proposition 
that there is a relationship between prices received by the 
farmers, and yields. "While adequate incentives at the farm 
level will not guarantee that all farmers will make the addi­
tional efforts needed to increase production, their absence 
will certainly mean that such efforts are unlikely to be 
made" (1, p. 350). 
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As far as the economic development of the agricultural 
sector is concerned, the present credit situation has other 
undesirable consequences. The most important one in this 
respect being a perpetual flight of capital out of the farm 
sector, and more specifically, out of the rural areas. The 
money lenders or green buyers, who share a large part of the 
profits of the small farmers do not reinvest their profits 
in the villages (except for money lending or more green buying). 
Thus capital is transferred out of the villages, and in most 
cases out of the farm sector altogether. 
To summarize the above arguments, this study confirms 
the generally recognized notion of inadequate agricultural 
credit in Iran. It reflects the general neglect of the farm 
sector by the policy makers during the past few decades. In 
1972 agriculture accounted for 20% of the country's gross 
national product, yet farm credits amounted to a mere 6% of the 
total "institutional" credits to the private sector. In the 
year 1350, all of the credit extended to the farmers by the 
government institutions (ADFI, ACBI, and the Rural coopera­
tives) amounted to only 6% of the value of the goods services 
produced in the farm sector (13, p. 42 and 95). Thus the of" 
ficial report of Iran's Central Bank admits that "...the farm 
sector is still faced with an acute credit shortage" (13, p. 
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42). What is less obvious, and what this study has revealed, 
is the fact that the credit shortage is much more acute for 
the small village farmers than for the commercial farmers. 
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CHAPTER IV. UNEMPLOYMENT, UNDEREMPLOYMENT AND 
SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
Nearly all of the commercial farmers interviewed con­
sidered labor shortages to be one of their main problems. 
Many of these farmers maintained that shortage of labor, more 
than any other thing, prevents them from choosing the crop 
pattern they consider optimal. More specifically, a number of 
farmers believed that there exists at the present time, an 
upper limit for the amount of cotton produced in this area, 
and that this limit is set primarily by the number of workers 
available. 
In a country like Iran, where unemployment and "under­
employment" is supposed to be rampant, such statements are 
indeed surprising. In fact, one experts to find in this area 
an overabundance of workers seeking jobs, an "unlimited sup­
ply of labor" available to be used in commercial agriculture 
or industry. According to the commercial farmers inter­
viewed, however, this is simply not the case. Farm workers 
are hard to find during some months of the year. Employers 
compete for the available workers and thus pay higher wages.^ 
These observations seem to imply that in Gorgan and Dasht 
^It must be emphasized that wages are still quite low in 
this region, as well as in other parts of the country. At 
the peak of the cotton season, when wages in this region are 
at their highest level, a farm worker receives $2.20' for a 
full day of work. 
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the problems of unemployment and "underemployment" do not 
exist. This conclusion, however, may be erroneous. The 
simultaneous existence of widespread "underemployment" and 
"labor shortage" is a problem which has plagued most of the 
underdeveloped countries. To understand this apparent para­
dox one must be familiar with the term "underemployment" and 
what it implies. This, however, is not a simple matterI In 
the next section, the theoretical discussions of underemploy­
ment are reviewed and a workable definition of underemploy­
ment is adopted for this study. 
The Underemployment Controversy 
Some Theoretical Problems 
The recent debate over the unemployment problem in the 
less developed countries has its theoretical basis in W. A. 
Lewis's paper entitled "Economic Development with Unlimited 
Supply of Labor" (49). Lewis considers the process of 
economic development in a "Dual" economy. Such an economy 
is one with two distinct, dissimilar, and more or less un­
related sectors. These two sectors can be called the "Capi­
talist" and the "Subsistence" sectors. The capitalist sector 
usually consists of relatively capital intensive, profit 
motivated firms who hire labor. The subsistence or "tradition­
al" sector uses very little capital, and does not hire labor. 
In the traditional sector, people are self-employed and the 
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marginal productivity of labor is quite low and perhaps even 
zero. The people involved in this sector consume the average 
product of the farm workers.^ 
The process of development in Lewis' framework consists 
of the capitalist sector being expanded and the subsistence 
sector being contracted. The capitalist sector draws from the 
pool of laborers coming out of the traditional sector. At 
the going wage rate (slightly above the average product of 
/ 
labor in the traditional sector) the capitalists can count on 
a perfectly elastic supply of labor. Thus, the supply of 
labor for the capitalist sector is unlimited in the sense that 
at the going wage rate supply exceeds demand. The process of 
development continues until all of the "redundant" or "surplus" 
labor is absorbed in the modern sector and the supply curve of 
labor becomes less than perfectly elastic. 
The proposition that the capitalist sector in a develop­
ing country can count on an "unlimited supply of labor" has 
caused a great deal of controversy in recent years. Some 
"...what determines the agricultural real wage? Clear­
ly if the agricultural sector is commercialized (i.e.) it is 
organized in the form of a competitive market economy, profit 
maximizing behavior would imply a zero level of real wage 
wages (since the marginal productivity of labor is zero). 
However, a zero level of real wages is patently impossible as 
this would imply starvation for the mass of agricultural 
workers...(thus) (an) institutionally determined real wage 
level is set, usually not far from the caloric subsistence 
and related more or less to the average productivity of agri­
cultural labor" (26, pp. 21-22). 
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economists have accepted Lewis* Hypothesis concerning the 
existence of unemployment and underemployment in the develop­
ing countries and have made it a cornerstone of their 
theories (78). Others have attacked the hypothesis as un­
realistic, simplified, or simply wrong. In what follows, 
the two sides of this controversy are reviewed. 
Perhaps the most famous of the theories based on 
the phenomenon of "unlimited supply of labor" is that put 
forward by Ranis and Fei (78) . This model has attracted 
a great deal of attention in the "development" literature, 
despite its inherent weaknesses. 
The Ranis-Fei model also divides the economy into two 
sectors, with agriculture being the traditional sector of this 
dual economy. The industrial (modern) sector is assumed to 
be small, though growing, and utilizing labor efficiently. 
Once again, the process of development consists of a transfer 
of "unproductive" labor out of the farm and into the in­
dustrial sector. 
It is assumed that the farm sector of such an economy 
is characterized by an abundance of "disguised unemployment", 
and zero marginal productivity of labor. It is thus con­
cluded that "... it is possible to transfer labor from the 
subsistence sector to the commercial-industrial sector 
without reducing agricultural output and without increasing 
the supply price of labor to the industrial sector during the 
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early stages of development (31, p. 21). 
The existence of "idle workers" in the farm sector is 
the cornerstone of this model. On the one hand, assumption 
of disguised unemployment in the rural sector is needed to 
conclude that transfer of workers out of the farm sector and 
into the industrial sector does not reduce total farm out­
put. For if the transferred workers were in fact engaged 
in productive activities, their removal from the agricultural 
sector would lead to a reduction in the farm output. The 
assumption of widespread existence of "disguised unemploy­
ment" allows Ranis and Fei to assert that this transfer of 
labor does not change the total farm output and may even 
increase it!^ This then leads to the conclusion that as the 
labor transfer proceeds, an agricultural surplus is created 
2 
which can be used for capital formation. 
^"Up to now we have assumed that while the redundant 
(zero-MPPL) workers are (transferred), total agricultural 
output remains constant. It is, however, perfectly pos­
sible — perhaps even likely — for agricultural productivity 
to increase at the same time" (26, p. 23). 
"The existence of such a redundant agricultural labor 
force is a highly significant phenomenon in view of the fact 
that we have here a portion of the population which, while con­
suming agricultural output, is unable to make a productive 
contribution to it" (26, p. 13). Thus it is concluded that 
marginal productivity of farm workers is zero (26,- p= 21), 
When part of the (idle) workers are transferred out of the farm 
sector, a surplus is created because farm consumption is re­
duced while production has remained unchanged (26, pp. 22-23). 
"It is in this sense that we can think of the removal of the 
redundant agricultural labor force as freeing a hidden source 
of rural savings for deployment in the development effort. 
This surplus can be siphoned out as an investment fund for the 
development of the industrial sector" (26, p. 23). 
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On the other hand, the existence of "disguised unemploy­
ment" is used as a justification for assuming a constant real 
wage rate for the industrial workers during the first phase of 
the development process. It is assumed that in the farm 
sector .there exists an institutionally determined real wage 
equal to the initial average productivity of labor" (26, p. 
22). This wage rate is more than the (zero) marginal pro­
ductivity of labor and represents the minimum amount required 
for subsistence. It is further assumed that during the 
initial phase of development, the industrial wage rate is 
also equal to this minimum subsistence amount, and will re­
main constant so long as there exists underemployment in the 
farm sector.^ 
The constancy of industrial wage rate in the initial 
phase of development is essential for a rapid development in 
the Ranis and Fei framework. It ensures high levels of profit 
in the industrial sector which are assumed to be reinvested 
and thus bring about further growth. All during the initial 
phase of development, even though the industrial sector demands 
^"...It is intuitively obvious that the existence of a 
pool of redundant agricultural workers constitute a potential 
source of labor supply for the industrial sector, preventing 
a rise in the industrial real wage..." (26, p. 18). 
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more and more labor, the wage rate remains constant.^ 
It is thus reasonable to assert that the validity and 
relevance of the Ranis and Fei model — as well as that of 
other models based on Lewis' analysis — depends upon the 
validity of assuming the existence of widespread "dis­
guised unemployment" in the less developed economies. If 
it can be shown that in the majority of the underdeveloped 
countries "underemployment", as defined by Lewis and his 
"followers", does not exist, then it can be concluded that 
the models of economic development based on the widespread 
existence of "surplus labor" are void of any relevance for 
these underdeveloped economies. Furthermore, if it could be 
shown that "underemployment" does not exist in the less 
developed economies, to the extent assumed by these writers, 
the models based on "surplus labor" lose much of their 
appeal, which stems from the models' promise of "getting 
something for nothing".^ This explains, to a great extent, 
""The operational significance of the (constant institu­
tionally determined wage rate) prevailing in the agricultural 
sector is that it governs the value in exchange of the in­
dustrial wage rate.... This means that changes in the demand 
for industrial workers cannot appreciably affect the level of 
industrial wages since the existence of a pool of disguised un­
employed in the agricultural sector serves to cushion the im­
pact on the indastrial real wage" (26, pp. 156-157). 
^"The popular appeal of the "disguised unemployment" 
arises from its claim to offer something for nothing in the 
, way of a major potential for economic development" (39, p. 90). 
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the heated arguments about the existence, and the extent of, 
"disguised unemployment", that have filled the pages of various 
economic journals in the past two decades. 
The terms "disguised unemployment", "underemployment" and 
"surplus farm labor" have fill been used to convey the same 
meaning.^ "Underemployment", defined precisely, refers to a 
situation where removing a part of the labor force from the 
farm sector leaves the agricultural output unaffected, even 
2 though nothing else has been changed. The underlined segment 
of the definition is of crucial importance. For if the removal 
^The term "disguised unemployment" was originally used by 
Joan Robinson in a discussion of the Great Depression of the 
1930's. She used the term to refer to those who had lost 
their jobs as a result of the depression and were performing 
odd jobs — e.g. selling matches, etc., — to stay alive (50, 
p. 150). The sense in which the term are used in the current 
development literature is, however, entirely different. The 
current interpretation refers to underemployment in the farm 
sector of the less developed countries. Robinson believes . 
that calling rural unemployment "disguised unemployment" is 
wrong. "...The characteristic of disguised unemployment in 
the original sense is that it could be cured by an increase in 
effective demand. Rural underemployment requires some basic 
reorganization of the conditions of production" (79, p. 328). 
These terms, however, are used interchangeably in this study. 
2 
The United Nations experts in the field have defined 
the "Disguised Unemployed" as "those persons who work on their 
own account and who are so numerous, relative to the resources 
with which they work, that if a number of them were withdrawn 
for work in other sectors of the economy, the total output 
of the sector from which they were withdrawn would not be 
diminished even though no significant reorganization occurred 
in this sector, and no significant substitution of capital" 
(62, p. 2,044). 
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of the agricultural labor is accompanied by providing the 
remaining labor force with more modern technology, then the 
fact that farm output would not fall, or even increase, is not 
a strange phenomenon. Indeed ignoring the underlined segment 
of the above definition, one can use it to conclude that even 
the farm sector in the United States is plagued with disguised 
unemployment. Hardly anyone can deny that some portion of the 
labor force can be removed from the United States' farm sector 
without affecting the farm output, provided that more sophisti­
cated machinery is given to those remaining in the agricultural 
1 
sector. 
The point made above may seem too obvious to require re­
iteration, but the fact is that many writers who have come up 
with the conclusion that disguised unemployment is all pre­
valent in the underdeveloped countries have overlooked this 
point; To make this point clear, we can use the following 
exaggerated example. Consider an underdeveloped country 
with 80 percent of its population engaged in farming. If we 
could provide the most modern farm technology now available -
say those used in the U.S. farm sector - then it would probably 
be true to say that all but a small part of the farm workers in 
^As it was mentioned previously, the appeal of the "sur­
plus labor" models stem from the proposition that labor can be 
extracted from the farm sector, without a fall in the farm 
output, "...without improving the techniques of production" 
(39, p. 90). 
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this country could be removed without changing the farm out­
put. Is it then legitimate to conclude that, say, 90 percent 
of the farm workers in this country are redundant, or are 
underemployed? Ludicrous as this seems, there are never­
theless empirical studies that have used this kind of reason­
ing and have come up with impressive figures for the rate of 
"underemployment" in some less-developed countries. 
(See 91, p. 39)1 
Another point mentioned by the critics of the underem­
ployment hypothesis is the seasonality of agriculture. Agri­
culture by its very nature requires a great amount of working 
hours in some months while in other months it needs very 
little. If we are to adhere to the "ceteris paribus" condi­
tion mentioned above, and if the farm output is not to fall, 
then the number of workers required in the farm sector is that 
which is needed in the peak season. A number of studies have 
ignored this point. They have calculated the total labor 
hours required in the agricultural sector of an underdeveloped 
country and subtracting this from the total labor hours avail­
able in agriculture, they have reached wild conclusions regard­
ing the percentage of underemployment. What these studies 
^ome economists have simply "assumed" the existence of a 
particular amount of underemployment (e.g. Rosenstein Rodan, 
see (81, p. 54). For examples cited to prove the nonexistence 
of disguised unemployment see 81, especially pp. 63-70 and 
p. 44. 
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have done, and what is obviously illegitimate, is that they 
have ignored the seasonality of farming.^ (81, p. 58) 
Another source of confusion has been the whole question 
of zero marginal productivity of labor. It is generally as­
sumed by most writers in the field that the existence of 
underemployment necessarily implies zero marginal productiv­
ity of labor. Thus many writers who oppose the underemploy­
ment hypothesis have attempted to show that marginal product 
of labor in the farm sector of the less developed countries 
is not indeed zero or negative. The fact is, however, that 
marginal productivity of labor being zero is not a necessary 
condition for the existence of underemployment, and thus 
rejecting the former does not mean nonexistence of the 
latter (62, p. 2,052). Underemployment can be present even 
where marginal product of labor is above zero (62, p. 2,054), 
"To make this point clear, let us consider this example. 
Suppose that harvesting a peach orchard requires 20,000 labor 
hours. If, as is usually the case in agriculture, the har­
vesting must be completed within a short period of time, say 
20 days, then we need 100 workers, each working 10 hours a 
day for 20 days to do the job. Now if one were to calculate 
the required labor hours without considering the very crucial 
time constraint — which requires the job to last no more than 
20 days — one could conclude that all that is needed are 10 
workers, working 10 hours a day for 200 days. This - to say 
the least - is an exercise in futility. If the work is 
stretched far. beyond the specified 20 days, the output is lost 
and services of the workers mentioned above can find no employ­
ment after the 20 days of harvesting. The seasonality of agri­
culture is a natural fact that everyone, including the econo­
mists, must come to accept. The only cure for this problem 
must be found in additional employment, designed to provide 
jobs for farm workers during the off season, or in providing 
the farmers with farm machinery and thereby free the laborers. 
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Much effort has been channeled (wasted?) into proving that 
marginal product of labor in the less developed countries 
is not zero, which would supposedly (wrongly) imply that 
underemployment does not exist in these countries. 
The source of confusion in this respect has been the 
failure on the part of these writers to make a distinction 
between "zero marginal product of a unit of labor and the 
zero marginal product of a worker" (29, p. 86). One must 
distinguish between the number of people on the farm and the 
number of hours worked by each worker. The workers may only 
work 4 hours each day, remaining idle the rest of the day. 
This, however, does not mean that marginal product of a unit 
of labor is zero.^ There is, of course, some potentially 
productive labor being wasted in this instance. But the im­
portant thing to recognize is that the waste is not because 
of zero marginal productivity of labor, but is due to the 
2 fact that workers are not working "full time". 
^"The concept of marginal productivity of labor must of 
course, logically refer to the labor input, which in the ordi­
nary way must be reckoned, not by the size of the labor force, 
whether it is working or not, but by the hours, days, and 
weeks of actual work. If that is clear,- it cannot be taken 
for granted that underemployment in terms of actual idleness 
on the part of the labor force implies a zero marginal produc­
tivity of labor.... There could of course be, and should be-
underemployment at a marginal productivity of labor higher 
than zero..." (62, p. 2,052). 
2 
This, however, makes the definition of underemployment 
quite arbitrary. In this instance "the amount of disguised 
unemployment depends on what we consider to be a full day of 
work for each (worker)". 
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Another feature of the theory of underemployment is its 
static nature. As we saw before, underemployment is present 
if a portion of the labor force can be removed from agri­
culture without a fall in the farm output. It is also as­
sumed that the techniques of production, capital equipment, 
etc., are not changed (increased) when the part of the labor 
force is removed. Thus we are keeping everything the same and 
only change the number of workers engaged in farming. The 
time period, however, during which this change is to take 
place is not specified. In this connection Myrdal raises the 
important point that if everything else — including the insti­
tutional framework — are to remain the same, then when some 
laborers are withdrawn, farm output does not fall if the re­
maining farmers work more hours. Under the static condition 
of the complementary factors, this is the only conceivable 
way for the farm output not to fall when a part of the labor 
force is removed. Can we make such assumptions about the 
1 
workers in the less developed countries. 
^Note that even granting the validity of this assumption, 
we are still left with the problem of violation of the "cet--
eris paribus" condition. As we have seen before, "underem­
ployment" is present if a portion of the labor fores can be 
removed without a reduction in the output, even though every­
thing else remains unchanged. "Everything Else", of course, 
includes the number of hours worked by the remaining workers. 
Otherwise, it can be shown that underemployment is present in 
every sector of every country. Can anyone deny that we can 
remove, say 10% of the workers in the United States' farm 
sector without a reduction in her (footnote continued on 
following page) 
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There are many reasons which make the validity of the 
above assumption doubtful. To begin with, the workers might 
be underemployed "voluntarily" due to poor health. In many 
areas widespread diseases reduce the ability of the indi­
viduals to work more than a few hours each day, or a few 
months each year. Until recently one such disease was 
malaria which affected a great many people in the less de­
veloped countries. While malaria is more or less vanishing 
as a major threat to the people of the third world, there are 
still many other illnesses victimizing these people.^ To 
these must be added the ever present state of undernourish­
ment which the people of the less developed countries have 
come to accept as a fact of life. All of these, obviously, 
reduce the efficiency of the farm workers in the underdeveloped 
countries and explain — at least in part — their less than 
"full time" employment. 
(Footnote continued from preceding page) farm output, given 
that the remaining workers work a bit more each day? Thus the 
fact that a part of the farm workers in the less developed 
countries can be removed with no loss of output, providing 
that others work longer hours, does not prove the existence 
of "surplus labor" in these countries. In fact, it does not 
prove anything except the fact that if everyone worked longer 
hours we would need fewer people to do the work11 
"Mal-de-Chagas, prevalent in northern parts of Argentina, 
a disease caused by Schistosoma Mansoni in Egypt, various 
other diseases caused by parasites prevalent in Asia and 
Africa are some examples. This list, unfortunately, is not 
exhaustive. 
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Another factor to be considered is participation by 
women, children and elders in the work force. One cannot 
simply "assume" that these groups will participate in the 
"productive works" once a part of the present work force is 
transferred out of the farm sector and remunerating jobs are 
made available in the rural areas. Such assumptions lead to 
erroneous conclusions. Women do not participate in outside 
activities because they must run the home, take care of 
children and — in many instances —because such works are 
not considered "proper" for a woman. 
No one can deny — as this is supported by overwhelming 
evidence — that with a basic reconstruction of the village 
economy, and with a fundamental transformation of people's 
attitude, women do indeed increase their participation in the 
labor force. But these basic alterations in people's ways of 
life cannot be simply "assumed". This assumption becomes 
particularly unrealistic when it is emphasized that "...total 
output...would not be diminished even though no significant 
reorganization occurred in this sector..,.". The fact is that 
if "no significant reorganizations occurred", things would 
remain as they are. If there is no day care center to take 
care of the children, if there is no group care for the 
children and the elders — who invariably live with their 
^See p. 69, herein. 
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families -- then the women will stay at home to perform these 
traditional functions. 
It may thus be concluded that the theory of "disguised 
unemployment" suffers from serious shortcomings. It is based 
on a number of implicit assumptions which are not consistent 
with the facts of the real world, and the conclusions it leads 
to are contrary to observable facts.^ This conclusion runs 
Thus far, we have said very little about the theoretical 
foundation of "disguised unemployment". This has been in line 
with the tradition as far as this concept is concerned. The 
main problem with the concept of "disguised unemployment" is 
not that theoretically is not conceivable, It is not diffi­
cult to see that, given a particular stock of capital, addi­
tion of more and more workers may ultimately bring about a 
situation where the last worker adds nothing to total output. 
For this to happen, it is only necessary for the production 
function to have a zero slope at some (high) level of labor 
application. Moreover, this does not necessarily imply no 
substitutability between labor and capital at each point on 
the isoquant. It is merely sufficient for the labor-capital 
substitutability to be impossible at some range on the iso­
quant. If it is accepted that, as additional labor is ap­
plied to the land; with a given stock of capital, a point will 
be reached beyond which opportunities for substituting labor 
for "other factors" is no longer possible, then the proposi­
tion of zero marginal product of labor must be accepted (25, 
pp. 539-565). 
The problem, however, is that this hypothesis does not 
represent the situation existing in the less developed coun­
tries. Viner asserts that "I find it impossible to conceive 
of a farm of any kind on which, other factors of production 
being held constant in quantity, and even in form as well, it 
would not be possible- by known methods to obtain some addi­
tion to the crop by using additional labor in more careful 
selection and planting of the seed, more intensive weeding, 
cultivation, thinning, and mulching, more painstaking harvest­
ing, gleaning, and cleaning of the crop" (81, p. 60). Thus, 
once again, we are faced with the problem of an unrealistic 
assumption (in this case lack of factor substitutability) and 
reaching a conclusion which, though logical, is unsound. 
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contrary to what is alleged to be a "consensus" on this matter. 
Ranis and Fei assert that "for the case of the typical labor 
surplus underdeveloped economy... there exists a general con­
sensus that the pervasive phenomenon is one of widespread 
disguised rural unemployment and underemployment" (26, pp. 
11-13). In the light of what has been said before there is a 
strong doubt that widespread "underemployment" in the sense 
used by Ranis and Fei, exists in any underdeveloped country. 
One may add that the emphasis on this concept has confused 
the issue and has diverted attentions from the basic problem 
of the less developed countries. 
Many attempts have been made to specify the concept of 
"disguised unemployment" in terms which would not be subject 
to the criticisms mentioned in the previous pages. It is 
immediately recognized, however, that such an attempt reduces 
the concept of underemployment to a mere statement about 
obvious facts. Thus one writer concludes that: "The only 
definition of disguised unemployment which has empirical 
justification or logical consistency is that,..labor is so 
abundant in the agricultural sector that all workers cannot 
be productively employed for an arbitrary set "normal" working 
day, month, or year; therefore, the entire labor force is idle 
part of the time judged by this arbitrary norm. (Furthermore) 
...This does not mean that labor transfer results in no de­
cline in (the farm) output" (94, p. 470). And another writer 
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believes that after all that is said and done about "under­
employment" and "disguised unemployment" we are left with the 
empty statement that "if it were possible to improve the 
methods of production in agriculture, if the skill of farm 
laborers is increased, if social habits could be changed,..., 
if technology in industry could be changed so as to employ 
unskilled rural workers, if capital and other cooperating 
factors...could be provided in larger quantities and better 
quality, if and to the extent that all these things happen 
or are done, agriculture can release a lot of labor without 
loss of output and industrial output be stepped up at the same 
time" (30, pp. 150-151). 
Obviously, these statements are a far cry from the con­
cept of "disguised unemployment" as used by Arthur Lewis and 
which constitutes the foundation upon which the Ranis and Fei 
model is based. We may therefore conclude that the concept 
of "underemployment", and the models which are built on the 
assumption of its widespread existence, are void of practical 
significance for the underdeveloped countries. Empirical 
evidences seem to support this conclusion as well,^ 
1 
Estimation of the amount of "disguised unemployment" is 
inherently difficult. Aside from the choice of methods, which 
could affect the results to a large extent, there is the prob­
lem of defining various concepts. For instance who is "eco­
nomically active"? How many hours a day, and how many days a 
year constitute "full time" work? Should a distinction be 
made between voluntary and involuntary unemployment?, and so 
on. Clearly, (footnote continued on following page) 
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The conclusion that "underemployment"/ as defined by 
Lewis and his followers, does not exist in any substantial 
amount in the underdeveloped countries, should not be 
interpreted as saying that the farm sector in these countries 
cannot supply the industrial sector with labor and surplus 
food. What we have concluded is that the concept of "disguised 
unemployment", and the related models of development, treat the 
process of economic development in an unrealistic, and mech­
anical manner. 
The fact is that in most underdeveloped economies a great 
percentage of the population are engaged in farming, and that 
this percentage is much higher than that existing in the more 
"developed" countries. The average productivity of the farm 
(Footnote continued from previous page) the result of the 
study varies a great deal according to which set of defini­
tions is used. Added to all these, is the problem of col­
lecting data, A direct approach — one which some experts 
believe to be the only satisfactory method {90, 2) re­
quires questioning the farmers directly and may be quite cost­
ly. In most cases, therefore, indirect methods are used. 
Because of all these problems, it is not unusual to find 
different authors coming up with widely different figures for 
the rate of underemployment for the same area (91, pp. 36= 
40). 
T. W. Schultz uses a historical event to prove that "under 
employment" does not exist even for an overpopulated country 
like India. After the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919, it is 
estimated that about 6% of the total population (but about 8% 
of the agricultural labor force) were left dead. This was ac= 
companied by a reduction in the amount of land under various 
crops by an average of 3.8%. Furthermore "...the provinces.,, 
with the highest death rates...had also the largest percentage 
declines in acreage sown to crops" (81, p, 67)= It can be, 
therefore, concluded that the part of the labor force which 
fell to the disease were not in fact "redundant" (see 81, pp. 
61-70). Also see (81, pp. 41-44). 
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workers in the less developed countries is much lower than 
that of their counterparts in the industrial countries. These 
are undeniable facts. What is denied, and what the concept 
of disguised unemployment implies, is the notion of "getting 
something for nothing". 
In the process of development, an underdeveloped country 
can indeed count on large numbers of workers being released, 
from the farm sector without any substantial reduction in 
the farm output, given an increase in the "complementary" in­
puts, such as farm equipments, fertilizers, etc. Alternative­
ly, labor can be released from the farm sector, with no re­
duction in the volume of farm output, given that those re­
maining are persuaded - be it by additional monetary incentives 
or ideological campaigns — to work more hours each day. One 
or both of these alternatives are quite likely to be success­
ful in most underdeveloped countries. But this is not the 
same thing as treating the process of capital accumulation as 
a "costless" transfer of people from villages to the cities. 
Moreover, in all likelihood, a successful implementation of 
such policies requires not only improvements in the techniques 
of production, but a drastic change in the structure of the 
village economy. Ignoring these basic requirements of 
economic development, the models based on "unlimited supply 
of labor" become irrelevant as a guide for policy making in 
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the underdeveloped countries, as they direct the attention to 
"the wrong thing" (39, p. 90). 
Using the foregoing review of the concept of "under­
employment" , we shall now proceed to construct a practical 
framework for analyzing the process of labor transfer from the 
farm sector to the other sectors in the Iranian economy. This 
framework will then be used to estimate the "surplus labor" 
available in the farm sector of the northern Iran. 
The farm sector in Iran is characterized by all traits 
of a stagnating, traditional agricultural sector including 
many partially idle and - compared to the other sectors - less 
productive workers. More than half of the population live 
in the rural areas and are engaged — directly or indirectly 
— in agricultural activities. Yet, the farm sector produces 
less than 16% of the country's G.N.P. The rate of population 
growth in Iran iâ among the highest in the world, being in 
excess of 3% a year. 
All of this may be taken to mean that there exists sub­
stantial amounts of "underemployment" in the Iranian farm 
sector.^ However, if by this it is meant that some of the 
fariTi workers can be removed from the farm sector without any 
reduction in the volume of farm output — while at the same 
time all "other things" are kept constant —^ then this 
^This is indeed the assessment of the I.L,0. economists, 
(See 88, pp. 127-128). 
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statement is simply incorrect. It was mentioned at the begin­
ning of this chapter that even at the present time, in the 
area of this study, many farmers are faced with a shortage 
of labor at the peak months of the farming season. Obviously, 
if some of the farm workers should migrate out of the rural 
sector — with no increase in the stock of capital with which 
the remaining farmers work, or with no increase in the level 
of participation by women, etc. — then the level of farm 
output would undoubtedly fall.^ 
To be sure, there does exist a potential "surplus labor" 
in Iran's farm sector. But this "surplus" is a changing 
phenomenon, and it is something other than what the proponents 
of "underemployment" theory have in mind. The "surplus labor" 
used in our context is not a timeless, abstract phenomenon. 
In particular, it depends upon the level of technology, the 
mix of the crops being produced, the amount of "complementary 
inputs" being used, and finally on "institutional factors". 
In this context, it is meaningless to talk about "surplus 
labor" in abstract terms (62, p, 2509). "Surplus labor" can 
be large or small, depending upon the level of various factors 
^To be sure, seasonal unemployment is prevalent in this 
area. Literally millions of days of potentially productive 
labor are wasted during the off-seasons. But at the peak of 
the season there are very few farm workers going unemployed. 
In fact, during the cotton harvest season even the household 
servants are drawn into the cotton fields to pick cotton. 
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which determine its level.^ 
Myrdal asserts that the concept of underemployment 
depends upon a particular policy assumption (62, p. 2069). 
One can talk about a particular level of "surplus labor", 
and the process of utilization of this pool of "redundant" 
farm workers not in abstract terms, but rather in the con­
text of a particular economic policy (62, p. 2059). This 
point will become clear as we use this framework to estimate 
the potential "surplus labor" available in the farm sector 
of northern Iran, using different policy assumptions. 
Potential Surplus Labor in 
Gorgan and Dasht 
It is now possible to estimate the present, and the po­
tential, level of surplus farm labor in Norther Iran, using 
the framework developed earlier. The technical coefficients 
used here are based on the estimates of 47 "farm units" who 
were interviewed. 
^We may define the amount of surplus labor, at time t, 
to be a function of several variables: = f (a^,b^.,c^,d^, 
...,z^) where the variables inside the parentheses are those 
mentioned above. These variables can change over time, either 
due to market forces, or because of deliberate government 
policies. There exists a particular amount of "surplus labor" 
for every combination of variables a.j. through z^. Thus while 
"surplus labor" may be nonexistent at a particular time in a 
country, it can be "created" by various policies which affect 
the variables a to z. 
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Table 8 shows the hectares of land under various crops in 
this region. It also shows (columns 3 through 13) the number 
of man-days of work required for production of each crop during 
the different months of the year. The last two columns of this 
table show the number of man-days of work, and the number of 
workers, required for the production of the prevailing crop 
mix during the peak month of the year.^ As Table 6 shows, 
during Khordad, the third month of spring, about 124,886 
2 people are working on the farm of this region. Performing 
similar calculations for the other months of the year, we can 
calculate the number of workers involved in agricultural work 
in this region during each month of the year. These numbers 
are used to plot Figure 2 which shows the fluctuation in 
demand for farm workers in this region. 
For reasons to be explained later, the currently avail­
able supply of farm workers may be taken to be at least 
124,886.3 This number of workers are assumed to be available 
^It is assumed that each worker works, on the average, 28 
days in each month. 
^Iranian calendar year starts in the first day of spring. 
Khordad, being the third month of the year, starts on the 22nd 
of May and ends on 22nd of June. 
^The actual number of workers in the farm sector of this 
region may be slightly more than the above figure. The reasons 
for this statement are stated in Chapter VIII, below. However, 
since at the present time we are mainly interested in the con­
cept of "potential surplus labor" and not its exact magnitude, 
the accuracy of this figure is not crucial to the argument 
presented. 
Table 8. Labor requirement of selected crops and the number of workers needed during peak season 
spring Simmer Fall winter 
crops Hectares 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 %%% ^^Sed 
during the during 
peak month peak month 
Wheat 259(440 »5 — 1 — — — — — 1.5 — — — 259/440 9,266 
Cotton 197,400 .5 1 15 13 5 1 15 7 4 - - 2,961,000 105,750 
Barley 75,012 — — 1 — — — — — 1 — — — 75,012 2,679 
Sunflower 14,100 - 724 6 - - - - - 3 28,200 1,007 
Soybean 1„015 4 15 13 3 15 - - - - - 15,225 544 
Rice 7,896 - - 20 3 - 12 - - - - 157,920 5,640 
CO o v5 M 5 5 5 pZ 5 5 ni 3 i o r j œ œ œ r > - i r > i n r -  r H  o o  
Total r-ir~(om mm r-mr- m oo 
C O O ' i ' < ^ O O O t r i < J l < i 3 *  r 4  T f  
r-î- îH- iH 
Months 
Figure 2. Number of workers needed in the farm sector during different months 
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for hire throughout the year.^ In view of this assumption, 
fluctuations observed in Figure 2 represent the seasonal un-
2 
employment in the farm sector of this region. 
Figure 2 'shows that during the month of Khordad, all of 
the available farm labor force is "employed" in the farm 
sector of this region. Thus, if a part of the farm people of 
this area are removed from the farm sector — with "everything 
else" remaining unchanged — agricultural output will un­
doubtedly fall.^ We can therefore conclude that "disguised 
unemployment" or "surplus labor" — in the strict sense of 
these terms — do not exist in the rural areas of this 
region. 
1 
For elaboration on this point see Chapter VIII, pp. 
150-153. 
2 
We have taken one month as a "unit" in this argument. 
The amount of work necessary for production of a crop during 
each month is assumed to be uniformly distributed throughout 
that month. Thus, if cotton requires 28 man-days of work 
during the 3rd month, we have assumed that one worker, working 
28 days in this month, can do the job. obviously this may not 
be the case. Ideally, one can get the most accurate result 
using one day as a "unit". Due to lack of accurate data, how­
ever, this is not possible in this case. It must be noted, 
however, that selection of a month as a "unit" underestimates 
the amount of seasonal unemployment= 
^Removing part of the people from the farm sector at 
this time would mean fewer workers to perform such tasks as 
weeding the cotton fields, planting the rice, etc. If mechan­
ical equipment is not made available, fewer workers simply 
cannot do the job that is needed to be performed. A lower 
yield; therefore, is the inevitable result. 
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There does exist, however, a potential surplus labor. 
This surplus labor, however, is not constant. It varies 
with changes in the degree of mechanization, labor force 
participation rate, etc. which influence demand and supply 
of farm labor. The observation that no surplus labor is present 
is valid only so long as the current conditions prevail, i.e., 
this conclusion is relevant only so long as the level of tech­
nology, the mix of the crops produced, the extent of utiliza­
tion of complementary farm inputs, the degree of participa­
tion by women, the amount of inmigration and outmigration 
of farm workers, etc. remain as they are. Should any of 
these factors be changed, then there may well appear a sub­
stantial amount of surplus labor which could be transferred 
out of the farm sector with no change in the amount of farm 
output.^ 
To shov; this, we can assume a change in one of these 
"factors" and observe its effect upon the level of "surplus 
labor". In particular, let us assume that cotton production 
in this region becomes completely mechanized. This requires 
the introduction of more farm equipments into the farm sector 
of this region,- which we assume is made possible by a govern­
ment aid program. Such a change in the "level of technology" 
^At least in principle, it is also possible for a labor 
shortage to develop. This could happen, e.g., if mechaniza­
tion was reduced, or fewer people participated in the work 
force. 
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applied in the farm sector reduces the number of man-days 
of work required for the production of the same crop mix 
drastically. Table 9 shows the labor requirement in each 
month as well as the number of workers required during the 
peak month for this new situation. Figure 3 shows the number 
of workers needed during the different months of the year. 
During the peak month of the year, only 19,136 workers 
are needed to perform the necessary tasks in the farm sector 
of this region. Any "worker" who is not "employed" during 
this month/ therefore, can be classified as "redundant". The 
assumed change in the "level of technology" — with all other 
things remaining as they are — has thus "created" "surplus 
labor" amounting to more than 105,000 people. This is "sur­
plus labor" in the true sense of the word. Given the existence 
of an industrial sector which can absorbthese workers, a labor 
transfer out of the farm sector can be expected. 
Before continuing this argument an important point must 
be emphasized. The type of calculations performed in the 
above example is essentially the same as that used by some 
economists who have concluded that "underemployment" is pre­
valent in the less developed countries. Vîe have already stated 
that reaching such conclusions by such methods is not legiti­
mate.^ What we have concluded from this example is that 
^See p. 70, herein. 
Table 9. Labor requirement of selected crops and the number of workers needed during peak season 
Sprinq Summer Fall Winter 
Number of 
man days 
Number of 
workers 
Crops Hectares 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 required 
during the 
peak month 
required 
during 
peak month 
Wheat 259,440 .5 - 1 - - - - - 1. ,5 — — - 259,440 9,266 
Cotton 197#440 .5 1 - 1 1 1 - - • - - - - -
Barley 75,012 - - 1 - - - - - 1 — — - 75,012 2,679 
Sunflower 14,100 - 7 2 4 6 3 28,200 1,007 
Soybean 1,015 - 4 15 13 3 15 - - - — — - 15,225 544 
Rice 7,896 - - 20 3 - 12 - - - — — - 157,920 5,640 
Total 8,
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Figure 3. Newly "created" surplus labor 
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"surplus labor" will be present if the level of technology 
used in the farm sector could be increased. This is obvious­
ly not the same thing as saying that 105,000 workers in this 
region are "redundant". Our example only shows what is most 
obvious, but which is unfortunately neglected in many cases. 
The above exercise was a clear indication that "savings" in 
the form of "surplus labor" is not there for the taking. 
There is no doubt that a potential saving, in the form of 
"surplus labor" does exist. But the process of utilizing this 
potential is not — as implied by the adherent of underemploy­
ment hypothesis — a costless one. Not only the "creation" 
of "surplus labor" will require large amounts of investment 
— which in this case happened to be in the form of farm 
equipments — but the absorption of these workers requires 
heavy investment in the urban areas as well (39, pp. 88-89). 
Similar though perhaps less drastic results, are obtained 
by changing other variables in the "surplus labor function". 
If we assume an increase in the degree of participation by 
women in the labor force, the total number of workers avail­
able increases and — assuming no decrease in the amount of 
complementary inputs and no change in the mix of crops pro­
duced, "surplus labor" will become available. Once again it 
must be emphasized that this is not a "costless" process. 
Increase in the degree of participation by women cannot 
simply be "assumed". It requires not only a substantial 
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amount of investment in the form of building day-care centers, 
etc., but also presupposes fundamental changes in the structure 
of the village society and people's attitude. 
Finally, a change in the relative price of the farm 
products — which could be brought about by means of a de­
liberate government policy — can result in the appearance of 
"surplus labor". For instance, should the government of Iran 
decide to stop its current policy of wheat price control, the 
price of wheat will rise substantially. This will cause — 
in all likelihood — an increase in the amount of land under 
wheat production. As will be shown in a later chapter, a 
bulk of this land is withdrawn from cotton production. 
Substitution of wheat for cotton — ceteris paribus — reduces 
the number of workers needed in the farm sector^ and thus 
creates "surplus labor". Changes in the government's poli­
cies, therefore, may be used to "create" "surplus labor" in 
the farm sector, even if no "underemployment" exists at the 
present time. 
Conclusions 
Our theoretical discussions led us to conclude that the 
concept of "underemployment", as put forward by Lewis and 
others, is an empty concept. The models based on this notion 
^Cotton production is much more labor intensive than 
wheat production. See Table 8 above. 
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concentrate on the wrong thing and ignore the basic issues 
involved in the development of an underdeveloped economy. 
In these models, emphasis is placed upon the widespread 
existence of a "surplus labor" and "hidden savings" which 
can be utilized for capital formation in the industrial sector 
without any change in the level of technology or in the 
institutional framework existing in the farm sector of an 
underdeveloped country. This represents, to say the least, 
a naive approach to the process of economic development. 
To be sure, there does exist a "potential surplus labor" 
and a "potential saving" in the farm sectors of the less 
developed countries. The problem is how to make the realiza­
tion of the "potentials" possible. The conditions necessary 
for realization of such potentials include not only intro­
duction of additional "complementary inputs" into the farm 
sector,- but also a basic reorganization of the socio-economic 
institutions existing in the rural areas.^ The theories which 
"Of equal importance is the creation of an environment, 
in the industrial sector, which facilitates the absorption of 
labor in an efficient manner. The Ranis and Pei model takes 
the existence of such an environment largely for granted. The 
existence of large masses of unemployed workers living in the 
newly created "ghettos" around large cities in nearly every 
underdeveloped country should be ample proof that labor 
absorption is not an automatic process. Analyzing the condi­
tions necessary for efficient utilization of labor in the 
"nonfarm sectors", and what these conditions imply in terms 
of planning for a mass migration of labor from villages to the 
cities, however, lie outside the scope of this study (see 39, 
pp. 88-89). 
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ignore the necessity of such efforts, or simply assume 
that they will be forthcoming, are, to say the least, ir­
relevant as a guide for policy making in the less developed 
countries. 
It was concluded that the term "underemployment" - de­
fined in the strict sense of the term - is an empirically 
empty concept. Once stripped of its unacceptable, implicit 
assumptions, it becomes a simple statement about obvious 
facts. It is legitimate to speak of "underemployment" not 
in abstract terms, but only in connection with a particular 
policy assumption. Furthermore, it must be recognized that 
"underemployment", as interpreted here, is a changing phenome­
non. This point was illustrated with the help of some examples. 
It was shown that, while no "surplus labor" exists at the 
present time in the farm sector of northern Iran, various 
amounts of "surplus labor" could be forthcoming if certain 
changes are made in the variables which determine the level 
of "surplus labor". Furthermore, it was seen that govern­
ment's policies could be devised to create various levels of 
"surplus labor". Whether or not such policies are desirable 
for a particular country depends among other things —- on 
the labor absorption capacity of the other sectors of the 
economy. What is important, however, is the recognition that 
"surplus labor", instead of being a "timeless", abstract 
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concept» is in fact a changing phenomenon whose magnitude 
could be varied by — among other things — discretionary 
policies. 
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CHAPTER V. MARKET LIMITATIONS 
Nearly all of the farmers interviewed expressed dissatis­
faction with the existing markets for their crops.^ Famili­
arity with the present marketing mechanism is essential to 
understanding the farmers' dissatisfaction with it. A descrip­
tion of the prevailing marketing system in the area of this 
study, therefore, is in order. Though problems associated 
with marketing farm products are present - in varying degree 
- in all parts of the country, these problems are particular­
ly noticeable in this region. The reason for this being the 
fact that the crops in this area, more than in any other agri­
cultural region, are produced for outside markets, rather than 
for local use. 
The main crop in Gorgan and Dasht is cotton. Having 
2 
very little local use, nearly all of the cotton produced is 
marketed. The same is true of the soybeans and sunflower seeds 
produced in this area. The situation is slightly different 
for wheat and barley. Though all of the wheat and barley 
crops produced by the "commercial" farmers are marketed, a 
^As Table 5 in Chapter II shows, 96% of the commercial 
farmers and all of the villagers interviewed were dissatisfied 
with the prevailing market situation. See p. 28, herein. 
^Local spinning of cotton is rapidly disappearing. The 
availability of cheap, manufactured cloth has rendered local 
cloth weaving an unprofitable enterprise. 
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large part of these crops produced by the village farmers are 
used locally. Nevertheless, the share of the crops produced 
in this region, which reaches the market is indeed large, in 
comparison with other parts of the country. Thus the problems 
associated with marketing in Iran are best manifested in 
this area. 
The problems and shortcomings of the present marketing 
channels in Iran could be analyzed from many different angles. 
One could point to the existence of unstable prices for many 
farm commodities, the absence of any type of forecasting to 
aid the farmers, government price control for some farm 
products, high producer-consumer margins, lack of competition 
in market for some farm commodities, inadequate institutions 
to deal with the distribution of farm products as well as many 
other problems. All of these problems exist in Iran's farm 
sector in varying degrees (see, for instance, 43, Annex 9). 
The most important marketing problem - at least in the area of 
this study - seems to be the results of what can be generally 
termed "market imperfections". The great bulk of this chapter 
deals with this important problem. 
"Market" may be defined as a medium, where buyers and 
sellers meet and exchange takes place. The "rate" of exchange 
or "price", may be determined in various ways. In a "planned" 
economy, where the state is the sole, or major, buyer, the 
producers sell their crops at a predetermined price. This price 
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is determined on the basis of the costs of production and in 
the framework of a national economic policy. In such cases 
the "marketing problems", along with the "market" itself -
in its traditional form - are largely eliminated. This is 
at least true for the producers who deliver their crops and 
receive their income from the state. Whatever marketing 
problems remain (such as storage, transportation, distribu­
tion to retailers, etc.) do not concern the producers. 
In a "market economy", prices are determined by the 
"market forces". Competition among the buyers and the sellers 
creates an "equilibrium" price which must be accepted by all 
parties involved, since no single buyer, or seller, can exert 
any influence upon it. In the countries where this "classical" 
competitive market exists, marketing problems are minimal. The 
prevailing competition tends to reduce the inefficiencies to a 
large extent. The producers may, of course, be hurt by the 
vagaries of the market in some years, but are rewarded with 
higher prices in other years. 
The existing marketing system for farm products in Iran 
fits neither of the above mentioned "models", though it con­
tains elements of both. ,The combinations of these elements, 
however, have given rise to a market system which functions 
quite poorly. A description of the prevailing marketing 
channels in the Gorgan and Dasht region will demonstrate 
this point. For the sake of brevity, only the process of 
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marketing wheat and cotton will be described. 
Wheat Market 
Wheat prices in Iran are, to a large extent, government 
controlled. Due to the importance of wheat as a food item 
for Iranians, the government of Iran takes certain actions 
(such as subsidizing imports) to keep wheat pricee r-'- a 
specific level. The price received by the farmers, therefore, 
has little to do with the demand for and supply of wheat in 
Iran, the process of marketing wheat is as follows: 
A majority of village farmers - many of whom grow wheat 
for market as well as personal consumption - sell their crops 
"green". This is done because the small farmers are unable 
to obtain the desired amount of credit from any other means 
(see Chapter III). For these farmers, therefore, the problems 
associated with marketing and credit are so interrelated as 
to make an isolated analysis of the marketing situation al­
most impossible.^ 
The village farmers - those who sell their crops green -
2 have very little to say about the prices they receive. This 
"Most of the literature in this area treats the two prob­
lems simultaneously. See for example (1). 
2 
"The farmer has virtually no bargaining power in the 
marketing of his output. Channels and institutions for disr 
tribution and marketing are such that farmers often have but 
alternative for selling their products, and this is often 
intermingled with credit advances" (43, Annex 9, p. 3). 
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is not the same thing as saying that the farmer is a price 
taker, though he definitely is one. The point is that such 
farmers receive substantially less than the price which is de­
termined by forces upon which they have no control - in 
the case of wheat in Iran by the government's policy. The 
market price of wheat in Iran has been kept at a low level by 
the government's intervention (see Chapter 10), yet the price 
received by these village farmers is significantly lower than 
the market price. These farmers sell their crops before it 
is harvested at large discounts because they have no alterna­
tive source of obtaining credit. For these farmers, who do 
not even own their crops when it is harvested, the primary 
problem is that of credit shortage and chronic indebtedness. 
This problem - which is not confined to this area or to 
Iran - is recognized as a crucial obstacle to efficient agri­
cultural marketing.^ 
For those wheat farmers - either the commercial farmers 
or villagers - who do not sell their crops green, the situa­
tion is slightly more favorable. As it is described in great 
detail in Appendix A the government takes certain actions to 
keep the pries of wheat at a low level. The wheat farmers 
have very few choices in selling their product. They can 
Of all handicaps to efficient agricultural marketing, 
chronic indebtedness is probably one of the most important 
for many millions of small producers" (1, p. 108). 
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either sell their crop to the government agencies at a low 
price, or to the merchants who offer them a slightly better 
deal. In the past few years this price has been so low as to 
make wheat farming an unprofitable enterprise. Only in 1974 
did the government raise its purchase price to a level high 
enough to enable wheat farmers to reap a modest profit. 
Cotton Market 
The government does not interfere - directly at least -
in the cotton market» Prices are determined by the "market 
forces". But the market is far from the competitive model 
described above. The marketing problems of Iranian agri­
cultural products appears in their most glaring form in the 
cotton market. Once again, part of the problem is directly 
attributable to the "credit problems" of the village farmers. 
But the major defects in the cotton market stem from the "im­
perfections" in the market, 
A majority of small cotton farmers sell their crops 
green. As it was described in Chapter III, the village 
farmers sell their unharvested crops to the local banakdar 
or the traveling green buyer, or perhaps to a small city 
merchant. But these green buyers are mere middlemen. They 
resell this cotton - at a profit of course - to any one of the 
handful of giant trading companies who are among other things 
104 
- cotton exporters. These giant conglomerates have virtual 
monopoly power in their dealings with the farmers. No matter 
who buys the cotton from the farmers in the first place, it 
finally ends up in the hands of one of the companies.^ 
In this respect - unlike the credit situation - there 
is little difference between the village and commercial 
farmers. In the final analysis they all must accept the 
price offered by these buyers. 
Cotton farmers in this region number in hundreds, per­
haps much more. Furthermore, they constitute a heterogenous 
group with divergent interests. Members of this "group" range 
from the small village farmer with one hectare of cotton, to 
the large commercial farmer - merchant with hundreds of 
hectares of cotton. There is virtually no possibility of 
collusion among these producers. Opposing this myriad of 
small and large farmers are a handful of buyers, well organized, 
all powerful, and closely connected by their common interest,^ 
They are the major buyers of cotton - both the lint and the 
seeds - in this area. The lint is mostly exported to foreign 
markets, and the cotton seeds are used for its oil content in 
^One of these companies, the Behshar Industrial Group, 
had gross sales of $250 million in 1352. 
2 There is ample evidence of collusion among the above 
mentioned trading companies. This collusion is resulted in a 
de facto monopoly in the cotton seed market and to a lesser 
extent in the cotton lint market as well (29, p. 218), 
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their own cotton-seed crushing plants. 
For a number of reasons, the cotton farmers must accept 
the prices offered them by these buyers. To begin with, 
most of the cotton produced must be exported to foreign 
countries, as the demand of the domestic industries is well 
below the country's supply of cotton lint. But exporting 
cotton requires a "license", or a "permit" from the govern­
ment. The "permit", however, is given to only a few 
merchant companies, mainly the same trading companies men­
tioned above. Thus the cotton producers = or even their 
cooperatives, to the extent that they exist - have no alterna­
tive but to sell to those who are in a position to export the 
cottons. 
One could hypothesize that, were cotton exports free for 
everyone who had cotton to sell, the price of cotton in Iran 
would have been the same as the "world market price", In 
that case the only difference between cotton prices (of the 
same quality) in Gorgan and, say, Liverpool, would be the 
transportation costs. Although even at the present time price 
of cotton in Iran generally moves in the same direction as the 
world price, at times the difference becomes much more than can 
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be accounted for by the transportation costs.^ Such differ­
ences are, of course, nothing but monopoly profits accruing 
to those who possess the "license" to export cotton. These 
licenses are at times sold, by those who hold them to the 
merchants or even cotton producers themselves who cannot ac­
quire it in any other way. 
The situation is much worse in the cotton seed market. 
Being extremely perishable, cotton seeds cannot be stored 
more than a few days in the regular storage houses. Building 
the necessary storage facilities are well beyond the financial 
capabilities of the farmers. Thus the farmers sell their 
cotton seeds at whatever price is offered them. 
Cotton seeds are used for their oil contents, There are 
only a few "vegetable oil" companies in Iran who buy practical­
ly all of the cotton seeds produced in this area. Once again, 
these oil extracting companies - with the exception of one be­
longing to the army - are the subsidiaries of the giant con­
glomerates mentioned previously. The cotton seed buyers, 
therefore, are by and large the same companies that buy the 
cotton lints. The price of the cotton seeds - which is lower 
now than a decade ago ^ is virtually dictated by these eom-
^Due to the differences in the grading system, it is dif^ 
ficult to establish the exact relationship between the price 
of cotton lint in Gorgan and the world market price. However 
Dr. M. Gorgani has demonstrated that while the two prices move 
more or less in the same direction, the correspondence is not 
exact. It is not unusual to find periods when lint prices in 
Gorgan remained constant while world prices increased (29, pp. 
227-229). 
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panies. The farmers have the choice of selling their cotton 
seeds at the "set" price, or let them rot. 
Unfortunately, adequate price data is not available to 
investigate the effects of this "imperfection" in the cotton­
seeds market. Nevertheless, with whatever data could be 
gathered, the general trend can be established. In the eleven 
years between 1342 to 1352, the price of cotton-seed dropped 
1 
from 7000 Rls./ton to 6500 Rls./ton. A reduction of 7%. 
During the ten year period of 1342 to 1351 (the latest year 
for which data is available) the general food index rose by 
more than 28% (75, p. 621). The price index of vegetable oil 
- the main substance of which is cotton seed oil - increased 
from 115.7 in 1349 to 133.9 in 1350, and to 156.4 in 1351, 
and at the end of 1351 it stood at 189.1 (75, pp. 623=629). 
Thus between 1349 and 1351, price of vegetable oil increased 
by more than 63%, while during the same period the price of 
cotton seed in Gorgon, increased by a mere 9%. These data 
may not be conclusive. But the cotton farmers in this region 
are convinced that cotton seeds are undervalued, mainly be­
cause there is little, if any, competition among the buyers. 
Competition, the economic textbooks tell us - is a 
healthy and driving force in a market economy. It squeezes 
out the inefficient producers and retains the most viable 
^Data gathered in Gorgan by this writer. 
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ones. It prevents the consumer from paying "exorbitant" 
prices and it provides an environment in which the producers 
sell their crop where it fetches the highest price. 
If there is any truth in the textbook panegyrics of a 
competitive market, then the source of many of the problems 
described above may be traced to the "structural" defects of 
the cotton - or for that matter the wheat - markets. How­
ever, there is a fundamental difference between the market 
"defects" in the two cases of wheat and cotton. 
It was mentioned before that nearly all famners inter­
viewed were dissatisfied with the existing markets for their 
products. Strangely enough, however, despite the absurdly 
low price of wheat compared to that of other crops, especially 
cotton - the dissatisfaction was much more pronounced for the 
cotton market. The farmers in Iran unlike their counter^ 
parts in the U.S. whom this writer had occasion to meet -
do not mind government intervention in their economic af­
fairs, Their complaints were not directed at the government's 
policy of wheat price control per se. This was particularly 
true among the village wheat farmers. Their objection was to 
the fact that the government's purchase price - which ultimate­
ly determines the market price of wheat - was set with little 
regard for the costs of production and the general cost of 
living. Other objections were directed against the rigidity 
of the government's specifications, and the corruption of the 
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buying agents. 
One could devise a scheme whereby a single buyer - say the 
government - buys the crops from the farmers at a specified 
price. If this purchase price is set at a "reasonable" level, 
the farmers would probably welcome the offer and sell their 
crops to the government. Under such a scheme, the disad­
vantages of not reaping windfall profits in "good" years, is 
offset by the merits of a guaranteed market and a stable 
price. Though such policies may create bureaucratic problems 
and corruption, one must nevertheless admit that they are con­
ceptually workable. The problems with the "wheat market" in 
Iran, is therefore attributable to the methods of implementa^ 
tion of the policy of government intervention.^ 
The problems in the cotton market, however, stem from 
different sources. The unequal bargaining powers of the 
sellers and the buyers has created a lopsided market. Eco­
nomic theory teaches us that in a market where a single buyer 
faces a large number of sellers, the buyer is in a position to 
reap huge "monopsony" profits which he would not have been 
^The advantages of stable prices should not be under­
estimated. Abbot considers a "reasonably" stable prices for 
farm products as one of the main conditions for providing 
production incentive to the fanners. He adds, however,- and 
this is what has been overlooked in Iran, that prices thus 
set should have a relationship with the costs of production 
(see 2, pp. 350-351). 
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able to reap in a market where the buyers compete for the 
purchase of the product. While the cotton market in Gorgon 
area does not represent a "pure" monopsony, for there are 
more than one buyer, it is nevertheless very close to it. 
There is every indication of total collusion among the giant 
companies who buy most of the cotton lints and virtually all 
of the cotton seeds. For all practical purposes, there is 
only one "buyer" in the cotton market, thus rendering the 
situation a - de facto - monopsony. 
The "buying party"? naturally wants to pay as little 
as possible for the commodities he buys. This is, of course, 
true in all markets, and in all enterprises where maximum 
profit is the motive. In a competitive market this desire to 
buy cheap on the part of a purchaser is "checked" by the 
existence of other buyers. If the purchase price is set too 
low by one buyer, he ends up with no purchase at all. 
In the cotton market in this region there is no "checks" 
of the sort described above. The buyers can set a price 
which they consider right. The sellers have a choice to sell 
at this price or not to sell at all. As it works out. and as 
one may expect, the farmers sell their cotton and their cotton 
seeds every year at the "market" price. The final outcome 
of this situation being that every year a substantial amount 
of capital - which under a competitive market would have 
accrued to the farmers - is transferred from the farmers to 
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these "conglomerates". Small wonder that the farmers are un­
happy with the markets for their crops. 
It may be difficult to solve the major problems of the 
farm sector in Iran in a short period of time. It may be a 
long time before the policies aimed at increasing the tech­
nical efficiency of the farms bear fruit. But there are many 
steps, which require no fancy plans, and which can almost im­
mediately improve not only the living conditions of the 
farmers but technical efficiency as well. If there is any 
relation between the price received by farmers for their crops, 
and the efficiency and enthusiasm with which they work, then 
the mere termination of this yearly transfer of capital may 
be conducive to agricultural development.^ 
The solution to this problem does not seem very diffi­
cult. One possibility would be for the government to set a 
purchase price and buy the produced cotton - at the world 
market price, less the transportation and the administration 
costs - and export it, or sell it to domestic industries. 
1 
The following calculations indicate the magnitude of 
this "capital transfer". 
In 1351, total cotton produced in Gorgan area amounted 
to 385,501 tons (53, Table 2). This came to 127,816 tons 
of lint, and more than 250,000 tons of cotton seed. 
In the decade of 1341-1351, price of cotton lint has 
increased by almost 200%. If price of cotton seed had in­
creased by half as much, which the farmers believe it cer­
tainly would have in a "free" and competitive market, cotton 
seed prices would have been 6000 Rls./ton higher than what 
they are today. Thus the farmers would receive an additional 
1,500,000,000 Rls. for their cotton seed (roughly $22,000,000) 
each year. 
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The other would be to allow the farmers - or their coopera­
tives - to export cotton themselves. By increasing the num­
ber of exporters and the consequent competition among the 
buyers, cotton lint prices would cease to be subject to ma­
nipulation by any single buyer. As for the cotton seed prices, 
the solution may not be that simple. Cotton seed crushing 
plants require heavy investments and cannot be expected to 
grow in numbers in the near future. Thus the main purchasers 
of cotton seeds will continue to be the same trading companies 
for a while.^ Government price regulations, therefore, seem 
to be the only possible way for the farmers to receive a 
higher price for their cotton seeds. 
The problems mentioned in the foregoing discussions are 
just part of the whole set of problems generally referred to 
as marketing problems. The widespread green selling by the 
small farmers, and the "imperfect" markets, however are the 
most important problems faced by the farmers in this area. 
Furthermore, many other problems have their roots inithe 
shortage of credit and monoplastic markets. Shortage of 
credit is the main reason for the extremely high producer" 
consumer "margins" of wheat and cotton sold by the small 
farmers. The imperfection in the market for farm products 
reduce the prices the farmers receive and this has a negative 
1 
Other uses of cotton seed - such as their use in animal 
feed - are quite limited at the present time. 
113 
effect on their incentive to produce more efficiently. 
In conclusion, this chapter has dealt with the most im­
portant problems of marketing farm products in this area. 
Problems such as poor roads and transportation facilities, 
large number of middlemen and inadequate storage facilities 
are also present and add to the producer-consumer margin. 
In the light of the credit shortage and the imperfect markets 
which characterize the farm sector of this region, however, 
the former problems are of secondary importance. 
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CHAPTER VI. WATER SCARCITY 
The table on page 28 reveals that about 70% of both types 
of farmers consider water shortage to be a serious problem, 
hampering their operations. To be sure Iran is an arid 
country and water is a limited resource in agricultural 
production. Shortage of water has been described by some 
as a major obstacle for agricultural development. This, 
however, cannot be said for the Gorgan area, which receives 
more than 24 inches of rainfall annually. While a part of 
this region receives very little rainfall and is considered 
"desert", other parts receive as much as 45 inches of rain­
fall annually. There are more deep and semi-deep wells in 
this area than in any other part of the country. In fact, 
about 20% of the semi-deep wells existing in the entire 
country, are located in this area (75, pp. 323-331). It is 
therefore surprising to find a large percentage of farmers 
in this area reporting water shortage as a pressing problem 
in their operation. 
To understand this, one must recognize the manner in 
which water is used in agriculture. Water, like labor, is 
used most intensively during certain periods of the year. 
Furthermore; water unused during the winter and spring is 
^(41,- pp. 9-10). It must be mentioned that there is 
room for improvement in this area to a great extent. 
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largely gone to waste and cannot be used during summer when 
it is needed most.^ Thus it is crucial to differentiate 
between the general availability of water and water avail­
ability during certain peak periods. Moreover, since each 
crop requires water in a particular quantity by months of the 
year, abundance or shortage of water in an area depends upon 
the types of crops produced in that area as well as the 
pattern of water availability. 
The information on "water problems" conveyed by Table 5 
on page 28 may now be seen in a slightly different light. 
While there does exist widespread shortage of water in this 
region, the serious water shortage occurs only during certain 
periods - about two to three months of the year - when cotton 
fields are in need of irrigation. Due to the rapid increase 
in the amount of land devoted to cotton production in the past 
few years, this problem of water shortage has been aggravated. 
This is a clear example of the existing interdependence 
among economic variables. The price of wheat has been kept 
at a constant level for many years by the government, while 
price of cotton has been steadily increasing. There has thus 
occurred a gradual increase in the amount of land used in 
cotton production, and a concomitant reduction in the amount of 
Building dams, as well as water reservoirs can, of 
course, avoid water waste to a large extent. 
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Table 10. The amount of water in cubic meter needed for various crops in 
different months (source, farm interviews) 
Spring Summer 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Parvardin Ordibehesht Khordad Teer Mordad Shahrivar 
Poorly irrigated 
cotton - — — 600 800 — 
Fairly irrigated 
cotton - - - 800 800 800 
Fully irrigated 
cotton - - 600 800 1200 1200 
Poorly irrigated 
wheat - 800 — - - -
Fully irrigated 
wheat 600 800 - - - -
Fully irrigated 
barley 600 800 - - - - •  
land sown to wheat. This product substitution has, among other 
things, altered the previous pattern of factor use. In the 
case of water, the substitution of cotton for wheat has meant 
an increase in the total amount of water used in this region, 
particularly during the summer months when the ratio between 
the amount of water available to the amount of water used is 
at a very low level. 
Table 10 shows the amount of water needed, in different 
months, by the three most important crops in the region. Cot­
ton, if it is irrigated, requires intensive irrigation during 
the summer months. Wheat and barley, need water during the 
first two months of spring. The total amount of water required 
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per hectare of cotton (fully irrigated) is more than twice as 
much as that needed for a hectare of wheat (also fully irri­
gated) . Thus the increase in the amount of land used for 
production of cotton, and the resulting concentration of de­
mand for water during the summer months, is at least in part 
- responsible for the present water scarcity in this region. 
The recent revision in the government's purchase price 
of wheat - increasing it from 6,000 to 10,000 Rls./ton -
will undoubtedly check the trend towards more cotton pro­
duction. This in turn, will alleviate the present water 
shortage to some extent. But to the extent that the govern­
ment is intent on controlling the price of wheat, drastic 
reductions in the amount of cotton produced is not likely 
to occur. The government must, therefore, be willing to 
undertake the necessary steps towards providing more water, 
as well âs irrigation facilities, for the farmers- This in­
cludes construction of dams and water reservoirs to prevent 
water waste during the off seasons. 
The system of water distribution is also in need of im­
provements. At the present time only the large farmers, 
who can afford to dig deep and semi-deep wells in their land 
or to acquire permits to pump water from the rivers, have more 
or less adequate water. The majority of small farmers have no 
access to any source of water and must rely only on the rain­
fall. To alleviate the problem of water scarcity in this 
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region, therefore, requires not only steps which would reduce 
the waste of water and increase the total amount of water 
available for irrigation, but a better distribution of the 
water as well. 
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CHAPTER VII. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE CROP PATTERNS 
Direct questioning was used to estimate the supply 
schedules for wheat in Gorgan and the Plane. In each of the 
five subregions, at least three villages and five commercial 
farmers were interviewed. The farmers were asked about their 
production responses at different wheat price levels. More 
specifically, the questions dealt with; 
1. The amount of land currently used for production of 
wheat (and other crops). 
2. The amount of land which would be used for production 
of wheat (and other crops) if - ceteris paribus -
the price of wheat were raised to; 
a - 10,000 Rls./ton 
b - 15,000 Rls./ton 
c - 20,000 Rls./ton 
The results obtained for each subregion are summarized in 
the following section. Before that, however, a few words 
must be said about an assumption made in analyzing the data. 
It has been assumed that within the commercial or village 
groups the individual farmers' response to price variations 
is not affected by the size of their farms, i.e., the 
response is randomly distributed., a farmer, so long as the 
size of his holdings qualifies him as a commercial farmer, 
is considered a "unit" within the commercial farmers group. 
Whether he has 100 or 1000 hectares of land, it is assumed, 
matters little in so far as his price responsiveness is 
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concerned.^ The same reasoning applies to the villages. 
The size of the village, it is assumed, does not affect the 
supply response of its farmers. This explains the fact that 
the table on page 121 is in terms of percentages rather than 
absolute figures. 
This table reveals several important facts. To begin 
with, in all of the five subregions the village farmers de­
vote a larger percentage of their land to wheat production 
than do the commercial farmers. The difference is much more 
2 than can be explained by "chance". Moreover, this phenomenon 
continues to exist at all levels of wheat prices. This means 
that now and in the future, the village farmers produce 
This statement may seem to contradict our basic dif­
ferentiation of the village (or small) fasnner from the large 
(or commercial) farmer. The above statement seems to imply 
that size of the farm has no effect upon the nature of deci­
sion making, whereas distinction between a village farmer and 
a commercial farmer is based on the premise that the two 
groups behave so differently as to merit their categorisation 
into two distinct groups. 
The point to be recognized, however, is that the size of 
the farm does affect the nature of farming, and of farmers' 
decision making behavior up to a limit. Beyond that, the 
significance of the farm size diminishes and eventually be­
comes nonexistent. Thus while there is a world of difference 
between a farmer with 3 hectares and another with 100 hec­
tares of land, there is very little difference between two 
farmers, one having 1000 and the other 2000 hectares of land. 
^In Areas I and V, the difference is 12%. In Area II it 
is 3%. In Area III, 10% and in Area IV, the difference 
is 20%. 
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Table 11. The percentage of land sown to cotton and wheat under different 
wheat price levels 
Currently Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Wheat Cotton Wheat Cotton Wheat,. Cotton Wheat cotton 
Commercial 
Farms 
Village 
Farms 
Commercial 
Farms 
Village 
Farms 
Commercial 
Farms 
Village 
Farms 
Commercial 
Farms 
Village 
Farms 
28% 57% 
36% 56% 
41% 54% 
44% 40% 
52% 17% 
37% 47% 
57% 34% 
Area I; 
37% 53% 50% 44% 79% 21% 
55% 37% 73% 22% 98% 2% 
Area II; 
51% 44% 68%, . 29% 91% 9% 
69% 24% 83% 12% 94% ' 2% 
Area III; 
48% 35% 63% 30% 82% 15% 
64% 13% 86% 10% 92% 
47% 37% 64% 24i 
73% 22% 89% 6% 95% 
Area V: 
4% 
82% 10% 
0% 
Farms 
Village 
Farms 
48% 10% 
60% 10% 
ou* 
76% 6% 84% 
9% 95% 
0% 91% 
1% 
0% 
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various wheat price levels 
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relatively more wheat than the commercial farmers. 
The reason for this difference in behavior is the nature 
of the village economy and the uncertainty faced by the small 
farmer. The small, village farmer depends on the products of 
his few hectares of land for his survival. There is no 
savings or credit or welfare programs he can depend on. Should 
his land fail to provide sufficient income to buy food, his 
family faces starvation. He must make sure this does not 
happen. Under such circumstances the farmer fears both the 
weather and the market and is forced to avert any risk and 
play it safe. He does not produce a crop which - though 
highly profitable in normal circumstances - might fail to 
provide him with the necessary income either because of bad 
weather or lack of market. Thus, while production of cotton 
was much more profitable in the years 1351 and 1352, a great 
majority of small farmers still produced some wheat on their 
land. 
This behavior might surprise the economist who is in 
the habit of assuming a single valued objective function 
incorporating only the expected level of profits. But the 
small farmer in Iran cannot afford to maximize the average 
expected returns if that plan has a large probability of 
failure. The risks of starvation involved in maximizing 
expected level of income are more than he is willing to take. 
Cotton is a risky crop. It needs a minimum amount of water. 
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it requires a rather specific weather conditions, it is prone 
to diseases - if it is not sprayed with insecticides - and 
most important of all it cannot be eaten! It must be marketed. 
The uncertainty about future market conditions is an important 
detriment to a small farmer's willingness to grow only cotton. 
Wheat, on the other hand, has several characteristics 
that a small farmer wants. It requires less total water than 
cotton per hectare and not as much summer water as cottons. 
Dry weather and lack of irrigation reduces the yield of 
wheat but seldom to zero in this region. Wheat is less prone 
to plant disease and above all it can be consumed directly. In 
fact wheat is the most important food item for the Iranian 
villager.^ 
Thus one can safely assume that at the present time# and 
for the near future, some wheat will be produced by the village 
farmers even at a zero market price for wheat. 
The commercial farmers, on the other hand, are mainly 
concerned with the maximization of long run profit. They can 
afford to average good years with bad years and produce for 
the market= Thus they produce what promises to yield them 
the highest profit« With low wheat prices of the past few 
^The "average" per capita consumption of wheat in Iran 
is about 187 kg. for the rural areas, however, the relevant 
figure is 235 kg. (43, Annex 14, Table 3.3). 
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years and high cotton prices, cotton pushed wheat off even 
marginal cotton land. 
Another point to be mentioned is the difference in the 
responsiveness of the farmers to wheat price variations. 
The following table brings the relevant data together. 
Table 12. Percentage increase in wheat production when price of wheat 
is raised front 6000 Rls. to 10,000 Rls./ton 
Area I Area II Area III Area IV Area V 
com Vill Com Vill Com Vill Com Vill Com Vill 
9% 19% 10% 23% 6% 12% 10% 16% 12% 16% 
Table 12 indicates that village farmers are more responsive 
to wheat price increase than the commercial farmers. While 
the magnitude of the difference varies between different areas, 
in all areas the village farmers are more responsive to wheat 
price increase than their commercial counterparts. Indeed, 
the difference in the price response - in this price range -
between these two types of farmers is statistically signifi­
cant at a = Qol, The reason for this difference is the same 
as that mentioned previously. For the reasons explained 
above, there exist a "bias" in favor of wheat production 
among the village farmers. It must be noted that even at the 
higher price of Rls. 10,000/ton for wheat, cotton is still 
more profitable than wheat in most types of land, given the 
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1352 price levels for cotton. The behavior of many farmers 
who react strongly to the wheat price increase, therefore, 
cannot be justified by the motive of maximizing the expected 
profit alone. It has been mentioned that - for a number of 
reasons - the small village farmers have an inclination to 
grow wheat rather than cash crops. But Table 12 shows that 
even the commercial farmers* response to the increase in the 
price of wheat is appreciable. 
The reason for the rather quick response of both types 
of farmers to an increase in the pries of wheat may be 
found in the manner in which the questions asked were in­
terpreted by the farmers. The question was: "How many 
hectares of land would you devote to wheat production, should 
the price of wheat increase to 10,000 Rls., while other 
prices, as well as production costs, remained unchanged at 
their present level?" 
Given the price of cotton in 1352, a wheat price of 
10,000 rials was still much too low to make a significant 
difference in profitability of wheat for most types of land. 
Price of cotton in that year reached the highest level it had 
ever reached, nearly double that of the previous year. Con­
sidering this price of cotton, the farmers' response to an 
increase ^n the price of wheat "should" have been much less 
than it actually was. If, however, we assume a more "normal" 
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price for cotton, say something lower than the record price 
of 1352, but higher than that of 1351. Then wheat production 
— with a price of 10,000 Rls./ton — becomes competitive with 
cotton. The actual response of the farmers becomes much more 
"reasonable" when a more realistic price is considered for 
cotton. 
One cannot be sure of what actually happened. The 
farmers' great response to a change in the price of wheat 
might have been caused by a variety of factors, some of which 
have been mentioned in connection with the small farmers "bias" 
towards wheat production. But it is also tempting to specu­
late that — regardless of the exact meaning of the questions 
asked -- the farmers did indeed assume a lower price for cotton 
than that of 1352. It should not be surprising to find that 
the farmers -- in making their production decisions — do not 
merely consider the previous year's price levels, but rather 
consider an average of the past few years, as well as the 
possibility of continuation of the present trends. As it 
turned out, the farmers were correct in doubting the continu™ 
ation -- or even the stability ~ of that year's unusually 
high cotton prices.^ 
When wheat prices are raised to 15,000 Rls./ton and then 
to 20,000 Rls./ton, the general trend, observed above, 
^See Chapter 10, pp. 203-216. 
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continues. Tables 13 and 14 bring the relevant data together. 
Table 13. Percent of land used for wheat, when price of wheat is 15,000 
Rls./ton 
Area I Area II Area III Area IV Area V 
Com Vill Com Vill Com vill Com vill Com Vill 
50% 73% 68% 83% 63% 86% 64% 89% 82% 84% 
Table 14.. Percent of land used for 
20,000 Rls./ton 
wheat, when price of wheat is 
Area I Area II Area III Area IV Area V 
Com Vill Com Vill Com vill Com Vill Com Vill 
?9% 98* 91% 94% 79% 92% 82% 95% 95% 91% 
There can be no mistake about the general trend. Village 
farmers — for the reasons mentioned previously, produce rela­
tively more wheat than the commercial farmers, at all price 
levels.^ 
^The only exception occurs for Area V, where at the price 
of 20,000 Rls./ton of wheat, village farmers grow relatively 
less wheat than do the commercial farmers. This phenomenon 
has an easy explanation. Area V is the desert plain of low 
quality, salty land. The village farmers — mostly Turkmen 
tribes — have no choice but to grow barley in a large portion 
of their land. Their land, in many cases, is not suitable for 
wheat production. In addition to this, barley is needed for 
livestock which most Turkmen villages keep. 
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Aggregation of the Supply Schedules 
It is time now to aggregate the separate supply "curves" 
of each subregion into a supply schedule for the whole area 
of Gorgan and Dasht. For the sake of clarity, the separation 
between the commercial and the village farmers will continue 
to be maintained temporarily. The village supply schedules 
for wheat, therefore, will be aggregated separately from the 
commercial supply curves. Thus we shall end up with two dif­
ferent aggregated supply schedules. 
The procedure used for aggregating the supply curves is 
a simple one. The amount of land used for wheat production 
— at each level of wheat prices — for all areas, are summed 
up, and then divided by the total land in the area. This 
gives an "average" of the percentage of the land devoted to 
wheat production — at each price level —^ for the area of 
this study. It must be noted that in this method, the size 
of each subregion is given a "weight" in calculations of the 
mean, proportional to the hectares of land in that region. 
The procedure may be stated as follows: 
Let 
L i. stand for The percentage of the land used for 
wheat production (w), by the com­
mercial farmers (c), in the sub-
region (i), at a price of wheat = j. 
^This procedure is carried out once for the commercial 
farmers, and once for the village farmers. 
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Let 
K. Stand for The total amount of land (hectares) 
in the sub-region (i). 
Then 
It follows that 
is the amount of land used for wheat 
production - by the commercial 
farmers - in the subregion (i), when 
price of wheat = j. 
Zc = 
1=1 
Z is what we are interested in. It is the percentage of the 
land used for wheat production, by the commercial farmers, 
in all of the subregions, when the price of wheat is equal 
to j.l 
These calculations must be carried out for j = 6 Rls./kg, 
i = 10, j = 15, and j = 20 Rls./kg.^ An equal number of calcu­
lations are required to derive the percentage of land in the 
area of this study which is devoted to wheat production by the 
Zg is nothing but the "weighted mean" of the percentage 
of the land used for wheat by the commercial farmers in all 
five subregions. 
2, 
'Prices of all other crops are assumed constant. 
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village farmers. In this case what must be calculated is 
'w 5 
I K. 
i=l 1 
Table 15 shows the results of these calculations. This 
information is translated into the supply schedules shown in 
Figure 9. 
As it was mentioned previously, the trend is quite simi­
lar for both groups of farmers. The village farmers produced 
relatively more wheat at all price levels for wheat, and show 
a greater response to wheat price variations than do the com­
mercial farmers. The reasons for the village farmers' inclina­
tion toward wheat production have been explained previously. 
Basically the same factors give rise to a more elastic supply 
schedule of wheat (at least in the first segment of the 
curves) for the village farmers. 
There remains one final step in the process of finding 
one schedule representing the supply of wheat in Gorgan and 
Dasht. This step, however, is a difficult one. There is no 
data on the share of each of the above groups — the com­
mercial and village farmers — in the total land in Gorgan and 
Dasht regions. 
Using a number of observable facts one will conclude that 
the "village farms" amount to more hectares of land than the 
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Table 15. The percentage of land sown to cotton and wheat at different 
price levels of wheat, for all areas 
Currently Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Wheat Cotton Wheat Cotton Wheat Cotton Wheat Cotton 
Commercial 39% 42% 48% 36% 69% 22% 85% 11% 
Farms 
Village 
Farms 50% 31% 67% 20% 83% 10% 94% 2% 
"commercial farms". This, however, is only a conjecture and 
cannot be proved. The number of small farmers, obviously, is 
much more than that of large farmers. But the members of the 
latter group — by definition — hold many times as much 
land as those of the former categories. While super large 
farmers are few in this part of the country, there are farmers 
with 500 or even more than a thousand hectares of land. 
Many of the small, village farmers, on the other hand, own no 
more than three or four hectares of land. Thus the mere 
knowledge that the small farmers outnumber the large ones by 
a multiple, does not tell us anything about the relative share 
of each group in the total hectares of land in this area. 
Yet a decision must be made. We must estimate the portion 
of the land farmed by the commercial type farmers and that 
farmed by the village farmers. This is necessary if anything 
meaningful is to be said about the consequences of wheat 
price increases. Thus, conjectural and inaccurate as it may 
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be — we must estimate one supply schedule for wheat, for the 
area of this study. It must be pointed out that inasmuch as 
the trends in both the commercial and village supply schedules 
are very similar, the resulting "combined" supply curve should 
not be much different than what we could get, if we had ade­
quate information. 
One way to construct a single supply schedule for wheat 
in this area is to take the average of the two curves, i.e. 
give both types of farmers equal weight. This, however, is 
not reasonable in the light of our observations. Based on our 
conversations with the officials of the "Land Department",^ 
we can estimate the ratio of land held by "commercial" farmers, 
to noncommercial farmers as 2 to 3. Using this estimate the 
aggregate supply function for wheat in this region can be 
derived, as it is shown in Figure 10. 
Table 16. aggregate supply function for wheat 
Currently Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Wheat Cotton Wheat Cotton Wheat Cotton Wheat Cotton 
46% 35% 59% 26% 76% 15% 90% 5% 
A literal translation of the title would be "Department 
of the Properties". In fact, however, this office is con­
cerned with land holdings. 
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Figure 10. Aggregate supply schedule for wheat in Gorgan and 
the Plain 
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CHAPTER VIII. THE EFFECT OF WHEAT PRICE INCREASE ON 
ACREAGE UNDER VARIOUS CROPS, EMPLOYMENT AND 
SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
The aggregate supply schedule of wheat, derived in the 
manner described in the last chapter, can be used to estimate 
the impact of variations in the price of wheat upon the 
production of wheat in the area of this study. The addition­
al information gathered through the interviews can also help 
us to estimate the effects of variations in the price of 
wheat upon the output of other crops, which compete with 
wheat for the available factors of production. 
When the price of wheat is increased, more wheat will be 
produced.^ More land for wheat production means less land 
for other crops. Thus an increase in the price of wheat re­
sults in a change in the amount of each crop produced. As 
wheat production expands, the production of other crops con­
tracts, in varying degrees. 
To the extent that each crop uses a different mix of 
factors of production, the change in the amount of each crop 
produced leads to a change in the quantity of these factors 
being demanded. In particular, should an increase in the 
price of wheat -- and the resulting increase in the acreage 
The extent of the increase in wheat output depends upon 
the elasticity of the supply schedule. 
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and the amount of wheat produced — cause a reduction in the 
acreage and production of a crop which is more labor in­
tensive than wheat — e.g. cotton or rice, — then total de­
mand for workers will fall in this area. Variations in the 
level of employment, therefore, is one of the possible out­
comes of a change in the price of wheat. 
Another likely outcome of an increase in the price of 
wheat is a change in the distribution of income. Wheat is 
the staple food in Iran. The average per capita consumption 
of wheat in Iran is about 18? k.g. However, poor people and 
rural residents consume much more than this amount, while 
middle and upper income Iranians consume much less than this 
average. Obviously, an increase in the price of wheat does not 
affect all sections of the population uniformly. The poorer 
segments of the population are affected by this price size 
much more than are the middle and upper income groups. The 
"employment effect" of an increase in the price of wheat, 
mentioned before, also mainly affects the low inëôme groups. 
Finally, the change in the amount of each crop produced 
affects the volume of imports - or exports - of that product 
and thereby the country's balance of trade. Increases in the 
volume of wheat production reduces the imports of wheat to 
Iran, but this will be accompanied by either a decrease in the 
export of cotton, or an increase in imports of other grains, 
or both. 
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To summarize/ a change in the price of wheat alters the 
present mix of crop productions and thereby affects the level 
of employment, income distribution and the balance of trade. 
With the aid of the collected information, we now proceed to 
assess quantitatively each of the above mentioned theoretical 
consequences of an increase in the market price of wheat. 
Since the primary effect of an increase in the price of wheat 
is bringing about a change in the amounts of various crops 
produced - which then brings about the other "secondary" 
effects = the first step of the analysis should be the 
estimation of the consequences of wheat price increases upon 
the level of output of various crops. 
The Present Situation 
According to the information gathered from the interviews 
conducted for this study,^ the production of major crops in 
Gorgan and Dasht are as shown in Table 15. It must be pointed 
out that the cropping pattern estimated from our sample survey 
does not exactly agree with available government data. While 
the sample survey is subject to sampling error because of the 
small size of the sample, the official data is not completely 
^Based on a sample of 28 commercial farmers and IS 
villages. 
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Table 17. Percentage and hectares of land under various crops in Gorgan 
and Dasht at the present time (from farm interviews) 
Wheat Cotton Barley Sunflower Soybean Rice Others 
Percent 46% 35% 13.3% 2.5% 0.18% 1.4% 1.62% 
Hectares 259,440 197,400 75,012 14,100 1,015 7,896 9,137 
reliable either.^ According to the official statistics, the 
situation looks like this: 
Table 18. Percentage and hectares of land under various crops in Gorgan 
and Dasht at the present time (from government data) 
Wheat Cotton Barley Sunflower Soybean Rice Others 
Percent 47.8% 30% 14% 3% 0.17% 1.1% 4.7% 
Hectares 270,000 170,000 80,000 17,000 1,000 6,500 19,500 
Since the differences between the two estimates are not 
great, ws would not be far off the mark by using our 
^he usual manner in which these "official" estimates are 
made are as follows. The total amount of the crop produced 
is somehow estimated. This figure is then divided by a num­
ber which is assumed to represent the "average yield" of that 
crop. The resulting number is the total amount of land under 
this particular crop. There are several sources of serious 
error in this scheme. First, it is very difficult -- and 
for some crops even impossible — to estimate total production 
in each year without accurate record keeping. For instance, 
total production of cotton is derived by the records of the 
lint separating plants in this area. This may lead to some 
inaccuracies, but still it is reasonably realistic. For wheat 
and barley, however, there is no way one can come up with such 
a reasonably accurate figure. Much of the wheat produced does 
not reach the market, as it is consumed locally. 
Another source of error is the estimate of the "average" 
yield of each crop. There is no need to point out that if the 
total product is unknown (footnote continued on following page) 
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estimates.^ 
The Output Effect 
It has been mentioned before that the primary effect of 
an increase in the price of wheat is to alter the share of 
each crop in the total cultivated land. In this region the 
greatest amount of substitution occurs between wheat and 
cotton. 
Table 19 summarizes the changes that take place as 
the price of wheat is raised to 10, 15 and 20 Rls./kg from its 
initial price of 6 Rls./kg. 
When price of wheat is raised from 6 to 10 Rls./kg 
the hectares of land under wheat increases from about 259,000 
to 333,000. This is an increase of 28% or about 73,000 
hectares of land. A bulk of this land comes from that 
(Footnote continued from previous page) (or at best roughly 
estimated), and the total amount of land under this crop is 
also not known, then the yield itself cannot be determined 
except by conjecture. We end up with a vicious circle. The 
official figures, therefore, are at best rough estimates. 
^Using our sample results has the additional advantage of 
making our work more consistent. The information upon which 
the subsequent analysis will be based are derived from the same 
sample survey- It is only reasonable, therefore, to select 
the starting point also from the information provided by the 
sample survey. In this way, any overestimations, or under-
estimations will most likely remain consistent throughout the 
analysis. Inasmuch as we are primarily interested in the relar-
tive magnitude, rather than absolute numbers, the selection of 
our own estimates is a logical one. 
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Table 19. Production of various crops when price of wheat is at various 
levels (from farm interviews) 
wheat Cotton Barley Sunflower Rice Soybean Others 
46%^ 35% 13.3% 
a = 6 Rls./kg 
2.5% 1.4% 0.18% 1.62 
259,440 197,400 75,012 
b 
14,100 
= 10 Rls./kg 
7,896 1,015 
59% 26% 9.8% 1.6% 1.4% 0.18% 
332,760 146,640 55,272 9,020 7,896 1,015 
76% 15% 4.5% 
c == 15 Rls./kg 
1.1% 0.97% 0.1% 
428,640 84,600 25,380 6,204 5,470 564 
90% 6% 2.6% 
d * 20 Rls./kg 
0% 0.3% .02% 
507,600 33,840 14,664 0 1,692 113 
*The numbers may not sum up to 100% due to rounding errors. 
previously used for cotton production (50,000 hectares). 
Barley production is also reduced, as about 19,000 hectares 
of land is withdrawn from barley production and used for 
wheat. Sunflower production is also reduced. Rice and soy­
bean production are unaffected. 
It must be noted that this rather rapid response cannot 
be fully accounted for by the rise in profitability of wheat 
production. Presumably other considerations - notably risk 
aversion - have been taken into account in making this 
decision. 
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Although the survey did not cover yield changes associated 
with acreage changes, it seems safe to assume that less cotton 
in the mix of the crops will, among other things, raise the 
average yield of cotton and - to a lesser extent - of wheat. 
In recent years, due to a gradual reduction in the relative 
profitability of wheat especially as compared with cotton, 
more and more land has been transferred from wheat to cotton 
production. The difference in price levels has been so great 
as to make cotton production more attractive even on land with 
little or no summer irrigation possibilities which are much 
more suitable for wheat production. An increase in wheat 
prices should raise the average yield for both crops by re­
ducing the demand for summer water. Some lands well suited 
for wheat production will be withdrawn from marginal cotton 
production. This will raise the average yield for cotton 
produced in this region. The increase in the average yield of 
wheat is likely to be less drastic as some lower quality land 
- particularly those formerly used for barley production -
will be transferred to wheat production when price of wheat is 
raised. 
Part c of Table 19 shows the changes that take place when 
the price of wheat is raised to 15 Rls./kg. The reduction in 
the amount of land used for cotton production is indeed 
drastic. The land under wheat increases by 65% or 163,000 
hectares (compared to the current situation). Most of this 
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land is that formerly used for cotton production (more than 
112,000 hectares). However, production of all other crops 
are reduced as well. In particular, barley production is 
reduced by about 50,000 hectares, (65%). 
Part d of Table 19 shows the situation when the price 
of wheat is raised to 20 Rls./kg. Almost 90% of the land is 
now used for wheat production. Sunflower production is 
reduced to zero and rice production is confined to 0.3% of 
the land. Cotton is produced in 6% of the land. Barley 
production is reduced to 14.6 thousand hectares. This amount 
of land must be the kind of land which is not suited for wheat 
production by any means and can be used only for barley (the 
desert, salty land). 
The Employment Effect 
The primary consequence of an increase in the price of 
wheat is a change in the share of each crop in the total farm 
lands of this area. As wheat becomes more profitable, more 
land is transferred to its production from other crops. Since 
the degree of labor intensity of wheat production is not 
identical with that of other crops for which wheat is substi­
tuted, an increase in the price of wheat brings about a change 
in the number of workers needed for farm activities, and 
consequently in the level of employment in this area. 
Table 20 and Figure 11 show the estimated employment 
Table 20. The nuiotiei: of man-days of work required by selected crops during different months and 
the nuintier of workers needed in this area's farm sector during the peak month 
(price of wheat = Rls. 6/kg> (from farm interviews) 
Spring Summer Fall Winter 
Number of 
required 
Number of 
workers 
Crops Hectares 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 in the 
peak 
month 
needed 
in the 
peak month 
Wheat 259,440 .5 - 1 - - - - - 1 .5 - " - 259,440 9,266 
Cotton 197,400 .5 1 15 13 5 1 15 7 4 - - 2,961,000 105,750 
Barley 75,012 - - 1 - - - - - 1 - - 75,012 2,679 
Sunflower 14,100 - 7 2 4 6 3 28,200 1,007 
Soybean 1,015 - 4 15 13 13 3 15 - - - — - 15,225 544 
Rice 7,896 — 30 3 — 12 — — — — — •V — • 157,920 5,640 
Total No. 
of workers 
needed each 
month 
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Number of workers needed in the farm sector during different months 
(price of wheat = Rls. 6/kg) 
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situation at the present time. The technical information con­
tained in Table 20 are based on the estimates of the farmers 
interviewed and related to the prevailing methods of farming.^ 
As the figure shows, during the third month of spring 
(Khordad) which is the peak month of the farming season in 
this region, more than 124,000 workers are engaged in the 
agricultural activities. Although in no other month of the 
year so many workers are needed in the farms of this area, one 
can still take this figure to represent the number of workers 
which — given the need for their services — are available 
for work. This is equivalent to saying that — at the going 
wage rate — the supply of labor is equal to 124,000, or 
At the present time (i.e. year 1352) most of the 
operations required for wheat production in this region of 
the country are performed with machinery. This includes plow­
ing, discing and harvesting. (It has been estimated that 
about 95% of the wheat fields are mechanized (29, p. 243). 
The large farmers own their own farm equipment, while the 
small farmers rent these machines from other farmers. At any 
rate, it can be stated that wheat growing is — relative to 
most other crops produced in this region — highly capital 
intensive. 
Cotton, on the other hand, is highly labor intensive-
At the present time only plowing and discing is performed 
with machines. Weeding (which requires about 30 man-days of 
work for each hectare of cotton(, as well as harvesting 
(which requires almost an equal number of man-days per hec­
tare) are performed manually. It must be emphasised, however 
that — should the need arise — cotton production can become 
much less labor using. Applications of herbicides can save 
many man-days of work during the spring, while the use of 
cotton pickers can save an equal number of man-days during 
late summer and early fall. This, however, will take place 
only if labor costs are very high or the machinery prices are 
reduced. Given the availability and cost of labor, and the 
very high price of farm equipments cotton production will con­
tinue to be labor using for some time. 
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more. 
There are a number of reasons for this statement. To 
begin with the most important one. Table 20 lists six crops 
which, taken together, account for 554,000 hectares of land. 
This means that 10,000 hectares of land is unaccounted for. 
This is the land used for production of vegetable crops, 
tobacco, and orchards. These agricultural activities ob­
viously require workers, some of whom will be working on these 
activities during the third month of spring. To this extent, 
therefore, the figure of 124,000 is — if anything - an under­
estimation. 
It might, of course, be argued that while there may well 
exist this number of workers in this area during Khordad, 
some of them may be in this region only for a month or two and 
leave afterwards. They cannot, therefore, be included in the 
year-round labor force of this area. 
While there are some workers — whose number may be 
quite large — who migrate to this region during the peak 
months and leave soon after, it still can be maintained that 
they are part of the labor force of this area. The logic of 
this statement becomes clear when it is recognized that these 
migrant workers come to this region because there is no work 
in their own villages or towns and leave only when they cannot 
^Total land in the area of this study is 564,000 hectares. 
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find employment in Gorgan and Dasht. It must be remembered 
that the country as a whole has an unemployment rate of 10 
to 12 percent (41, p. 3). During the off seasons — when 
most farm workers are off their jobs throughout the country 
~ the unemployment rate must be larger than this. The farm 
workers who leave this area during the off season are, there­
fore, not very likely to find jobs elsewhere. They usually 
leave for their home villages where they can be with their 
relatives until the next season. It is not unreasonable, 
therefore, to assume that were there employment opportunities 
available for them in this region throughout the year, they 
would remain and continue to be part of this area's labor 
force.^ 
Finally, to say that the total available labor force in 
this region is equal to 124,000 implies the assumption that 
during the peak month (Khordad) there exists no amount of 
unemployment. This assumption was made simply because there 
is no reliable data about the rate of unemployment in this 
part of the country during Khordad. To the extent that 
unemployment does exist, the figure of 124,000 is an under­
wit must be noted that even those workers who —for any 
reason — do leave for their home villages must stay in Gor­
gan and Dasht for at least 5 months, and maybe more. This is 
because the two "peak" months are the third and the 7th months 
of the year. Very few workers leave this region between these 
two periods. 
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estimation of the available supply of farm workers in this 
region.^ 
Thus we may take the figure of 124,000 to represent the 
number of workers available for work in the farms of this 
region. Figure 12 shows the estimated fluctuation in the 
use of labor throughout the year. The peak month (when demand 
It must be emphasized that we are talking about farm 
workers. One must be careful to distinguish between the rate 
of unemployment in general and the rate of unemployment among 
the farm workers. This distinction is particularly important 
for Iran, where feudal values are still prevalent. Not every 
man - or woman - works for someone else, and particularly not 
on someone else's farm. Farm work is reserved for the lowest 
groups in the society's pyramid. 
Schultz points out the "...difference in earnings from 
farm work and from other work" as the explanation for this 
phenomenon. He maintains that for those people who have any 
opportunity to work in the cities, for example those who 
have had a few years of schooling, there exists other, non-
farm, jobs which pay much more than farm work. Thus, even if 
they are unemployed these people would rather wait in the 
towns and look for other jobs than to go back to the low pay­
ing farm jobs (81, pp. 26-27). 
Both of these explanations are relevant in the case of 
Iran. Thus an unemployment rate of 10% in the cities is not 
inconsistent with a tight labor situation in the farms» In 
short - and this is consistent with this writer's observation 
- it is quite likely that nearly all farm workers are em­
ployed in the month of Khordad in this region, the unemployment 
rate of 10% in the towns not withstanding. 
^Livestock activities have been excluded from this 
analysis. This is because there are very few commercial live-­
stock operations in this part of the country. The villagers 
do keep sheep and dairy eows mainly for their own consumption,-
but also partly for sale to others. There is, however, no 
data on the number of these animals. There is also no data 
on the number of man-days a farmer spends on his livestock 
"operation". Most likely, the wife — while performing other 
household duties — takes care of the animals as wellc 
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for workers is at its highest) is Khordad, with the 7th month 
(Mehr) coming a close second. Table 20 shows the cotton is 
responsible for a very large portion of demand for labor. 
During Mehr, in fact, only cotton requires labor. This 
points out the crucial role of cotton production in the 
economy of this region, and in particular in the lives of 
thousands of people who derive their livelihood from their 
sporadic work in the cotton fields. 
Before continuing our discussion, it must be mentioned 
in passing that here lies a tremendous source of "potential 
surplus labor". Should the economy begin to grow at a rate 
sufficiently rapid to hire the available pool of the un­
employed in the country, there needs to be little worry about 
the scarcity of labor. With introduction of modern equipment, 
tens of thousands of workers will become available for pro­
ductive activities elsewhere.^ 
Table 20 also shows the extreme fluctuation in the level 
of employment in this part of the country. Being primarily, 
and almost exclusively, an agricultural region, Gorgan and 
Dasht can offer very few of these seasonally unemployed farm 
workers any other job. while a small percentage of these 
people find such jobs as construction workers, by far the 
great majority remain idle throughout the "off season". 
^See Chapter IV, p. Ç2. 
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Ignoring for the moment the small percentage of workers who do 
find other jobs, total man-days "lost" due to seasonal unemploy­
ment amounts to about 28 million. This is a rough estimate 
of the waste of potentially productive manpower, which could 
conceivably be used for the betterment of the lives of these 
people themselves. To this important problem we shall re­
turn shortly. 
When price of wheat is increased to 10,000 Rls./ton the 
situation changes to that shown by Table 21 and the accompany­
ing Figure 12. In this case seasonal unemployment is less 
than that of the previous case, but this is only because the 
number of workers needed in the farm sector has decreased. 
Even in the peak month only 99,000 workers are needed for the 
new combination of crops produced. About 24,000 workers, 
therefore, may be classified as truly "surplus labor".^ 
Their services are not needed at any time of the year in the 
2 farm sector of this region. 
When price of wheat is raised to 15 Rls./kg, the situ­
ation is altered drastically (see Table 22 and Figure 13). 
The greatest number of workers needed in this case is about 
56,000. This means that — were the price of wheat to in-
^See Chapter IV, p. 62. 
^The alternative use to which these "redundant" workers 
can be put is discussed below. 
Table 21. The ntutiber of man-days of work required by selected crops during different months and 
the number of workers needed in this area's fcurm sector during the peak month 
(price ol: wheat « Rls. 10/kg) 
Number of Number of 
days workers 
Crops Hectares Spring Summer Fall Winter required needed in 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 in the 
Deak month 
the peak 
month 
Wheat 332,760 .5 - 1 - - - - 1 .5 — — - 332,760 11,884 
(1.00) — • 
Cotton 146,640 .5 1 15 13 5 1 15 7 4 2,199,600 78,557 
(1.7) 
Barley 55,272 - — 1 — — •• _ _ 1 _ ». •• 55,272 1,974 
(1) 
Sunflower 9,020 7 2 4 6 3 18,040 644 
(.1) 
Soybean 1,015 - 4 15 13 3 15 15,225 544 
Rice 7,89(5 -
— 20 3 - 12 — • — — • — 157,920 5,640 
Total nmnber 
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Table 22. The nijniber of man-days of work required by selected crops during different months and 
the nuniber of workers needed in this area"s farm sector during the peak month 
(pric<s of wheat * 15 Rls./kg) 
Number of Number of 
days workers 
Crops Hectares 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 required in the 
peak month 
needed in 
the peak 
month 
Wheat 428,640 .5 1 1.5 428,640 15,309 
(1.00) 
Cotton 84,600 .5 1 15 13 5 1 15 7 4 _ — .. 1,269,000 45,321 
(1.7) 
Barley 25,380 — 1 —, — — — — 1 — _ 25,380 906 
(1) 
Sunflower 6,204 — 7 2 4 6 3 12,408 443 
(.9) 
Soybean 564 - 4 13 13 3 15 8,460 302 
Rice 5,470 - - 20 3 - 12 - -
• '• 
- 109,400 3,907 
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Table 23. The miitiber of man-days of work required by selected crops during different months and 
the nuiriber of workers needed in this area's farm sector during the peak month 
(price oi: wheat = 20 Rls./kg) 
Number of Number of 
days workers 
Crops Hectares 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 required in the 
peak month 
needed in 
the pecik 
month 
Wheat 507,600 .5 1 _ _ - 1 .5 507,600 18,129 
(1.65) 
Cotton 33,840 .5 1 15 13 5 1 15 7 4 — _ _ 507,600 18,129 
(1.7) 
Barley 14,664 1 _ _ 1 _ _ _ 14,664 524 
(1) 
Sunflower 0 7 2 4 6 0 0 
(.9) 
Soybean 113 — 4 15 13 3 15 1,695 60 
Rice 1,692 — - 20 3 - 12 33,840 1,209 
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crease to 15 Ris./kg — the farm sector in this part of 
the country could "free" more than 58,000 workers. The man­
power lost due to seasonal unemployment also shrinks, as 
there are fewer workers on the farm at all times. 
Finally, when price of wheat is raised to 20 Rls./kg, the 
previous trend continues. The number of workers who now 
become "redundant" increases to more than 86,000. This 
means that an increase of this magnitude in the price of 
wheat — and the resulting product substitution — renders 
almost 70% of the workers currently engaged in the farm 
sector absolutely "redundant". Seasonal unemployment — 
though still high in a relative sense, is reduced in terms of 
the absolute number of man-days lost (see Figure 14). 
Two subjects, mentioned in passing in the last section, 
need further discussion. 
Surplus Labor 
It was seen that as price of wheat increases, and as 
wheat production increases at the expense of other crops — 
more and more farm workers become "redundant", in the sense 
that their services are not needed during any period of the 
year. There appears, therefore, "surplus labor" in the true 
sense of the term.^ The relevant question in this connection, 
^See Chapter IV. 
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then becomes; what can — or will - happen to these "freed" 
workers who have nothing to do in the farm sector as a 
result of the increase in the price of wheat. The answer to 
this question determines — to a great extent — the de­
sirability of a policy of wheat price increase. 
There is no doubt that in a country where more than half 
of the people are engaged in agricultural activities, and 
still domestic production of most farm products fall short 
of domestic demand, the farm sector is quite inefficient. 
There is no doubt also, that a fraction of the people now en­
gaged in farming activities could — given a transformation 
of the farm sector — feed and clothe the whole population. 
This, however, is not tantamount to saying that reduction 
of the number of people engaged in agricultural activities 
is necessarily a desirable situation. 
A number of theories of economic development have at­
tributed to the farm sector in an underdeveloped economy 
the "role" of providing — among other things — the workers 
that could be used in the industrial sector as the latter 
grows and is in constant need of cheap labor (26). This is 
not the place to evaluate the soundness of this prescription. 
Nevertheless, it can be emphasized that even in the above 
framework, reduction in the size of the farm sector is con­
sidered desirable only if the workers released from the farm 
sector are transferred to an industrial sector which uses 
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them more efficiently than the "over crowded" farm sector. 
A transfer of farm workers — inefficiently employed as they 
might be — to the urban areas is no improvement if these 
people are not absorbed by the industrial sector and are 
forced to live in shanty towns and beg or wash car windows 
to make a living. The basic criteria in judging the de­
sirability of a policy which creates "surplus labor" in the 
farm sector is, therefore, the need — in other sectors — 
for these people and the efficiency of utilization of human 
resources in those sectors. 
Where can the surplus labor — formed as a result of an 
increase in wheat prices — go to be employed more ef­
ficiently? 
The leading industry in Iran is oil. Its revenues are 
so large (especially in the past two years) as to overshadow 
every other aspect of the economy. It is the most important 
economic sector in all respect but employment. It hires a 
mere 0.6% of the labor force of the country. In the past the 
oil sector has contributed very little to increased employ­
ment and in all likelihood it will have a minimal employ­
ment impact in the near future as well. The newly created 
"surplus workers", there, have no hope of being employed in 
the oil sector. 
Judging by its past performance, the industrial sector 
as a whole is also unlikely to be able to provide employment 
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for these surplus farm workers. It has been estimated that 
during the years 1341 to 1346 (duration of the third plan) 
value added in the industrial sector increased by more than 
70%, while during the same period employment in this sector 
increased by less than 25% (41, p. 3). In fact, the employ­
ment creating capacity of the industrial sector is not even 
sufficient to absorb the addition to the labor force that 
comes about every year. The industrial and the oil sector 
combined absorb about 80,000 new workers each year, while 
the labor force is increasing by more than 300,000 each 
year (41, p. 3). Even at the present rate of growth of the 
labor force — and without the type of migrations which is 
being discussed here — it is estimated that the unemploy­
ment rate in Iran has been increasing at about 8% a year 
(41, p. 3). 
What all this means is that we cannot simply assume that 
the "surplus labor" freed from the farm sector can be ef­
ficiently employed in the other sectors of the economy. 
Should price of wheat increase, and should the workers who 
will then be left without a job leave the villages for the 
urban areas, the inevitable result would be a swelling in 
the number of urban unemployed, already estimated at 10-12% 
(41, p. 3). Furthermore, it must be emphasized that this 
process cannot push the urban wage rates down as there is 
very little room for this at the present time. Workers 
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receive extremely low wages which cannot stand much further 
reduction. The IBRO economists have estimated that the 
real wage rate for the construction workers in Tehran was 
lower in 1967 than what it was in 1959, and only in 1968 
increased to a level above the 1959 level (43, Annex 14, 
Table 7.6). It must therefore be concluded that migration 
of rural surplus workers to the urban centers can only 
create more "open" and "disguised" unemployment 
It.is in the light of these facts that a policy of 
wheat price increase must be assessed. An increase in the 
price of wheat — ceteris paribus — will "free" large num­
bers of workers from the farm sector. It is true that in 
a rapidly industrializing economy, where the other sectors 
require vast numbers of workers to expand, creation of sur­
plus labor in the farm sector may be desirable. The case 
in Iran,- however, is quite different. The problem hindering 
rapid industrialisation does not seem to be lack of cheap 
labor, as there are plenty of unemployed workers in all urban 
centers. Under these circumstances the employment effect 
of the envisaged wheat price policy — i.e. creation of 
surplus labor — must be deemed undesirable. 
^Disguised unemployment is used here in its original 
sense as it was used by J. Robinson. This type of unem­
ployment is quite large in Iran already. 
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Seasonal Unemployment 
Seasonal unemployment in the agricultural regions is 
thought to be unavoidable. By its very nature, farming re­
quires more work in certain periods and little or no work in 
other periods within a year. Thus employment in the farm 
sector fluctuates a great deal in different months of the 
year. Application of modern equipments in farming can reduce 
the absolute number of man-days wasted due to seasonal un­
employment, but it does little in providing off season jobs 
for those people who remain on the farms. At any rate, use 
of modern farm equipments in a large scale is beyond the 
ability of most underdeveloped economies. 
The amount of manpower wasted in the form of seasonal 
unemployment in Iran is indeed tremendous. Cotton and rice, 
two important crops in Iran, are produced with methods which 
are extremely labor intensive. These crops require large 
numbers of workers during a few months of the year and very 
few during other months. This fact largely accounts for the 
prevailing situation in Iran's farm sector where farmers and 
farm workers are overworked during some months, and totally 
idle during other months. In this way. millions of po­
tentially productive working days are wasted in the region 
of this study alone.^ 
^This problem is indeed quite general and applies not only 
to other parts of Iran, but to most other less developed coun­
tries as well. 
168 
No one can deny the urgent need of the less developed 
countries for such potentially productive manpower as are 
wasted due to seasonal unemployment. One needs only travel 
through the rural roads, pass through village streets, in­
spect the village bathhouse or school (if they exist) to 
recognize how much work needs to be done. Building small 
bridges, repairing the roads, paving the village streets with 
stones, repairing the old — or building new — bathhouses 
and schools require very little else except workers. The 
seasonally unemployed workers could engage in these — as 
well as other socially desirable — projects with very little 
real costs to the society. 
The problem is, however, that harnessing this immense 
pool of human energy in its full potential is very un­
likely — if not impossible — given the present structure 
of Iran's rural society. The fact that many people are 
idle most of the time in the rural areas does not necessarily 
imply that they are willing to work on communal projects, 
such as the ones mentioned before, without some kind of reward.^ 
^The main reason f or the lack of enthusiasm of idle 
workers to work on community projects with little or no mone­
tary rewards may be their position in the society. It is very 
difficult for a farm worker — who may have to leave the 
village to seek jobs elsewhere — to see the benefits of bet­
ter roads or a school to himself or his family. It is very 
unlikely that anyone who owns no land and is in the bottom of 
the village society should have the "communal feeling" 
necessary for working without the expectation of some sort of 
remuneration. 
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The private sector has proved incapable — or unwilling 
— to utilize the mass of unemployed workers in the rural 
areas of Iran (or for that matter in any other less developed 
country) to any considerable extent. This is of course what 
is to be expected. So long as unemployment exists in the 
economy# it is unreasonable for the private businessmen to 
hire workers who have to leave their factory a few months 
each year. The advantage of lower off-season wage rates is 
probably more than offset by the loss to the businessman of 
leaving his plant idle for a few months. 
Given the present structure of the economy, only the 
state is in the position to utilize the seasonally unem­
ployed workers. This, moreover, can be done through subsi­
dizing the public projects in the rural areas by giving the 
workers some kind of monetary rewards. This has not been 
done in Iran to any considerable extent. 
As it is, seasonal, unemployment must be taken to repre­
sent a pure loss to the society in terms of unused human 
energy. Any activity which gives rise to seasonal unemploy­
ment, therefore, must be considered to have an undesirable 
side effect. 
Cotton production, then, confronts us with a paradox. 
More land under cotton means more work for many people who 
would not be able to find jobs elsewhere* Yet, more land 
under cotton also means more seasonal unemployment. 
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Under the present circumstances — when unemployment in 
the country is in double figures — cotton production — using 
the same labor intensive technique — may be deemed more de­
sirable than wheat production, at least in so far as the 
employment creating effect of the two crops are concerned. 
Thus we may conclude that the "employment effects" of the 
envisaged wheat price policy which leads to more wheat and 
less cotton production is undesirable. 
Should the economy begin to absorb the presently un­
employed workers rapidly and a shortage of industrial labor 
develop, then an increase in the price of wheat would have 
desirable "employment effect" because: 
a. It leads to a decrease in demand for workers in the 
rural sector and thus provides the other sectors 
with more workers. 
b. It reduces the number of man-days lost in the rural 
areas due to seasonal unemployment. 
171 
CHAPTER IX. INCOME DISTRIBUTION EFFECT 
An increase in the price of wheat has a significant im­
pact upon the standard of living of a majority of the Iranian 
people. Thus to appraise the desirability of any wheat price 
increase, special attention should be paid to the income 
increasing or decreasing effect of wheat price change upon 
specific groups of people. In the first part of this chapter 
the present "wheat price" policy of the Iranian government — 
and its income distribution effect — will be reviewed. In 
the second part, the income distribution effect of wheat price 
increase will be analyzed. In the final section of this 
chapter a short discussion about the balance of trade effect 
of wheat price increase will be presented. 
Bread is the most important single element in the cost 
of living for millions of Iranians. On the average, Iranians 
consume between 150 and 190 Kilograms of wheat (niostly as 
bread) annually. Roughly 63 percent of the total caloric 
intake (both animal and plant calorie) of an "average" 
Iranian comes from wheat consumption (43, Annex 14, Table 3.9). 
However the percapita consumption of wheat among those in the 
lower income brackets is much more than the 150 to 130 kg. 
^The IBRD mission estimates the average annual wheat con­
sumption in Iran to be 187 kg per person (43, Annex 14, 
Table 3.9). 
* 
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which is the overall average. Table 24 illustrates this 
point. Thus those in the lowest income bracket spend close to 
Table 24. The percentage of income spent on bread, and per capita bread 
consumption, among various income groups in Tehran^ 
Percentage of Annual per capita 
Per capita income Per capita income income bread 
Rls. U.S. dollars spent on consumption 
bread kilogram 
Less than 8,000 less than 118 38% 234 
8,001 to 15,000 118 to 221 24% 230 
15,001 to 30,000 221 to 441 11.5% 220 
30,001 to 50,000 441 to 735 6% 193 
50,001 to 100,000 735 to 1,470 3% 173 
100,001 to 200,000 1,470 to 2,941 1.6% 171 
200,001 to 400,000 2,941 to 5,882 0.63% 140 
400,001 to 750,000 5,882 to 11,029 0.34% 140 
^Source? Personal sarmle survey in Tehran, 1352. 
40% of their income on bread alone. The percentage of income 
spent on bread is also very high for the second income group 
(mostly unskilled workers). This percentage drops rapidly 
as income is increased. 
The popularity of bread as a food item can be explained 
by its cheap price, compared with other food items. Bread is 
both filling and has a lot of calories. A kilogram of wheat 
has 3.080 calories and in June 1974 it cost about 
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7 Rls.^ Thus a hundred calories from wheat in that farm 
costs 0.2 Rls. Just to realize how cheap wheat really is, 
this price may be compared with the price of 100 calories 
from mutton which costs more than 256 Rls. at the retail 
level.^ Table 25 compares wheat with several possible substi­
tutes, as well as giving the annual per capita consumption 
of each item. 
The annual per capita consumption figures, clearly demon­
strate the dominance of bread in the average Iranian's diet. 
Partly by choice,- but mostly by necessity, the annual per 
capita consumption of bread in Iran is among the highest in 
the world. It may be noted that annual per capita consump­
tion of bread in Iran is three times as much as the annual 
per capita consumption of all other food items listed in 
Table 25, put together. Therefore an increase in the prices 
of bread is tantamount to a reduction in the standard of living 
for a large segment of the population of the country. Bread 
is so important and so cheap relative to other food that an 
increase in the price of bread has serious income reducing 
^This is the "average" retail price of wheat at harvest 
season in Iran. In Tehran, the price of wheat at this time was 
slightly higher than this level# while in the cities of 
Northern Iran it was 6.5 Rls, per kg, 
^The price used for mutton is the retail price in Gorgan, 
in June 1974. Price of mutton is slightly higher in Tehran. 
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Table 25. Calorie content, price^ and annual per capita consumption of 
selected food items in Iran*) 
Calories 
relative to 
calories 
in wheat = 100 
Price 
relative to 
price of 
wheat * 100 
Annual per 
capita 
consumption 
(ka) 
Wheat 100 100 187 
Potatoes 20 150 10.5 
Rice 116 400 26 
Beef 73 1500 3 
Mutton 78 2000 9.5 
Poultry Meat 41 1200 1.8 
Fish 43 1500 2.25 
^The prices used for these calculations are retail prices prevailing 
in May 1974. 
^Source: (43, Annex 14, Table 3.9, and for prices, personal survey;) 
effects. This renders bread price escalation political dyna­
mite. 
The governments in Iran have always found it a wise 
policy to keep bread prices at a low level even if it means 
incurring a huge cost to the public treasury. This policy 
of cheap bread price and urban bread subsidy in Iran goes 
back many years. In 1936 an organization was set up whose 
function was "... to secure adequate supply of wheat for the 
country, and prevent bread price increases..." (55). This 
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organization, functioning under the auspices of the Treasury 
Department, was called "The Cereal Price Control Corporation." 
This "corporation" was to "secure adequate supply of wheat" 
by buying and storing wheat at harvest time. The purchases 
would be primarily from domestic producers. Should this prove 
insufficient, wheat would be imported from abroad. On the 
other hand, the surplus wheat - if there was any - could be 
exported to foreign markets. In short this organization was 
authorized to intervene in all marketing activities involving 
wheat. 
In 1942, the year Iran was occupied by the Allied forces, 
the Cereal Organization became a branch of the "Food Office". 
In that year, Iran imported 42,000 tons of wheat and 25,000 
tons of flour (55). But this was an exceptional year. For 
several years after the war domestic wheat production was 
adequate and there was no need for imports. In fact, in the 
years 1346 and 1347 (1967 and 1968), the crop was very large 
and Iran exported more than 300,000 tons of wheat. The situ­
ation deteriorated, however, starting in 1969, when domestic 
production dropped more than 11% below the previous year (43, 
Annex 14, Table 2,4). 
In 1350, the "cereal Organization" became a subdivision 
of the department of rural cooperatives and it is now called 
"The Cereal and Sugar and Tea Organization". The objectives 
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of this organization are stated as follows: "protection of 
producers and consumers, purchasing the quantity of cereal 
deemed necessary for our purposes, and controlling wheat 
prices in all parts of the country..." (55). 
These stated objectives have had a tremendous impact upon 
the price and the level of production of wheat in Iran. To 
achieve these goals the government has intervened — directly 
or indirectly — in every aspect of the "wheat subsector". 
The actions of the government have kept the price of bread, and 
thus of wheat, at a level below what it would have been without 
interference. This has held down the cost of living for the 
low income Iranians to some extent. The present policy, how­
ever, has several problems. 
a. It has a negative effect on the farmers' incentive 
to produce wheat. This accounts, to some extent, for the 
widening gap between domestic production and consumption of 
wheat. Thus an ever increasing cost of subsidy is needed each 
year to import wheat and control the price of bread at this 
1 
low level. 
^In 1352, price of wheat in the world market increased to 
its all time record high. It is estimated that in that year 
the imported wheat cost the government of Iran about 22 Rls./kg 
(including transportation costs, insurance, etc.). This means 
that the government incurred a loss of 14.5 Rls./kg on its 
wheat distribution program. Assuming an import volume of 
500/000 tons, this means a loss of 7,250,000,000 Rls. or more 
than $100 million. 
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b. The present bread subsidy only helps the urban 
residents (mainly in large cities). Tehran receives 51% of 
the imported wheat at a subsidized price. Thus ; 10% of the 
population receives more than 50% of the subsidized wheat.^ 
Other urban centers receive the remainder of the imported 
wheat. The rural residents receive none of the imported, 
subsidized wheat. While it is true that most rural farmers 
grow some wheat on their own land, a large number of them 
- who own no land - must pay the regular, unsubsidized, price 
for the wheat they consume. The fam workers are good 
examples of this group. They receive the benefits of the 
government's wheat price policy only to the extent that the 
imported wheat reduces the overall market price of wheat in 
Iran to a level below what it otherwise would have beén. 
c. The present subsidy is indiscriminate in its effect. 
Rich and peer are subsidized alike, A person who is in the 
higher income brackets, so that the share of his income going 
for bread consumption is negligible, can well afford to pay 
a much higher price for bread. The low income Iranians, on 
^See Appendix A, p. 250. 
2 
In several villages, the price paid for wheat flour by 
the transient farm workers in Gorgan and Dasht was about 30% 
higher than that paid by the bakers in the city of Gorgan who 
got subsidized wheat. The difference between the subsidized 
and market price, however, is substantial only for a few 
months each year. See Appendix A, p. 250. 
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the other hand, for whom bread is by far the most important 
food item and absorbs a major part of their income, could 
well use a reduction in bread prices. 
Despite these problems, the present wheat price policy 
serves a basic purpose. It allows the urban poor (mainly 
the unskilled workers and the unemployed) to live on their 
meager incomes. It is difficult to imagine how the people 
in the lower income brackets could continue their existence 
without this subsidy on bread. 
We can now begin our analysis of the effects of an in­
crease in the price of wheat upon the distribution of income 
in this part of the country.^ In particular, we want to deter­
mine the groups which gain from an increase in the price of 
wheat, and the groups who suffer losses as a result of it. 
For the sake of clarity, this analysis will be divided into 
two parts, each relating to a basic assumption. 
1. The income-redistributing effects of wheat price in­
creases, assuming that the government discontinues its policy 
of intervention in the wheat - and bread - markets, 
2. The income-redistributing effects of wheat price in­
creases, assuming that the government continues (in basic 
principle) to support bread prices. 
^The conclusions reached in this section apply to all 
parts of the country as well. 
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1. Let us assume that the government decides to abandon 
its present wheat price policy and allows the price of wheat 
to seek its own level. Undoubtedly the price of wheat will 
increase in the absence of government intervention. We can 
assume for the sake of consistency that it increases to 
10 Rls./kg then to 15 and finally to 20 Rls./kg.^ 
The immediate result of an increase in the price of wheat 
from 7 to 10 Rls./kg will be an increase in the price of 
2 bread. Under the present government price control program, 
which includes a tight control of the shares of the millers 
and the bakers as well - the value of the wheat accounts for 
between 50 to 60 percent of the retail price of bread*^ 
Assuming no change in the "margin" of the millers and the 
bakers, the assumed 43% increase in the price of wheat will 
increase bread prices by about 24%. It is more realistic, 
however. to assume that these margins will also change and the 
^Or alternatively we may assume that the government does 
not stop its intervention in the market, but merely allows 
prices to increase to 10, 15 or 20 Rls./kg, 
^We have assumed that the current (1352) price of wheat 
was about 7 Rls. The price was not uniform throughout the 
country and fluctuated in different months» 7 Rls., however, 
is a reasonable average for the price of wheat prior to its 
upward trend in the summer of 1352, 
3 See Appendix A. 
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increase in price of bread will be about 30%. When price 
of wheat is raised to Rls. 15/kg, bread prices will rise by 
about 60%. Finally, when price of wheat is raised to Rls. 
20/kg, price of bread will increase by between 90 to 100%. 
Basically, the effects of increases in the price of 
bread (and wheat) can be separated into two parts. The first 
being the direct impact upon the "welfare" of the different 
groups of the population, of the increase in the price of 
bread, (the direct effects). The second is the effect on 
the "welfare" of those who have lost (or gained) employment 
as a result of the change in the price of wheat (indirect 
effects). 
The Direct Effects 
The consumers 
The direct effect of an increase in the price of wheat is 
to reduce the real income of the bread consumers. This re­
duction in the level of real income is small or negligible for 
^Strictly speaking, there is no reason for the "margin" to 
change. These margins have been tightly controlled by the 
government despite the claims of the millers and bakers — 
which are by and large justified — that their profits are very 
low and sometimes negative for the millers. Thus just as it 
has done in the past, the government can continue to control 
the shares of the millers and the bakers. The situation, how­
ever, will not last for long. Any realistic policy must allow 
for these margins to increase. See Appendix A, p. 250. 
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some groups and substantial for others. 
The group which suffers most as a result of wheat price 
increases are that composed of urban unemployed, those em­
ployed part of the year and a large number of landless rural 
residents. These are the people listed in the first income 
group in Table 24. 
The urban unemployed, and those workers employed part 
of the year, are by and large farmer peasants and farm 
workers who have migrated to urban centers (mostly Tehran 
and to a lesser extent other large cities) in search of jobs 
and have not been able to find them. They depend on their 
working relatives for their subsistence and supplement this by 
temporary jobs in the construction industry, performing 
various odd jobs, begging, etc. Their number can be estimated 
at slightly less than 4 million»^ 
According to the government data, in 1968, 19.9% of all 
urban families in Iran had. an annual income of less than 
Rls. 30,000. Another 10% had an annual income of between 
Rls. 30,000-40,000 (44, p. 307). Assuming each family on the 
average to have 5 members (the actual figure is 5.1, (44, 
p. 305). Then 19.9% of the urban residents have an average 
per capita income of less than Rls. 6000 (i.e. about $88.2) per 
year and another 10.7% have an average per capita income of 
less than Rls. 8000 (about $118) per year. Thus, altogether, 
30,6% of all urban residents have annual per capita incomes 
of less than Rls. 8000- which puts them in the first income 
group of Table 24. Considering the fact that the total number 
of urban residents in Iran is about 12.9 million (44, p. 
5.03), this would mean that about 3.9 million urban residents 
have an annual per capita income of less than Rls. 8000. (These 
figures were published in 1972. Later figures are not avail-
able). 
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Also included in this income group are a large number or 
rural residents, whose numbers may be estimated at about 4 
million^ 
The main food for the people in this income group is 
bread, as they can afford little of anything else. An in­
crease in the price of wheat — or bread — endangers their 
very survival. Table 24 shows, the urban poor spend close to 
40% of their total income on bread alone. While Table 24 was 
^While there is no data on the annual per capita income 
of the rural residents comparable to those presented above 
for the urban residents, reasonably accurate estimates can be 
made on the basis of available data. According to the govern­
ment data, in 1971, 35.3% of all rural families had a total 
monthly expenditure of less than Rls. 2500, or a yearly ex­
penditure of less than Rls. 30000 (about $441), (44, p. 305). 
The average number of family members in this group is repor­
ted to be 3.52. This means that each person in this 
group has a yearly expenditure of less than Rls. 8523 (about 
$125). It is reasonable to assume that people in this group 
have no saving to speak of, so that their yearly expenditure 
is more or less the same as their yearly money income. Con­
sidering the fact that about 17.429 million Iranians live in 
rural areas, we can conclude that 6,1 million rural residents 
have an annual per capita income of less than Rls. 8523. 
However, it must be noted that some of the rural residents 
listed in this income group have some land and grow their own 
wheat. Only landless rural residents, therefore, must be in­
cluded in this income group. Fortunately, an estimate of the 
number of landless rural residents is available. According 
to government data (in 1351), 2.67 million families own farm 
lands in Iran (74, p. 75). Assuming 5 members per family, 
about 13.35 million people are included in this land owaii^g 
group. Even if we assume that ail of these people live in 
rural areas — which is not the case — still some 4 million 
rural residents do not own any land. This is, however, a 
very conservative estimate as many land owners live in the 
urban areas. Thus, we can conclude that at least 4 million 
rural residents have an average annual income of less than 
Rls. 8523, 
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constructed on the basis of data gathered in Tehran, it can 
reasonably be taken to apply to other urban areas as well. 
It is also reasonable to assume that the rural residents in 
this income group spend at least 40% — and perhaps even more 
— of their income on bread.^ An increase in the price of 
wheatf therefore, reduces the real income of these people 
significantly. 
Should bread prices rise by 30%, as it would if price 
of wheat were to rise to Rls. 10/kg, people in this income 
group would have to reduce their consumption of bread and 
try to survive on less of other things as well. The state 
of their malnutrition, already quite serious, would become 
aggravated. With increases in the price of wheat to 
Rls. 15 or Rls. 20/kg, and a corresponding rise in the price 
2 
of bread to Rls, 20 or Rls, 24/kg respectively , their very 
survival would become impossible. 
The next group of bread consumers to be considered are 
urban unskilled and semi-skilled workers. They number at 
1 ' The overall average annual per capita consumption of 
wheat in the urban areas is estimated at 113 kg, while the 
similar figure for the rural residents is 235 kg (43, Annex 
14, Tables 3.2 and 3.1). 
^For the rural residents in this income group, only the 
increase in wheat price is relevant, as they bake their own 
bread. 
184 
1 
about 3.6 million and as Table 24 shows, the members of this 
group spend about 24% of their total income on bread. This is 
still a very high ration of bread which is supplemented by 
tea, sugar and perhaps cheese. 
It is not certain what happens to the average consumption 
of bread among these people as bread prices rise. The lower 
income member of this group will have to reduce their con­
sumption of bread as there are few other items to be elimi­
nated from their diet. However, an increase in the price of 
bread may cause an increase in the consumption of bread for 
the higher income members of this group. This happens 
because — due to the overwhelming importance of bread in 
their expenditure — the positive "income effect" more than 
2 
offsets the subsitution effect» As price of bread rises. 
1 
It is estimated that in 1968 (the latest year for which 
this type of data is available), 28.5% of all urban families 
had an average annual income of between Rls. 40,000-75,000 
(44, p. 307). Assuming each family on the average, to have 5 
members, it can be concluded that 28.5% of all urban residents 
had an average annual per capita income of between Rls, 8000-
15,000 (about $118 to $220). Thus about 3.67 million urban 
residents are included in this group. 
2 
change in the price of a commodity x affects the quan­
tity demanded of x. This effect can be separated into two 
parts; income effect and substitution effect. The Slutsky 
Equation expresses this idea 
dq* 3q 
9ayaPx = (^) -Qx^^v") . ^here y 
fjç U=constant ^ prices=constant 
is income. The term Oq /3p )— is the substitution effect. 
X X u 
This shows the change in (footnote continued on following page) 
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therefore, they will increase their consumption of bread and 
reduce that of other food items, if that is possible. 
At any rate, an increase in the price of bread reduces 
the real income of the workers and lowers their standard of 
living. With a rise in the price of bread of 30%, these 
people would probably cut down on their consumption of sugar, 
tea and cheese and increase their bread consumptions. There 
is no need to emphasize the impact of this upon the life and 
the work of these people. Although the bargaining power 
of the workers is — to say the least — quite weak, there 
is no doubt that such an increase in the price of bread will 
— in the long run — lead to an increase in the level of money 
(Footnote continued from previous page).. the quantity of x 
demanded as price of x changes- while real income remains 
the same. It follows from the principle of diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution that substitution effect is 
always negative, i.e. as price of x increases (decreases) 
the substitution effect works such that the quantity of x 
demanded decreases (increases)= 
The term -qj,(3qjj/3y) is the income effect. This shows 
the change in the quantity of x demanded as consumer's income 
changes, prices remaining constant. The income effect could be 
positive or negative or zero. The total effect of a change 
in the price of x (the sum of the two effects) may thus be 
positive or negative. 
Since substitution effect is always negative, 9q^/9p^ 
can be positive only if income effect (i.e., - q^jOq^^/Sy)) is 
positive and large enough to more than offset the negative 
substitution effect. In that case x is referred to as a Giffen 
good. Stringent conditions must be met for the total effect 
to be positive. In particular, for the quantity demanded of 
good X to rise as price of x increases not only must commodity 
X be an inferior good, but it must be an important item in 
the consumer's budget (see 35, pp. 24-29 and 36, Chapter 2), 
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wages. This is because the present wage rate represents the 
subsistence level. With higher bread prices the real income 
of the workers falls below that necessary for subsistence and 
particularly for being able to work. While it is difficult 
to estimate this increase in the level of money wage rate 
with any degree of accuracy, it is reasonable to assume that 
the change will be about that amount which will just compen­
sate the bread price increase, thus an increase of 30% in the 
price of bread would have to be followed by an 8% rise in the 
level of money wages for the unskilled workers. Similarly, 
increases in the price of bread by 60% or 90%, requires wage 
increases of 15% and 23% if the real income of the workers is 
to remain at its present level. 
^The average income of a family in this income group is 
estimated at Rls. 56,789 (weighted average of the two income 
groups listed as having an income of between Rls. 40000 and 
Rls. 50,000 (9.3% of all urban families) and between Rls. 
50,000 and Rls. 75,000 (19.2% of all urban families) in 
(44, p. 307). Assuming 5 members, per family, the average 
annual per capita income of the people in this income group 
amounts to Rls. 11,358 (about $167). An increase in the price 
of bread by 30%, or 3.75 Rls. per kg, means that each person in 
this group must have 0.63 x 3.75 = Rls. 2.36 more each day to 
remain unaffected by the increase in the price of bread 
(0=63 kg is the average daily consumption of bread for the 
people in this income group, see Table 24). Thus each family 
requires Rls, 11,8 each day, or Rls. 4312 each year in addi­
tional income to compensate for the bread price increase. 
The working member of each family, therefore must earn Rls, 
4312 each year, which is equivalent - on the average - to a 
7.6% increase in his money wage rate. 
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It is of course, possible for the nominal wage of these 
workers not to increase by the full amount necessary to off­
set the increase in the price of wheat. To this extent their 
standard of living has deteriorated as a result of the 
wheat price increase. It is also very possible, and indeed 
quite likely, for the increase in the workers' wages to 
materialize only after a period of time. The workers will 
suffer losses as a result of any such lags between the rise in 
the cost of living and the increase in their wages. It may 
be concluded that the unskilled workers suffer as a result of 
an increase in the price of wheat. This loss is especially 
hard to bear in the short run, before money wages rise suf­
ficiently to offset the bread price increase. But the loss 
might be appreciable in the long run as well if the workers 
are unable to raise their money wages sufficiently. 
Another group of people adversely affected by an in­
crease in the price of bread are a large number of urban 
residents whose average annual per capita income ranges 
from Rls. 15,000 to Rls, 30,000 and, as Table 24shows, spend 
îïicre than 11% of thsxr total income on bread. The number of° 
the people xn this income group may be estimated at about 
3.4 Million (44, p. 307). An increase in the price of bread 
by 30%, reduces'the real income of the people in this income 
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group by about 3.6%.^ This should not have a significant ef­
fect on the bread consumption of these people. Increases in 
the price of bread by 60% or 90%, reduces the real income of 
the people in this income group by about 7% and 11% respective­
ly. In both cases, it is very likely that people in this 
group would reduce their consumption of bread. This is 
because in this case the income effect is not large enough 
to offset the negative substitution effect. The substitution 
effect is also much larger than that for those in the lower 
income groups, as the people in this (Rls, 15,000 to Rls. 
30,000) income category may find it more satisfying to replace 
bread — to some extent — with other food items, such as 
rice and potatoes. This, however, would require either a 
reduction in their overall nonfood expenditures, or a decrease 
in the quantity of food consumed. 
Finally# there are those bread consumers whose real in­
come are not significantly affected by a wheat price increase. 
Though everyone consumes some bread and an increase in the 
price of bread means smaller amounts of money to be spent on 
other items; for a large number of people the effect of an 
increase in the price of bread, even an increase of 100 percent 
or more, is indeed negligible. Table24 clearly demonstrates 
^This is based on the data in (44, p. 307) as well as 
Table 24. 
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this point. As per capita income goes up, the significance 
of the expenditures on bread rapidly diminishes. Obviously 
one cannot draw a rigid line and divide the people according 
to whether an increase in the price of bread affects them 
significantly or not. One can, however, state that the people 
who spend a smaller part of their income on bread will feel 
the effect of a bread price increase to a lesser degree than 
the people whose expenditure on bread absorbs a larger portion 
of their income. Moreover, beyond a point, when income is 
quite large and bread consumption only a minute portion of 
that income, an increase in the price of bread will have no 
significant effect on the standard of living. The urban 
middle, and high income groups, approximately two million 
people (44, p. 307), may be classified as those whose 
"welfare" are not significantly affected by an increase in 
the price of bread. 
The Wheat Producers 
The groups who benefit most from an increase in the price 
of wheat are, naturally, those who produce wheat. This in­
cludes both the present and the potential wheat producers, as 
higher wheat prices induce some producers of other crops to 
switch to wheat production. It must be added that not all 
farmers who grow wheat benefit from an increase in its market 
price equally. In particular, the benefits accrued to the 
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smaller producers, especially small village farmers, are very 
little, while that going to the medium and large farmers are 
substantial. 
The reason for the unequal distribution of gains from 
wheat price increases are not difficult to see. Not only do 
the small farmers have less land on which to grow wheat, but 
they are in a position to market a smaller portion of their 
produce. Most small farmers produce some wheat for their 
own consumption, and market only what is above that level. 
To the extent that wheat is used for family consumption it 
matters very little what its market price happens to be. 
The small farmers, therefore, reap the benefits of an increase 
in the price of wheat only to the extent that they market their 
wheat, which is only a part of what they produce. 
The medium size and large farmers, on the other hand, are 
benefited by the wheat price policy to its fullest degree, 
they market all, or nearly all, of their crops and thus re­
ceive the higher price for each kilo of wheat produced. 
Another reason for the unproportional distribution of 
benefits from higher wheat prices to the wheat farmers is the 
existence of green transactions. The majority of small wheat 
farmers who market part of their crop, sell their wheat 
before it is harvested at large discounts. There is no doubt 
that a higher wheat price leads to a higher price of "green" 
wheat. But there is no reason to assume that all of the 
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wheat price increase will be accrued to the small farmer. In 
all likelihood a portion of the wheat price increase will be 
absorbed by the green buyers. There is, however, no way to 
be certain about the exact portion of any price rise which 
will be accrued by the small farmers and green buyers. 
It may thus be concluded that small farmers receive a 
less than proportional benefit from a wheat price increase 
than do the large farmers, and that for some small farmers, 
who produce only for their own consumption, there is no in­
come gain associated with a wheat price increase at all. 
While there is no way to determine exactly how many 
farmers benefit fully from a wheat price increase, some rough 
estimates can be made from the available data. According to 
the government data 803,000 parcels of farm land owned by the 
farmers in Iran have a size of less than one hectare (74, 
p- 74), Considering the fact that an "average" rural family 
has 5 members (44, p. 305), it is reasonable to assume that 
all of the wheat produced on these lands are locally con-
sumed and does not reach the market. Thus about 4 million 
1 
"The average size of the land is reported at .4 hecates 
(74, p. 74). Even if all of the land is sown to wheat, the 
average family has about 260 kg of wheat (the average yield 
is assumed to be 0.65 ton/ha). Thus each person has 52 kg 
of wheat per year. This is less than 1/4 of the average 
annual per capita consumption of wheat for rural residents. 
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small farmers are totally excluded from any benefit of a wheat 
price increase. Indeed, since their wheat crop does not 
suffice for their own consumption needs, they must purchase 
additional wheat, by the income they earn by working on 
other farmers lands as hired hands, from the market. These 
small farmers, therefore suffer a loss in their real income 
as a result of any wheat price increases. 
346,000 parcels of farm land are of a size of between 
one to two hectares (74, p. 74). Very little of the wheat 
produced on these farms reach the market. The average size 
of farm in this group being 1.47 hectares; each farm, even if 
all of it is sown to wheat, produces about 958 kg of wheat 
each year. This means each member of the farm family has 
about 192 kg of wheat per year, still far short of the 
average annual per capita wheat consumption of rural resi­
dents (see 43, Annex 14, Table 3.3). Thus 1.7 million rural 
residents, members of the families owning 1 to 2 hectares of 
land, are also exlcuded from any benefits o£ a wheat price 
increase. 
Thus, in all, 5,7 million rural residents, small farmers 
and their families, do not receive any benefits from wheat 
price increases. 
About 4.9 million rural residents, members of families 
owning between 2 to 10 hectares of land (74, p, 74), receive 
part of the benefits of wheat price increases. Although they 
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do not presently use all of their land for growing wheat, 
with higher wheat prices most, or all, of their land would be 
sown to wheat. Higher wheat prices increase the real income 
of these farmers in varying degree, depending upon the 
portion of the wheat crop marketed. 
Finally, about two million people, members of the fami­
lies owning more than 10 hectares of land (74, p. 74) receive 
the full benefits of wheat price increases, as they market 
nearly all of the wheat they produce. Furthermore, the 
benefits reaped by this group is quite substantial as they own 
more than 61% of all farm lands in the country (74, p. 74). 
An increase in the price of wheat results in a transfer 
of income from the consumers of wheat to the producers of 
wheat. The magnitude of this transfer, of course, depends 
upon the amount of the price increase. What is important to 
recognize, however, is that within this general transfer of 
income, another, less visible redistribution of income takes 
place. As a result of an increase in the price of wheat a 
majority of wheat producers will become better off, though 
large and medium farmers receive a much larger share of this 
benefit than the smaller farmers- A substantial number of 
small farmers do not reap any benefit from increases in the 
price of wheat while a still larger number of very small 
farmers are adversely-affected by it. 
Moreover, a substantial part of this transferred income, 
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is extracted from the urban poor and the rural landless who 
consume the bulk of the produced wheat. It must be concluded, 
therefore, that a policy of wheat price increase as described 
above, will lead to a more unequal distribution of income. 
The indirect effects 
An increase in the price of wheat leads to an increase 
in the amount of rural unemployment. The number of people 
who lose their jobs as a result of such increases in the price 
of wheat depend upon the magnitude of the price rise. Given 
the prevailing techniques of production, with wheat being 
highly capital-intensive and other crops, particularly cotton 
and rice, extremely labor-intensive, the number of such 
people will be substantial. While there is no way to estimate 
the total number of people who lose their jobs as a result of 
wheat price increases throughout the country, such estimation 
is possible for Gorgan and the plain area. It was estimated 
that as price of wheat rises to 10, 15 and 20 Rls., the 
number of people who become "redundant" in the farm sector of 
1 
this region amounts to 24,000, 58,000 and 86,000 respectively. 
Given the present conditions of the economy, in which 
there is little alternative employment opportunities for these 
newly unemployed rural workers, the effect of the wheat price 
^Sêê Chapter VIII, p. 7= 
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increase will be to reduce the conditions of these people to 
utter poverty, and worse. On the one hand, these people lose 
their jobs and thus their income is wiped out. At the same 
time they must pay higher prices for wheat, the only food they 
can afford to consume. 
It may be concluded that the indirect effects of an in­
crease in the price of wheat upon the distribution of income 
is much more regressive than its direct effect. One can hard­
ly imagine any additional jobs which will be created as a re­
sult of an increase in the price, and consequently of the 
production, of wheat. Any increase in the price of wheat, 
therefore, will lead to the creation of more unemployment and 
thus, considering also the direct affects of such a policy, 
to a more unequal distribution of income. 
2. Another possibility is for the government to allow 
wheat prices to rise, while controlling bread prices at their 
present level. The government can accomplish this objective 
by, for instance, standing ready to pay the difference between 
the costs of bread, including the baker's profit, and the de­
sired price of bread 
The main advantage of this scheme is that it does keep 
the price of bread low, while at the same time encourages the 
^Or alternatively, it could subsidize flour by paying the 
millers the difference between the costs of production of flour 
and the desired price of flour. 
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domestic producers to grow wheat on lands suitable for its 
production. Unlike the present scheme, this type of policy 
does not put undue pressure on one group, in this case, the 
wheat producers. 
There is, however, an important problem involved in this 
proposal. First of all, the government must decide whether 
to provide subsidized bread for the whole country or only for 
the urban areas. The former choice is both costly and im­
practical.^ But even subsidizing the price of bread in the 
urban centers is quite expensive. A simple calculation shows 
this point. 
Suppose that price of wheat is raised to 15 Rls./kg. 
The market price of bread, with no intervention on the part 
of the government, would rise to about Rls. 20/,g. If the 
yearly consumption of bread for the urban residents is esti-
2 
mated at about 2210 million kilograms, and if the government 
^The impracticality stems from the fact that rural resi­
dents, by and large, bake their own bread. The government must 
therefore subsidize the price of wheat or flour, rather than 
bread for the rural residents. This will undoubtedly create 
tremendous problems. For instance, the farmers themselves 
sell their wheat at a higher,price and buy the subsidized 
flour. Even the subsistence farmers can benefit by selling 
wheat and buying flour. This scheme is more equitable, but 
extremely costly. With a wheat price of 15 Rls,/kg, the 
government would incur a loss of about $600 million each year 
if all of the wheat consumed in the country is to be subsi­
dized (5 million tons x 8000 Rls./ton = 40,000,000,000 Rls.). 
2 
Assuming that about 13 million people live in urban 
areas (towns and cities), and that each person consumes about 
170 kg of bread in a year. 
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is determined to keep the price of bread at its present level 
the cost to the government would amount to 16.5 billion Rls., 
or roughly about $244 million. If the price of wheat goes up , 
to 20 Rls./kg in the market, the government would have to 
incur about $373 million to keep the price of bread at its 
present level. 
If only the urban residents receive subsidized bread, 
however, the condition of the rural poor becomes absolutely 
untenable. Not only do their employment opportunities dwindle 
in the rural areas (as a result of wheat price increase) but 
they must pay higher prices for their needed wheat, The 
system simply cannot work, unless a solution is found to this 
problem. 
Under this scheme the major beneficiaries would be the 
wheat farmers who, in effect, receive a direct payment from 
the government for growing wheat. No other group, except the 
rural poor, receives any additional loss or benefits (since 
bread prices remain at their current level). The cost of this 
subsidy is borne by the people, of course. Whether this pro= 
gram of bread price control will be progressive or not de­
pends to a large extent upon the method by which the govern­
ment collects the funds to pay for it. 
Finally, this scheme also has the disadvantage that it 
subsidizes bread for all income groups. The government could 
save a great deal by devising a method by which only the needy 
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are provided with cheap bread. 
In conclusion to this chapter, it must be noted that an 
increase in the price of bread will lead to a more unequal 
distribution of income. This takes place both directly and 
via its employment effect. Whatever other advantages a wheat 
price increase may have, it scores poorly on the income 
distribution front. 
The Balance of Payments Effects 
It was argued before that an increase in the price of 
wheat alters the share of each crop in the total farm land of 
this area. In particular, wheat production will increase at 
the expense of other crops. This means that an increase in the 
price of wheat changes the level of domestic production of 
wheat as well as other crops. This in turn affects the level 
of imports (or exports) of these farm products and the 
country's balance of trade. 
This study being confined to a small area of Iran, there 
is no way to estimate the impact of an increase in the price 
of wheat upon the country's balance of trade. At best we can 
make inferences about the possible effects of such a policy 
upon the country's balance of payments and make some generali­
zations. 
Table 26 shows the present level of net imports of the 
"six crops". Except for cotton, Iran is a net importer of all 
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Table 26. Net imports of six importemt crops (years 1350 and 1351)^ 
Year Wheat (Tons) Cotton Barley Rice 
Soybean and 
Sunflower 
(oil seed) 
1350 -997,549 +101,000 -191,870 -60,329 -104,445 
1315 -773,344 +112,000 -23,132 -91,659 -131,354 
^Source (67). 
other crops. 
An increase in the domestic price of wheat reduces the 
need for wheat imports but at the same time it reduces the 
domestic production of other crops. The net effect upon the 
balance of trade, therefore, depends on the world price level 
for each of these crops as well as the supply elasticities of 
these crops. 
Obviously, there is no way to estimate the change in 
the level of imports (or exports in case of cotton) which would 
be forthcoming as a result of an increase in the domestic price 
of wheat, given our limited information. We can only estimate 
the change in the production of these crops which would take 
place in the area of this study. Even if we did have an esti­
mate of the change in domestic production of these crops for 
the whole country, we would still be unable to predict the 
net impact of a wheat price increase on the country's balance 
of payments. The net change in the balance of trade depends 
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not on the physical quantity of imports and exports, but on 
their current values. Unless one can predict the future world 
market prices for these crops, one is unable to predict the 
effect of a wheat price increase on the balance of trade of 
the country. 
In general, one can state that: 
(VV - [(%='Ac) + (Pb'Ab) + (W + (Ps'Ag) 
A 
B 
where: 
w is wheat S is soybeans 
c is cotton SF is sunflowers 
b is barley is change in the volume of pro­
duction of i 
R is rice 
and Pj^ is relevant price level." If A>B, then it can be con= 
eluded that the wheat price increase has had a favorable im­
pact upon the country's balance of trade. If A<B, the balance 
of trade is negatively effected by the change in price of 
wheat. 
^Prices for the imported crops must include transportation 
charges as well as insurance costs. For the export crop, these 
costs must be subtracted from the "world market" price. 
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We have no information about the price elasticity of sup­
ply, for the entire country, of any of these farm products. 
We have no information about the future price levels of these 
crops either. There is no way, therefore, to reach any con­
clusions about the impact of an increase in the price of wheat 
on the balance of trade of the country. 
In the light of recent oil price increases and the 
enormous increase in the foreign exchange receipts of Iran, 
the balance of payments effect of a wheat price increase be­
comes of secondary importance. In devising a wheat price 
policy, therefore, primary emphasis should be placed upon the 
employment and income distribution effects of the wheat price 
increase. 
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CHAPTER X. USE OF LINEAR PROGRAMMING IN FORMULATING 
DESIRED PRICE POLICIES 
In the previous chapters the impact of wheat price 
variation upon several economic variables were analyzed, using 
the supply schedules based on the farmers' own estimates of 
their future production behavior. The conclusions reached 
in the foregoing discussions provide only the first step 
toward providing appropriate price policies. What remains 
to be done is the evaluation of each of these "conse­
quences" according to some priority scale. One may wish to 
"assign" top priority to the objective of self-sufficiency, 
even if it means the creation of a large amount of unemploy­
ment. Alternatively, balance of trade considerations may not 
be deemed extremely important. Instead, job creation may be 
given top priority. 
The decisions which are finally made reflect the values 
of the group — or the person making the decision. These 
"values" are in turn determined by the values of the groups 
in the society whom the decision maker represents. Obvious­
ly, one cannot come up with a policy measure which promotes 
the benefits of all groups within a society to the same ex­
tent. What can be done, is to confront the policy maker with 
the consequences of each particular policy measure he might 
want to take. In particular, it is possible to confront him 
with the "trade-offs" between various objectives. What are 
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the "costs" in terms of objective x when objective y is pro­
moted? This is in essence what will be done in this chapter. 
The following discussions consist of two separate parts. 
In the next section a linear programming framework will be 
used to arrive at supply schedules for wheat produced in 
norther Iran. This "normative supply schedule" will then be 
compared with the supply schedules based on the farmers' own 
estimates, constructed in Chapter VII. It is hoped that this 
comparison will shed some additional light on the arguments put 
forward previously. In the following section, using the same linear 
programming model, various "objectives" will be included in 
the model to arrive at a set of schedules, showing the "trade­
offs" between these "goals". 
Normative Supply Schedules 
For the following analysis we shall make use of a simple 
linear programming model.^ This model includes 33 restraints 
(rows) and £9 activities (columns). All of the land in the 
^The model can be specified formally as follows: 
Maximize z = C'x 
Subject to the restrictions; 
PX < S 
S > 0 
where 
Z is the objective function 
C is a 1 X n vector of "net prices" 
X is a n X 1 vector of crop outputs 
P is a m X n matrix of input-output coefficients 
S is a m X 1 vector of resource supplies. 
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area of this study is divided into seven "land types", ac­
cording to soil properties and water availability. The only 
other restraint included in the model is labor,^ Capital 
restraint is not included in the model and it is assumed that 
the needed farm equipments are available to the farmers at a 
2 
constant cost. All of the information used in the model are 
provided by the farmers themselves. Thus the cost of pro­
duction of various crops and the expected yields, used in 
the model reflect the prevailing state of affairs in the 
farm sector of this region. 
The model can be used to derive the "normative" supply 
schedule for wheat in Gorgan and the plane. This may then be 
compared with the aggregated supply schedule for wheat de­
rived previously. 
Using the prices received by the farmers in 1352, and 
running a parametric programming on the price of wheat 
The restraints, as well as activities are described in 
Appendix B. Also included is the method by which costs of 
production of different activities (the C values) are calcu­
lated. 
2 
The exclusion of capital constraint from the model does 
not undermine the validity of our conclusions. What our as­
sumption in regard to capital means is that increase in the 
amount of land sown to wheat, which occurs by and large at 
the expense of other crops, creates little need for addition­
al farm equipments. Furthermore, to the extent that addition­
al farm equipments are needed, it is assumed that the farmers 
can obtain them at a cost, equal to the prevailing "rent" of 
farm machineries. 
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starting at Ris. 6000/ton, the normative supply schedule 
for land sown to wheat can be derived. This is shown in 
Figure 15. The farmers' own estimate of the wheat supply 
schedule is also graphed in the figure to make comparison 
easier. Figure 16 shows the two supply schedules in terms of 
the quantity of wheat produced at various wheat price levels. 
As Figures 15 and 16 clearly show, the supply schedules 
constructed on the basis of farmers' own estimates lies to 
the right of the "normative" supply schedule. This means 
that at all levels of wheat prices the farmers believe that 
they will produce more wheat than what should be produced on 
the basis of profit maximization behavior. 
One can think of many reasons for this observation. The 
linear programming model used, for instance, could be an 
unrealistic replica of the real world and thus the conclusions 
reached on the basis of this model may be irrelevant. Alterna­
tively, the aggregated supply schedule derived may not repre­
sent the actual reactions of the farmers to wheat price varia­
tions. More importantly, the cause of the observed divergence 
in the two supply schedules may be due to the simplistic — 
and unrealistic — objective function of the linear programming 
model used. Construction of the "normative" supply schedule 
is based on the assumption that the farmers' only objective is 
maximization of "profit". This is obviously a simplification 
of the real world objective of the farmers, to say the least. 
Table 27. The results of parametric picograituning, as price of wheat is increased from Rls. 6,000/ton 
to Rls. 21,000/ton and the farmers estimated supply response (price of cotton Rls. 
29,000/ton) 
Price of 
cotton 
Rls./ton 
Price oJ: 
wheat 
Rls.,/ton 
L. P. Solution Farmers' Estimates 
Hectares of 
land sown 
to wheat 
Quantity of 
wheat 
produced 
(tons) 
Hectares of 
land sovm 
to wheat 
Quantity of 
wheat 
produced 
29,000 6,000 59,479.62 136,803.13 259,440 415,104 
29,000 7,000 76,290.34 182,947.14 
29,000 8,000 347,579.62 481,784.75 
29,000 9,000 347,579.62 481,784.75 
29,000 10,000 347,579.62 481,784.75 332,760 532,416 
29,000 11,000 319,076.50 529,674.70 
29,000 12,000 307,010.57 557,777.49 
29,000 13,000 306,992.57 557,777.49 
29,000 14,000 303,854.35 566,694.75 
29,000 15,000 397,524.24 665,004.19 428,640 685,824 
29,000 16,000 399,874.00 677,929.19 
29,000 17,000 399,874.00 677,9^9.19 
29,000 18,000 399,874.00 677,9:29.19 
29,000 19,000 468,685.00 808,670.09 
29,000 20,000 468,685.00 808,670.09 507,600 812,160 
29,000 21,000 468,685.00 808,670.09 
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It has been mentioned previously that many farmers — especial­
ly the poor, village farmers — have a tendency to produce more 
wheat than could be justified on the basis of profit maximi­
zation motive alone. This is because the small farmers must 
produce some wheat — regardless of its market price — for 
their own consumption, or else jeopardize their survival. 
These farmers, therefore, have a strong tendency to avert the 
risks which are associated with producing cash crops. Con­
sidering these facts, it is not unusual to observe more 
production of wheat at all price levels than what would be 
forthcoming if all farmers attempted to maximize their 
"profit". This is especially true at low levels of prices 
for wheat. For instance, as Figure 15 shows, at the price 
of Rls. 6,000/ton, the "optimal" plan requires allocation 
of about 60,000 hectares of land to wheat production, whereas 
in actuality, the farmers were growing about 260,000 hectares 
of wheat.^ There is no way to reconcile these two observa­
tions, except by accepting the fact that many farmers grow 
wheat primarily for their own consumption even though it is 
more "profitable" to use the land for other crops. 
must be noted that even this small amoutn of wheat 
is included in the optimal plan because the available labor 
force is insufficient to grow any more cotton. When the 
same model was run with no labor restraint, the optimal plan 
included no wheat at all. 
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Although the exclusion of "other" motives from the ob­
jective function of the linear programming model accounts — 
to a large extent — for the observed divergence of the two 
supply schedules, there may be yet another reason for this 
phenomenon. It has been said before that the year 1352 was 
an unusual year for farm prices everywhere. In Iran, the 
price of most farm products followed the world wide trend. 
The price of wheat, being government controlled, however, did 
not increase appreciably. The most dramatic price increase 
occurred for cotton in Iran, where its price rose to more than 
twice of that of the previous year. It was at this time that 
the interviews were conducted. The farmers were asked to pre­
dict their supply responses for various price levels for 
wheat, assuming that all other costs and prices remained as 
they were at that time. Although this "ceteris paribus" 
condition was specified in the interviews, it is not unlikely 
to assume that most farmers had their doubts about it! It 
is possible that the farmers did not expect the abnormally 
high price of cotton to continue for long. It is possible 
that in answering the questions put to them they considered a 
more "normal" price for cottons, one which they thought will 
prevsil in the "long run", our specifications notwithstandingi 
In predicting their supply response in the face of wheat 
price increases, therefore, they may have based their calcu­
lations on — among other things — a lower price for cotton 
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than the level prevailing in 1352. Considering the fact that 
our linear programming solution was based on the cotton price 
prevailing in 1352, the observed divergence between the two 
supply schedules may — at least in part — be explained. 
To test this hypothesis, we ran the same model, using 
the same data, except for substituting a lower price for 
cotton. In particular, the price of cotton was set at Rls, 
23,000/ton.^ The result of this run are shown in Figures 
17 and 18. For the sake of comparison the farmers' estimate 
of the supply schedule is also drawn in these figures. It is 
clear that the two supply schedules are much more similar than 
they were under the assumption of a higher cotton price. Al­
though by no means a proof of the validity of the above-
mentioned conjecture, this "test" gives some weight to it. 
To summarize what has been said in this section, the 
observed differences in the supply schedules derived from the 
farmers' estimates and that given by the linear programming 
solution, could be explained by one of these two lines of 
arguments. 
a. That farmers in this region are primarily interested 
in averting risk, and profit maximization is a subordinate 
goal. They rather have the assurance of a lower level of 
^The number 23,000 was arrived at by averaging the price 
of cotton in the three periods of 1350-52. As it has turned 
out, the price of cotton in 1353 is even lower than this 
level. 
Table 28. The result of parameteric programming, as price of wheat is increased from Rls. 6,000/ton 
to Rls. 21,000/ton, and the farmers' estimated supply response (price of cotton Rls. 
23,000/ton) 
L.P. Solution Farmers ' Estimates 
Land sowm Quantity of Land sown Quantity of 
to wheat; wheat produced to wheat wheat produced 
(hectar&s) (tons) (hectares) (tons) 
23,000 6,000 57,858. 38 133,074.23 259,440 415,104 
23,000 7,000 77,710.. 00 187,631.99 
23,000 8,000 349,968.12 489,666,81 
23,000 9,000 349,968.12 489,666.81 
23,000 10,000 325,992.4 536,590.64 332,760 532,416 
23,000 11,000 325,992.4 536,590.64 
23,000 12,000 380,794.0 591,392.12 
23,000 13,000 380,794.0 591,392.12 
23,000 14,000 449,605.0 722,133.09 
23,000 15,000 468,685.0 808,670.09 428,640 685,824 
23,000 16,000 468,685.0 808,670,09 
23,000 17,000 536,678.0 1 ,007,308.19 
23,000 13,000 536,678.0 1 ,007,308.19 
23,000 19,000 536,678.0 1 ,007,308.19 
Price of Price of 
cotton wheat 
R1s./ton Rls./ton 
Table 28 (Continued) 
Price of 
cotton 
Rls./ton 
Price of 
wheat 
Bis./ton 
L.P. Solution Farmers' Estimates 
Land sown Quantity of 
to wheat wheat produced 
(hectare») (tons) 
Land sown 
to wheat 
(hectares) 
Quantity of 
wheat produced 
(tons) 
23,000 
23,000 
20,000 
21,000 
536,678.0 1,007 ,,308.19 
539,028.0 1,017,883.19 
507,600 812,160 
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income which is accrued to them by producing wheat (or at 
least the assurance of a means of subsistence) than producing 
the more profitable — but also more risky — cotton and ex­
pose themselves to — among other risks — the vagaries of 
the market. In their "objective function", therefore, risk 
aversion and certainty of a means of subsistence have more 
weight than profits, and alternatively; 
b. That the farmers do indeed give substantial weight to 
profits in making their production decisions. The reason for 
their behavior may be found in the fact that they in fact 
considered a "long run" and more realistic price for cotton 
than that of the year 1352. This would imply that farmers, in 
deciding what to produce, and how much to produce, envisage 
for each crop, a price which is based on the price of that 
good in a number of previous years, rather than considering 
the price in the previous year alone= Thus supply in each 
year may be expressed by ^t-2' ^ t-n^^ where: 
t is time period and Z is "other" factors, rather than the simple 
case of = f(P^_^,Z). 
In actuality, it is more likely that both of these explana­
tions are true. One can guess that for the commercial farmers 
the latter explanation is more realistic, while the village 
farmers' behavior is more heavily influenced by the necessity 
of risk aversion. 
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Multiple Objectives 
While the model used in the previous section is obviously 
incomplete, it nevertheless is useful as a first approxima­
tion for observing the changes in the crop mix which would be 
forthcoming as a result of wheat price variations. The major 
limitation of the model used in the previous section, how­
ever, lies in the specification of a single objective function. 
This limitation becomes particularly crucial when the model 
is to be used as a guide for policy making. 
In attempting to devise a particular "price policy", the 
policy makers may have several objectives in mind. They may 
want to encourage — or discourage — the production of some 
farm products. Alternatively, the objective may be a transfer 
of savings from agriculture to the industrial sector. Finally, 
the objective of the price policy may be controlling the price 
of food. The problem, however, sterns from the fact that 
regardless of the particular objective of the policy makers, 
"price policies" affect other variables in the economy as well. 
These "side effects", which in many cases may be undesirable, 
must therefore be taken into consideration before a particu­
lar policy is implemented. In dealing with such problems, a 
single objective linear programming model is of little use. 
Fortunately, methods have been developed which allow the 
inclusion of several "goals" in the linear programming frame­
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work (22). This allows the policy makers to assign various 
"weights" to each objective and derive the "optimal" plan 
associated with each set of "weights" assigned to various 
goals. The policy makers — once fully aware of the conse­
quences of placing various degrees of emphasis upon each 
objective — can then pursue that policy which entails the 
situation desired by them.^ 
The multiple objective linear programming model may be 
stated formally as follows: (22, pp. 325-326) 
Maximize Z = P(g^(x). ggfx), ••• g^^x)) 
Subject to hj(x) ^  0 j = l,...,m 
and 
X >0 
where 
"th. • » g^(x) represents the i "objective" function 
th 
hj(x) represents the j restraint 
^Theoretically, the model can be used to evaluate many 
types of "goals". However, with objectives which cannot be 
readily quantified the results obtained becomes, to some ex­
tent, arbitrary. In this study, therefore, the goals selected 
are all quantifiable. It must be emphasized that, so long as 
the individual goal function g^(x) are expressable in an arbi­
trary linear scale, the inclusion of any goal is permissible. 
However, to the extent that no method is available for ex­
pressing a nonquantifiable goal in a linear scale, the re­
sults obtained reflect the jud^ent of the programmer (or the 
policy maker if he has helped in finding the appropriate 
numbers), (see (22)). 
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and 
Z is some function of the level of individual goal 
functions. 
To avoid the problems associated with representing non-
quantifiable phenomena in a linear scale, the goals chosen in 
this section are all quantifiables. These goals are; 
a. Maximization of gross value of the output.^ This is 
the same objective used in deriving the wheat supply schedules, 
above. It can be expressed as: 
Maximize Z = + ^ 2^2 + ••• + 
where 
is the "net price" of activity i 
is the amount of activity i in the plan 
b. Maximization of the total number of workers needed in 
the farm sector- This "goal" requires the production of that 
crop combination which provides jobs for the most number of 
people. This may be expressed as: 
Maximize E = e^x, + 62*2 "*'••••'* e^^n 
^While we refer to this objective as "profit" raaxiïïiiza= 
tion, the term "profit" may not be strictly accurate. We have 
not included the fixed cost of farm activities in this model, 
simply because there is no data upon which an estimate can 
be based. With this in mind, we shall refer to this objective 
as "profit" maximization. 
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where 
e^ the number of man-days of work needed to produce a 
unit of 
c. Minimization of seasonal unemployment. This objective 
requires the production of that crop mix which minimizes the 
waste of manpower due to seasonal unemployment. There are a 
number of ways to specify this goal, none completely satis­
factory. The way we have chosen to deal with this problem is 
to specify the minimum use of labor during three peak months. 
The rationale behind this is that by reducing the number of 
workers during peak farming months, the production of those 
crops with high labor requirements during these periods will 
be discouraged while production of the crops with high non-
peak labor use will be encouraged. This will then help to 
reduce fluctuation in labor use during various months, and 
thus decrease seasonal uneiriployment. This goal may be ex­
pressed as; 
Minimize s^x^ + ^2^2 + • • ' + ®n^n 
where : 
is the number of man-days of work during the third, 
fourth and the seventh month of the year, needed 
to produce a unit of Xj^. 
These objectives will not be included in our previous 
model. A mechanism is used by which different "weights" can 
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be assigned to these goals. By gradually increasing the 
weights assigned to each objective — keeping the weight of 
other goals constant — we can deduct the trade-offs between 
these goals. This can then be used as a guide for policy 
making. 
Let: 
represent the weight assigned to goal #1 
Xg represent the weight assigned to goal #2 
Xg represent the weight assigned to goal #3 
The procedure is to start by setting X^ = 1 and X^ = X^ = 0. 
The solution to this program is identical with that of the 
single objective linear programming problem. Then, keeping 
X3 = Of the value of X2 is gradually increased= In this case 
we increase the value of X from zero to 2 by increments of 
0.2. This will allow the policy maker to see the effects of 
placing more and more emphasis on the "employment creation 
goal", upon the optimal crop combination. 
The technical coefficients, costs of production, and the 
yields of various crops used are all the same as those used 
before. The set of prices for various crops used in the model 
are also the same as those used before, except for cotton and 
wheat. The price of cotton used is Rls. 23,000/ton which 
represents the average price for the past 3 years. The price 
of wheat, however, represents a special case. Being govern­
ment controlled, the price of wheat in Iran does not vary with 
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the world price level. In this study, we shall select a 
price of Rls. 17,000/ton, which is assumed to represent the 
cost of a ton of wheat imported by the government.^ 
First/ the model is run with = 1, = ^3 = 0» The 
value of Xg is then gradually increased while and re­
main constant. The results of this run are listed in 
Table 29 and are graphed in Figure 19. 
As Figure 19 clearly shows, with the "prevailing" set of 
relative prices, the two objectives of profit maximization and 
employment creation are conflicting. With no consideration 
given to employment creation (Xg = 0), the optimal plan re­
quires production of more than one million tons of wheat and 
only a mere 10 thousand tons of cotton. If the set of prices 
used in the model do indeed reflect world prices, and in the 
absence of any other considerations, the policy makers should 
pursue a policy which would result in this crop combination. 
However, in all likelihood, the policy makers do have other 
things to worry about. In particular, this "optimal" plan 
implies a high level of unemployment in the rural sector of 
^The price of imported wheat paid by Iran in the past 
two years have not been released by the government thus far. 
It is believed that in 1974, Iran paid in excess of Rls, 
20,000/ton for her imported wheat (including the transporta­
tion costs). In 1973, she had paid much less. The price of 
Rls. 17,000 is selected rather arbitrarily. To the extent 
that the object of this analysis is the demonstration of the 
techniques which can be used for planning purposes, in­
accuracies in the magnitude of wheat price is unimportant. 
Table 29, The opjantity of wheat and cotton produced, the number of workers required in peak month, 
and profit levels associated with == 1, = 0,...2 
^2 
Quantity of 
wheat 
(tons) 
Quantity of 
cotton 
(tons) 
Number of workers 
employed during 
peak month 
Gross returns 
(Rls.) 
1 0 1,007,308 10,340 28,121* 14,381,237,040* 
1 0.2 808,670 188,580 61,308 14,268,947,520 
1 0.4 808,670 188,580 61,308 14,268,947,520 
1 0.6 677,929 291,796 98,171 13,870,316,640 
1 0.8 677,929 291,796 98,171 13,870,316,640 
1 1.0 677,929 291,796 98,171 13,870,316,640 
1.2 585,624 347,179 122,462 13,354,989,600 
1 1.4 572,699 355,639 124,057 13,287,319,680 
1 1.6 566,694 359,324 124,885 13,249,310,880 
1 1.8 566,694 359,324 124,885 13,249,310,880 
1 2.0 557,777 368,887 124,885 13,249,310,880 
^To make the comparison of the goals possible, the coefficients of each objective function 
were standardized.. In each case, the coefficients were converted to their respective values 
in a scale of 1 to 1,000. Once the results were obtained, these numbers were converted to 
their original scale (number of man-days and dollars). 
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northern Iran. The optimal crop production requires a mere 
28,000 workers at the peak month of the year. This means 
that even at the peak farming month, more than 96,000 farm 
workers are out of a job.^ These workers can, therefore, be 
considered absolutely "redundant". Given the inability of 
the other sectors to absorb additional workers, evidenced by 
the ever increasing rate of unemployment in the urban areas, 
these farm workers have nowhere to go. Considering the 
fact that the number of workers rendered "redundant" by this 
crop combination is close to 100,000 in this part of the 
country alone, the nationwide result of this "optimal" plan 
2 
may be catastrophic. 
The policy makers, therefore, may want to consider other 
possibilities. In particular, they may want to put more 
emphasis on the "goal" of job creation. Table 29 and Figure 
19 show what happens as Xg is gradually increased. At X = 
0.2, the optimal plan includes 188,580 tons of cotton, which 
means the employment of more than 61,000 workers at the peak 
month. These jobs are created, in effect, as a result of 
allocating the lands to the production of a crop combination 
^The total available farm labor force is about 125,000. 
2Another undesirable outcome of this situation is what 
happens to income distribution in the country. This high price 
of wheat would reduce the real wages received by the workers 
below that required for subsistence. The policy makers, there­
fore, have another reason for selecting a lower price for wheat. 
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which does not represent the "optimal" use of these lands. 
This is reflected in the drop in the value of the crops pro­
duced (Part C, Figure 19). When equal weight is assigned to 
both objectives = X2 = 1) , the "optimal" plan includes 
production of 291,796 tons of cotton and the employment of 
more than 98,000 workers. Once again, this is done at some 
cost, reflected by the "profit" drop. 
The policy makers must now decide on the proper course 
of action. If they had, a priori, a preference ordering of 
these goals, say equal emphasis on the two goals, then they 
will know, by looking at Figure 19, what crop combination 
should be produced. A price policy may then be devised which 
would give rise to that crop combination. The policy makers, 
however, may not have any clear notion of their preferences 
in regard to these goals. This is indeed quite likely to be 
the norm. In that case, the results obtained by this tech­
nique may help them to form some sort of preference schedule. 
By noting the consequences of placing various degrees of 
emphasis on different goals, they can form a more solid 
opinion about the importance of these goals. 
Next, we consider the objective of minimizing seasonal un­
employment. As it was mentioned before, we have chosen to 
minimize the number of man-days of work needed during the 
three peak months of the year. In the following calculations 
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Aj is gradually increased from zero to -2.0 by increments of 
-.2.^ At the same time, is set at 1.0 and Xg at 1.2. This 
means that we are specifying a reduction in the number of 
workers engaged in farm works during the peak months, while 
at the same time emphasizing the objectives of "profit" 
maximization as well as over all employment creation. The 
results of this run are listed in Table 30 and graphed in 
Figure 20. 
As Figure 20 shows, with the given set of prices and cost 
levels specified, attempting to reduce the number of workers 
needed during the peak months of the farming season leads to 
a reduction in the amount of cotton produced, an increase in 
the amount of land sown to wheat, a reduction in the number 
of workers needed in the farm sector, and an increase in the 
level of farm sector revenues. Oddly enough, by attempting 
to reduce seasonal unemployment, what we have accomplished 
is a reduction in the total number of workers in the farm 
sector. No new crop, one using more labor during the non-
peak months, enters the plan, even when is set at -2.0. 
This is of course, due to the nature of the crops produced 
in this area at the present time. 
To see this point more clearly, the number of workers 
1 \ 
The negative value of X3 indicates that seasonal unem­
ployment is an undesirable thing. By giving X^ a negative 
number, the third "goal" function is in fact minimized. 
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\ 
1 
1 
1 
1 
J. 
1 
1 
.1 
1 
1 
1 
Quantity of wheat and cotto.a produced, the number of workers needed during peak month, 
and tlie levels of profit associated with = 1, X^ = 1.2, and X^ * 0,.2,...2 
^2 ^3 
Wheat 
(tons) 
Cotton 
(tons) 
Number of Workers 
peak month Profit 
1.2 0 585,624 347,179 122,462 13,354,989,520 
1.2 -0.2 677,929 291,796 98,171 13,870,317,240 
1.2 -0.4 677,929 291,796 98,171 13,870,317,240 
1.2 -0.6 808,670 188,580 61,308 13,870,317,240 
1.2 -0.8 808,670 188,580 61,308 14,268,947,637 
1.2 -1 947,080 65,549 32,901 14,372,933,592 
1.2 -1.2 1 ,007,308 10,340 28,121 14,381,237,042 
1.2 -1.4 1 ,007,308 10,340 28,121 14,381,237,042 
1.2 -1.6 1 ,017,883 - 27,282 14,365,849,994 
1.2 -1.8 1. ,017,883 - 27,282 14,365,849,994 
1.2 -2 1 ,017,883 - 27,282 14,365,849,994 
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Figure 20. Trade-off between various goals. Data in Table 
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needed during various months in the farm sector of this region 
are drawn in Figure 21. The "solid" schedule shows the number 
of workers required when Xg = 0, while = 1 and Xg = 1.2. 
This refers to the starting point of Figure 20, when emphasis 
is placed upon the total number of workers needed in the farm 
sector. When the goal of reducing seasonal unemployment is 
simultaneously emphasized, the picture changes drastically, as 
shown by the "dotted" schedule. When A_is set at -1.0, the j 
absolute amount of seasonal unemployment is, of course, re­
duced tremendously. But this occurs only at the "expense" of 
total level of employment. When Xg = -1.0, about 90,000 
workers are rendered absolutely "redundant". Thus, given 
the present techniques of production of various crops, and 
the type of crops produced in this area, seasonal unemployment 
is reduced only when production of labor intensive crops are 
decreased. 
For a country which faces labor shortage, the policy 
implications of this phenomenon seems obvious. By devising 
policies which results in the crop combination associated with 
Xi = 1, Xg = 1.2 and Xg = 1, not only can the farm sector re­
lease large numbers of workers, but, given the assumed set of 
prices, total value of farm products also increases (Figure 
20, Part C). 
The choice of appropriate policy is difficult, however, 
for a country which has large amounts of unemployment. In 
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Table 31. Seasonal variation 
in the farm sector 
in the number of workers needed 
for two "weight" combinations 
Number of workers 
needed (A) 
Number of workers 
needed (B) 
Months A: X-, = 1.0 X, = 1.2 
^3 = 0 
B; X^ = 1.0 
X% = 1.2 
X3 = 1.0 
1 3,741 6,800 
2 12,269 2,044 
3 122,463 31,552 
4 102,598 10,221 
5 20,783 4,256 
6 7,482 1,363 
7 117,951 21,030 
8 62,355 14,132 
3 34,495 32,901 
10 0 0 
11 0 0 
12 0 0 
that case, the above conclusion renders the attempt to reduce 
seasonal unemployment illogical. For if the objective is to 
reduce wasting human resources, it does not make any sense to 
reduce seasonal unemployment at the expense of total unem­
ployment. In such cases, the activities which provide jobs 
for part of the year are to be produced even though this 
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Figure 21. Seasonal fluctuation in labor demand when = 0 
and X3 = 1.0. Data in Table 31 
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implies large, seasonal unemployment. 
It must also be mentioned that the conclusions reached 
above stem largely from the nature of the model. One could 
have included other farm activities which require labor during 
the off-season. In that case, seasonal unemployment could be 
reduced without substantial reduction in the number of workers 
employed throughout the year. Unfortunately, however, no one 
has formed a crop-animal combination which solves this prob­
lem satisfactorily, and to the extent that improvements have 
been made in this regard, they are not present in the farm 
sector of northern Iran. 
To conclude this discussion, one must accept the fact 
that seasonal unemployment is invariably associated with 
agriculture. The seasonally idle workers, of course, could 
find socially productive employment during the off seasons. 
They could improve the rural roads, build irrigation canals, 
improve their lands, produce handicrafts, etc. Most of 
these projects, however, require a social cohesion and the 
creation of coimunal projects whose benefits are reaped by 
all of the rural residents. The absence of these preconditions 
for effective utilization of manpower, however, is what 
characterizes the "traditional" farm sector in the under­
developed countries. 
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Conclusions 
In this chapter, the problem of decision making in the 
presence of conflicting goals were discussed. A linear pro­
gramming framework incorporating several objective functions 
was used as the analytical tool. 
The policy makers may have a well-defined preference 
ordering of various objectives before hand. In that case, ap­
propriate "weight" can be assigned to various objectives and 
the "optimal" plan can be found. In the more usual case, where 
the policy makers do not have specific "weights" in mind for 
different objectives, the procedure used here could help 
them form such a preference ordering. By observing the conse­
quences of placing various degrees of emphasis upon different 
goals, the policy makers can form a more informed opinion. 
In either case, when the appropriate "weights" are de­
cided upon, and the associated "optimal" plan arrived at, the 
policy makers need only to devise policies which promote the 
realization of the optimal plan. This could be done by a number 
of methods, whose effectiveness depend upon the nature of the 
economy in question. In a planned economy, the implementation 
of such policies represent no serious problems as economic 
activities are largely controlled by the state. In a country 
like Iran, where direct government intervention in the economic 
activities are limited, implementation of such policies are 
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more difficult. Still, appropriate price policies could be 
successful in encouraging production of some crops, while 
discouraging that of others, so as to induce the production 
of that crop combination indicated by the optimal plan. 
Finally, a few words about the incomplete nature of the 
model are in order. As it was mentioned previously, in at­
tempting to devise a realistic and successful policy many 
factors must be taken into account. In regard to this study, 
the model could have been expanded to include the "goals" of 
income distribution and balance of payments. Introduction of 
these goals would make the decision of the policy makers 
more difficult, but also more realistic. However, intro­
duction of such nonquantifiable objectives is not a simple 
matter. Judgments must be made as to how to express the im-
pact of each activity upon the distribution of income in a 
linear scale. These judgments are crucial, because the out­
come of the analysis is based on them. What is important, 
however, is that with enough time and a careful study of the 
impacts of each activity, a scale, though to some extent 
arbitrary, can be devised for most types of objectives. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of this study has been to estimate , 
the impact of wheat price increases upon several economic 
variables. Aside from the problems faced by the Iranian 
farm sector in general, the wheat subsector in Iran has had 
the disadvantage of a tight price control by the government 
which has kept the price of wheat virtually constant for a 
decade.^ In the Northern Iran area, where this study has 
been conducted, this has resulted in the production of wheat 
on the low quality lands, as lands of better quality are 
used for other, more profitable, crops, especially cotton. 
Using the data collected by directly questioning the 
farmers in Gorgan and the plain, a schedule showing farmers' 
response to wheat price increases was constructed. It was 
found that although all farmers respond rather quickly to 
wheat price increases, the small village farmers' response is 
more pronounced than that of the large, commercial farmers at 
all levels of wheat prices. It was estimated that as price 
of wheat rises to Rls= lO/kg, Rls. 15/kg and Rls. 20/kg from 
its present price of Rls. G.S/kg, the percentage of land sown 
to wheat in this area increases to 59%, 76% and 90% respectively 
^Only in 1974 was the official purchase price of wheat 
raised to Rls. 10/kg. 
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from the present 46% of all the land in this area used for 
wheat production. The most drastic reduction takes place in 
the amount of land presently sown to cotton. 
It is not certain at what level of wheat prices Iran be­
comes self-sufficient in wheat. The quick response to wheat 
price rises observed in Gorgan and the plain cannot be ex­
pected from other regions of the country. To determine the 
wheat price level at which Iran becomes self=sufficient in 
wheat, or in general to estimate the balance of trade 
implications of wheat price increases, requires another study 
covering all of Iran. 
Perhaps the most dramatic result of a wheat price 
increase, at least in the area of this study, is an increase 
in the level of unemployment. The wheat price policy assumed 
in this study increases the acreage of land sown to wheat 
largely at the expense of other crops, notably cotton. This, 
given the prevailing techniques of production, reduces the 
total number of workers needed in the farm sector. A 
mass of "surplus farm labor" is thus created which must seek 
employment in the nonfarm sector. Given the present rate of 
labor absorption by the nonfarm sectors of the Iranian economy; 
it is safe to conclude that most of the workers released from 
the farm sector would join the ranks of the unemployed. 
Table 32 shows the employment effect of wheat price increases 
in the area of this study. 
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Table 32. The number and percentage of workers released from 
the farm sector of Gorgan and the plain at various 
wheat price levels 
Price of Wheat Rls. 10/kg Rls. 15/kg Rls. 20/kg 
Number of workers re­
leased from the farm 
sector 24,000 66,000 86,000 
Percentage of the 
farm workers released 19% 53% 69% 
Even with a much less drastic results in other parts of the 
country, the employment effect of a substantial wheat price 
increase could be disastrous. 
Increases in the price of wheat leads to a more unequal 
distribution of income. In particular, an increase in the 
price of wheat, and thus of bread, causes a transfer of income 
from the wheat consumers, most of whom are low income Iranians 
whose main food item is bread, to middle and large farmers. 
Table 33 summarizes this income redistributing effect of wheat 
price increases in Iran. 
Table 53. The effect of wheat price increases upon the real income of various consumer and producer 
groups; a summary* 
Consumers Number of people in 
tjie group 
Comments 
Urban unei#loyed and 
partially ençiloyed, 
and rural landless. 
Annual per capita in­
come less than R]Ls . 
8,000 ($118) 
Urban workers. JVn.-
nual per capita 
income between R."Ls. 
8,000 and 15,000 
About 
8 
million 
About 
3.7 
million 
Urban lower-middle and 
middle income groups. 
Annual per capita in­
come between Rls. 
15,000 and Rls. 30,000 
About 
3.4 
million 
Higher-middle and high About 
income groups. Annual 1.9 
per capita income above million 
Rls. 30,000 
Real income drastically 
reduced. 
Real income drastically 
reduced. 
Real income reduced very 
little for wheat price of 
lO/Tcg but the reduction is 
significant when the price 
is Rls. 15 or 20/kg. 
No significasit change in 
real income. 
With price of wheat at Rls. 10/kg 
their state of malnutrition is 
aggravated. Higher wheat prices re­
sults in starvation and increaseing 
death rate. 
Real wages fall below subsistence 
rate. In the long run, money wages 
must rise by about 8% (for wheat 
price of Rls. 10/kg), by 14% (for 
price of Rls. 15/kg, and 22% for 
price of Rls. 20/kg) to compensate 
for the bread price increase. 
For Pw =: Rls. 10/kg. No substantial 
change occurs. Witk higher wheat 
prices, rice may replace wheat to 
some extent. In that case total non­
food expenditure must be reduced. 
Little consequence of any kind. 
^Classification of various incomsj groups is based on data collected in 1968 and published 
in 1972 (44, p. 307). 
Table 33 (Continued) 
Producers 
Number of 
people; in 
t-he group 
Change in real 
income Comments 
Very small farmers. About 
with less than 1 4 
hectare of land million 
Small farmers/ with about 
land of between 1 1.7 
to 2 hectares million 
Middle size farmers Alaout 
with land of between 4.9 
2 to 10 hectares million 
Medium and large About 
farmers, with more 2 
than 10 hectares million 
of land 
Real income actually 
reduced 
Little chamge in 
real income 
Increase in real 
income 
Increase in real 
income 
Their own production of wheat is less them 
their own yearly consumption of wheat. 
They must buy wheat from the market. To 
this extent, therefore, their situation is 
like that of urban poor. 
What they produce is consumed locacally, 
increase in market price of wheat, there­
fore, does not affect them much. 
These farmers receive higher prices for 
their wheat and thus will become better 
off. However, since they do not market 
all of the wheat they produce, they do not 
receive all of the benefits of a wheat 
price increase. 
These farmers market all of their crops 
and thus receive all of the benefits of 
a wheat price increase. 
It must be noted that not all fcirmers aire wheat producers. There is no data on the number 
of farmers who grow wheat. Most small, farmers grow some wheat, however ; The number of various 
groups of farmers, and their dependents, given in Table 33 therefore, represent the number of 
farmers potentially affected by wheat price increases. 
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Given the significance of bread in the diet of low income 
Iranians, it can be concluded that increases in the price of 
bread is not an advisable policy. Any increase in the price 
of wheat, therefore, should be accompanied by a government 
subsidy aimed at keeping the price of bread at its present 
level, lest the very survival of millions of Iranians would 
be endangered. 
Considering the present rate of unemployment in Iran, 
and the labor absorption capacity of the nonfarm sectors of 
the economy, large increases in the amount of land sown to 
wheat, at the expense of more labor intensive crops, must 
be avoided. This, however, is what would happen if wheat 
prices were raised to Rls. 15 or Rls. 20/kg. 
The problem of large unemployment in the farm sector 
could be avoided, or at least reduced, if wheat price in­
creases are accompanied by certain steps to bring more land 
into cultivation, this represents an enormous potential for 
increased agricultural production in Iran as the amount of 
land considered suitable for cultivation is more than twice 
that presently under cultivation and about 5 times the 
amount of land under cultivation in any one year (41# p= 7)» 
241 
5. 
LITERATURE CITED 
Abbot, J. C. Marketing Guide Number 1: Marketing 
Problems and Programs. Rome: F.A.O., 1958. 
Abbot, J. C. The Role of Marketing in the Development 
of Backward Agricultural Economies. Journal of Farm 
Economics 44 (May 1962); 349-362. 
Adelman, I., and Thorbecke, E. The Theory and Design 
of Economic Development. Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1969. 
Agrawal, R. C. and Heady, E. 0. Operations Research 
Methods for Agricultural Decisions. Ames, Iowa: The 
Iowa State University Press, 1972. 
Agricultural Development Fund of Iran. Annual Report 
and Balance Sheet. Tehran: Author, 1351. (In Farsi) 
6. Baldwin, G. B. Planning and Development in Iran. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 
7. Bank Markazi Iran. Annual Report and Balance Sheet as 
of March 20, 1966. Tehran: Author, July 5, 1966. 
8. Bank Markazi Iran. Annual Report and Balance Sheet as 
of March 20, 1967. Tehran: Author, June 20, 1967. 
9. Bank Markazi Iran. Annual Report and Balance Sheet 
as of March 20, 1968. Tehran: Author, August 13, 
1968. 
10. Bank Markazi Iran. Annual Report and Balance Sheet as 
of March 20, 1969. Tehran; Author, July 6, 1969. 
11. Bank Markazi Iran. Annual Report and Balance Sheet as 
of March 20, 1970. Tehran: Author, July 22, 1970. 
12. Bank Markazi Iran. Annual Report and Balance Sheet 
1349. Tehran: Author, July 20, 1971. 
13. Bank Markazi Iran. Annual Report and Balance Sheet 
1350. Tehran: Author, 1351. (In Farsi) 
14. Bank Markazi Iran. Annual Report and Balance Sheet 1351. 
Tehran: Author, September 2, 1973. 
242 
15. Bank Markazi Iran. Bulletin, Jan.-Mar., 1974, Vol. 12. 
Tehran: Author, 1974. 
16. Bank Markazi Iran. Index of Selected Food Product 
Prices. Tehran: Author, 1352. (In Parsi) 
17. Bank Markazi Iran. Iran's National Income 1338-50. 
Tehran: Author, Aban 1352. 
18. Bharier, J. Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1970. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1971. 
19. Bilas, R. Microeconomic Theory. 2nd ed. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971. 
20. Blase, M. G. Institutions in Agricultural Development. 
Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University Press, 1971. 
21. Brown, L. R. Some necessary incentives for raising 
yields. In Selected Reading to Accompany Getting 
Agriculture Moving, pp. 247-249. Edited by R. E. 
Borton. New York: The Agricultural Development Council, 
Inc. 1966. 
22. Candler, W. and Bohlje, M. Use of Linear Programming 
in Capital Budgeting with Multiple Goals. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 53 (May 1971): 325-
330. 
23. Dricker, P. F. Marketing and Economic Development. 
Journal of Marketing 22 (Jan. 195S): 242-268= 
24. Economic Department of Tehran University. Economic 
Research. Tehran: Author, 1349. (In Farsi) 
25. Eckaus, R. S. The factor proportions problem in under­
developed areas. American Economic Review 45 (1955): 
539-565. 
26. Pei, J. C. K. and Ranis,- G. Development of the Labor 
Surplus Economy. Kcmewood, Illinois; R. D. Irwin, 1964. 
27. Foreign Agriculture 12 (Sept. 23, 1974). 
243 
28. Fox, K. A. Intermediate Economic Statistics. New 
York; Wiley, 1968. 
29. Gorgani, M. Economy of Gorgan and the plain. Tehran: 
Safialishah Publishing Co., 1350. (In Farsi) 
30. Haberler, G. Critical Observation on Some Current 
Notions in the Theory of Economic Development. In 
Leading Issues in Economic Development. Studies in 
International Poverty, pp. 149-151. Edited by G. M. 
Meier. New York; Oxford University Press, 1970. 
31. Hayami, Y. and Ruttan, V. Agricultural Development, 
An International Perspective. Baltimore; The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1971. 
32. Hayami, Y. Rice Policy in Japan's Economic Develop­
ment. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 54 
(Feb. 1972); 19-30. 
33. Heady, E. O. Agricultural Policy under Economic 
Development. Ames, Iowa; The Iowa State University 
Press, 1969. 
34. Heady, E. and Candler, W. Linear Programming Methods. 
7th ed. Ames, Iowa; The Iowa State University Press, 
1973. 
35. Henderson, J. and Quandt, R. E. Microeconomic Theory. 
New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958. 
36. Hicks, J. R. Value and capital, an Inquiry into soïïiê 
Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory. Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1939. 
37. Higgins, Benjamin. Economic Development. New York; 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1968. 
38. Hirschman, A. 0. The Strategy of Economic Development= 
London: Yale University Press, 1958. 
39. Hla, fiyint. The Economies of the Developing Countries. 
New York; F. A. Praeger Publishers, 1965. 
40. Ilchman, W. F. Balanced Thought and Economic Growth. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 14 (July 
1966). 
244 
41. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Iran: Agricultural Sector Review, Vol. 1. Tehran: 
Author, 1970. 
42. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
IRAN: Agricultural Sector Review, Vol. 2. Tehran; 
Author, 1970. 
43. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
IRAN: Agricultural Sector Review, Vol. 3. Tehran; 
Author, 1970. 
44a. Iran Almanac and Book of Pacts 1972. Tehran: Echo of 
Iran Press, 1972. 
44b. Islam, N. Concept and Measurement of Unemployment 
and Underemployment in Developing Economies. Inter­
national Labor Review 89 (March, 1965); 240-256. 
45. Keyham Tehran Daily. Tehran: (Dey 14) 1352. 
46. Kindleberger, C. P. International Economics. 5th ed. 
Ontario: Irwin-Dorsey Limited, 1973. 
47. Kurtzig, M. E., and Parker, J. B., Jr. Middle Eastern 
Countries Will Buy More Wheat as Hopes for Big Harvests 
Dim. Foreign Agriculture 12 (Sept., 1974); 5-6. 
48. Le Baron, Allen. Long Term Projections of Supply and 
Demand for Selected Agricultural Products in Iran. 
Logan, Utah: Utah State University Press, June 1970. 
49. Lewis, W. A. Economic Development with Unlimited Supply 
of Labor. Manchester School of Economics and Social 
Studies 22 (May, 1954): 139-191. 
50. Meier, G. M. Leading Issues in Economic Development, 
Studies in International Poverty. 2nd ed. New York: 
Oxford University Press,- 1970. 
51. Mellor, John W. Agricultural Price Policy in the Con­
text of Economic Development. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economic 51 (Dec., 1969): 1413-1420. 
52. Mellor, J. W., and Stevens, R. D. The Average and Margi­
nal Product of Farm Labor in Underdeveloped Economies. 
Journal of Farm Economics 38 (August, 1956): 780-791 
245 
53. Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Office 
of Information and Public Relation. Cotton of Iran. 
Tehran: Author, 1352. (In Farsi) 
54. Ministry of Rural Cooperatives. Center for Agri­
cultural Marketing Development. Marketing of Whe&t and 
Barley in Iran, with Particular Emphasis on Grain 
Storage. Tehran; Author, 1972. 
55. Ministry of Rural Cooperatives. Cereal, Tea, and Sugar 
Organization. A Brief History of the Cereal Organization. 
Tehran: Author, 1352. (Unpublished, In Farsi) 
56. Ministry of Rural Cooperatives. Cereal, Tea, and 
Sugar Organization, The Agreement Between the Cereal 
Organization and the Miller's Union. Tehran; Author, 
1354. (In Farsi) 
57. Ministry of Rural Cooperatives. Cereal, Tea, and Sugar 
Organization. Share of Various States in the Imported 
Wheat. Tehran: Author, 1352. (In Farsi) 
58. Ministry of Water and Power. Gorgan Project, Compli­
mentary Investigation of Ground Water Development in 
the Gorgan and the Plain Area. Tehran: Author, 
Sept., 1972. 
59. Mohandes, A. Water Resources in Iran. Tehran: Tehran 
University Press, 1344. (In Farsi) 
60. Mosher, A. T. Getting Agriculture Moving. New York: 
Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966. 
61. Mueller, and Mehran, G. L. Market Organization and 
Economic Development. Journal of Farm Economies 41 
(Dec., 1959): 1307=1315. 
62. Myrdal, G. Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of 
Nations. New York: Pantheon Press, 1968= Volume 3-
63. Myrdal, G. Rich Lands and Poor. New York: Harper and 
Row, Publishers. 1957. 
64. Nurkse, R. Excess population and Capital Construction. 
In Leading Issues in Economic Development, Studies in 
International Poverty, pp. 146-149. Edited by G. M. 
Meier. New York; Oxford University Press, 1970, 
246 
65. Plan and Budget Organization. Basic Objectives and 
Policies of the Fifth Plan. Tehran: Author, (no 
date) 
66. Plan and Budget Organization. Fourth National Develop­
ment Plan, 1968-1972. Tehran: Author, 1968. 
67. Plan and Budget Organization. Import-Export Index of 
Selected Commodities. Tehran: Author, 1352. (In 
Farsi) 
68. Plan and Budget Organization. Iranis Fifth Develop­
ment Plan, 1973-1974, A Summary. Tehran; Author, 1973. 
69. Plan and Budget Organization. The Performance Report 
of the Third Development Plan, 1341-1346. Tehran: 
Author, 1347. (In Farsi) 
70. Plan and Budget Organization. The Principals and 
Goals of the Fourth Development Plan of the Country. 
Tehran: Author, 1347. (In Farsi) 
71. Plan and Budget Organization. The Report of the Second 
Seven Year Plan. Tehran: Author, 1343. (In Farsi) 
72. Plan and Budget Organization. Selected Statistics. 
Tehran: Author, 1351. (In Farsi) 
73. Plan and Budget Organization. Statistical Center of 
Iran. Result of Agricultural Census 1350. Tehran: 
Author, Azar 1352. (In Farsi) 
74. Plan and Budget Organization. Statistical Center of 
Iran. Result of Agricultural Census 1351. Tehran: 
Author, Mordad 1353. (In Farsi) 
75. Plan and Budget Organization. Statistical Center of 
Iran. Statistical Year Book of Iran 1351. Tehran: 
Author, 1352. (In Farsi) 
76. Plan and Budget Organization» Summary of The Fifth 
National Development Plan 1973=1378. Tehran: Author? 
1352, 
77. Price Gittinger, J, Planning for Agricultural Develop­
ment: The Iranian Experience. Washington, D.C.: 
National Planning Association, 1965. 
247 
78. Ranis, G. and Fei, J. C. A Theory of Economic Develop­
ment. American Economic Review 51 (Sept. 1971): 533-
565. 
79. Robinson, Joan and Eatwell/ John. An Introduction to 
Modern Economics. London: McGraw-Hill, 1973. 
80. Rosenstein-Rodan, P. Disguised Unemployment and Under­
employment in Agriculture. Monthly Bulletin of 
Agricultural Economics and Statistics 6 (July/August, 
1957): 1-7. 
81. Schultz, T. W. Transforming Traditional Agriculture. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. 
82. Sen, A. K. Choice of Techniques. 3rd ed. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1968. 
83. Snedecor, W. and Cochran, G. Statistical Methods. 
6th ed. Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University Press, 
1967. 
84. Taylor, D. C. Agricultural Development In Selected 
Middle Eastern Countries. New York: The Agricultural 
Development Council, Inc., 1968. 
85. Thorbecke, E. and Stoutjesdyk A. Employment and output, 
A Methodology Applied to Peru and Guatemala. Paris; 
Research Division of the O.E.C.D., 1970. 
86. Tinbergen# J. Economic Policy: Principles and Design. 
Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1956, 
87. United Nations. F.A.O. Production Yearbook. 25.. Rome: 
Author, 1972. 
88. United Nations. I.L.O. Employment and Income Policies 
for Iran. Geneva: Author, 1972. 
89. U.S. Department of Agriculture. Economic Research 
Service. IRAN, Agricultural production and trade. 
Washington# D^C=: Author- April 1974. 
90. Vakil, C. N. and Brahmanand, P. R. Planning for an 
Expanding Economy; Accumulation, Employment and 
Technical Progress in Underdeveloped Countries. Bombay: 
Vora, 1956. 
248 
91. Van de Metering, H. A First Measurement of the Rate of 
Unemployment of The Peruvian Agricultural Labor Force. 
Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, 
Iowa, 1971. (Unpublished) 
92. Watson, D. S. Price Theory and Its Uses. 2nd ed. 
New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968. 
93. Weeks, J. Employment, Growth, and Foreign Domination 
in Underdeveloped Countries. The Review of Radical 
Political Economics 4 (Spring, 1972): 59-70. 
94. Weeks, J. The Political Economy of Labor Transfer. 
Science and Society 35 (1971); 463-480. 
249 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Appreciation is extended to Dr. Arnold Paulsen for 
his help and suggestions in the preparation of this disser 
tation. 
250 
APPENDIX A; GOVERNMENT'S WHEAT PRICE POLICY 
Throughout this study references have been made to the 
Iranian "wheat price policy". This appendix serves as a 
description of the nature of that policy, as well as its 
method of implementation. 
In general, the objectives of the wheat price policy of 
the Iranian government are: 
a. Keeping bread prices at a low level 
b. Reducing seasonal fluctuations in bread prices 
c. Decreasing the excess capacity of the bakeries by 
reducing their number 
The means to achieve these goals are described below. 
Each year, before farmers plant their wheat, the govern­
ment announces an official purchase price for wheat. At this 
price the government stands ready, in theory, to buy all the 
wheat offered by the producers. In practice, however, 
the government buys very little from domestic producers.^ 
"The amount of wheat purchased from domestic producers by 
the government is indeed small. There are a number of reasons 
for this: 
a. The government's support price has been set too low, 
compared with the cost of production and the "free" 
market price, to attract many farmers. 
b. The government demands particular quality ofwhe^t 
which most farmers do not have. Government specifi­
cations are rigid. A typical ad for governments' 
purchasing policy runs as follows: 
(footnote continued on the following page) 
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In general, if a government announces a policy of pur­
chasing farm products at a fixed price, this implies a pro­
gram of price support. This is because when a government 
buys farm products, this will raise prices above what they 
otherwise would be. The total effect of the Iranian govern­
ment's "wheat policy", however, tends to reduce the price of 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
Clean Wheat Foreign Solid Objects at most 1% 
Other Cereals at most 1/2% 
Seeds of Wild Grass at most 10 seeds in 100 
Moisture 7% 
(45) 
The wheat grown by many farmers, particularly the small 
village farmers, does not meet these requirements and there­
fore cannot be sold to the government. Mixed grains of much 
more than 1/2% are common and moisture is often in excess 
of 7%. 
c. The wheat sold to the government must be delivered 
to"...the government silos or the storage house®, in state 
capitals...". The farmer must deliver it himself or pay for 
the transportation costs which in many cases is substantial. 
For the small farmers this is particularly burdening. More­
over, the farmer cannot be certain that his wheat will be 
bought once he has transported it to the city, for his crop 
may not meet the specifications. Thus he is most likely to 
save himself the trouble and sell his crop to the middlemen 
who would go to his farm and pay the transportation cost, and 
perhaps even offer him a slightly higher price. 
d. A large portion of the wheat farmers, especially the 
small wheat farmers, have sold their crops "green" to the 
merchants. Thus at the harvest time they have no crop to 
sell to the government. The merchant green buyer, is also 
unlikely to sell to the government,- for he can sell it as a 
higher price to private buyers, as will be explained below. 
We can therefore conclude that "the cereal organization 
virtually always handles overseas imports", and has little 
to do with buying domestically produced wheat (54, p. 6). 
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wheat in the country, relative to what it would be in 
the ..absence of government's intervention. When the gov­
ernment announces the official purchase price of wheat 
at Rls. 6,000/ton (which has been the official purchase price 
for the past decade), it is generally understood that the 
government is determined to take the necessary actions to keep 
actual prices received by the producers and paid by the 
millers close to this "artificial" price. The Iranian 
government implements its objective mainly by importing 
wheat and selling it at a subsidized rate. 
When the government announces its purchase price of 
wheat at Rls. 6,000/ton, the market price settles around 
Rls. 6,500/ton, at harvest time. The reason for this slight­
ly higher market price is that the millers and the merchants 
offer more to persuade farmers to sell their wheat to them, 
rather than selling it to the government. This price of 
Rls. 6,500/ton (about $95/ton), therefore, can be considered 
"Price received by farmers".^ This situation has existed in 
Iran for the past decade 
How does the government control wheat prices and prevent 
the establishment of a higher price, which would result from 
^This statement is not strictly accurate. The above 
price is relevant for harvested wheat. However, many farmers, 
particularly small village farmers, do not receive this 
price. They usually sell their crop before it is harvested 
at much lower price per ton. See Chapter III. 
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"free" market? If domestic supply of wheat is insufficient 
to meet the demand at this low price, what is it that keeps 
the price from rising? The answer is, of course, that the 
government imports wheat and supplies it to the bakers to 
insure the "stability" of wheat prices at this low level to 
consumers. It must be noted that government's policy of 
bread price control is effective only in the cities. Rural 
areas are not directly affected by this policy. Furthermore, 
there are two distinct policy measures, one for Tehran, the 
capital, and the other for other urban centers. 
Activities of the Cereal Organization 
in Tehran 
Each year, the "cereal organization" announces an of­
ficial wheat quota for different cities (see Table 34). This 
means that the government stands ready to supply a specified 
amount of (imported) wheat to the "permitted" bakers at a 
set price. The price charged by the government is uniform 
throughout the year, and has been Rls. 7,510/ton during the 
past nine years. This is approximately the same as the 
open market price of wheat in Tehran, during the harvest 
season. But for most of the year, market prices of wheat is 
well above this price (see Figure 22). 
Tehran has about 4,000 bakeries. The bakeries are 
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Table 34. Share of major Iranian states of 
wheat (1352)3 
the imported 
City Quota (tons) 
Quota 
(% of Total) 
Population 
(%) 
Tehran 200,000 51% {19% 
The Central State 
(Mainly Tehran's 
suburb) 
25,000 6% 
Khorasan 17,000 4% 9% 
East Azarbaijan 16,000 4% 10% 
Isfahan 20,000 5% 5% 
West Azarbaijan 10,000 3% 4% 
Kernanshahan 8,000 2% 2% 
Pars 6,000 1% 6% 
Sisten and 
Baluchastan 
8,000 2% 2% 
Mazandaran 5,000 1% 7% 
Gilan 5,000 1% 5% 
Total 390,000 100% 100% 
^Source; (57). 
small and serve only their immediate vicinity.^ This is mainly 
due to the type of bread preferred in Iran, which is best 
when consumed soon after baking, and cannot be stored for long 
^Each bakery thus serves about 900 people, or there is 
one bakery for every 200 to 250 families. 
1972 
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Figure 22. Monthly variation in market price of wheat (Source: 16) 
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without losing its characteristic flavor. The volume of each 
baker seems to be much less than its capacity. Although 
wages are extremely low and the cost of baking bread also 
low, bread baking in Iran is quite inefficient, as all baker­
ies operate with considerable excess capacity. The bakeries 
seem to be operating on the declining portion of their average 
cost curves. 
Partly because of this problem, the government has taken 
some steps to reduce the number of bakeries. To pursue this 
goal, about 2,518 bakeries have been given special "permit". 
The bakers with the permit can buy wheat from the Cereal 
Organization at the official price of Rls. 7,510/ton, while 
other bakers must pay the going market price for wheat. The 
price of bread is also government controlled and applies to 
all bakers. 
At harvest time, as was mentioned before, the market 
price for wheat is not much different than the government 
price. At times, the market price might even be lower. In 
such cases all bakers, permitted ones included, buy their 
needed supply of wheat from the merchants. But as market 
price begins to rise, the bakers with "permit" start buying 
from the government at lower prices. 
A baker with "permit", thus has a choice of two markets. 
Most of the year he takes advantage of the government's lower 
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offer. To buy the wheat from the Cereal Organization, the 
baker goes to his union. There he is given a coupon which 
he can take to the government silo and demand a quantity of 
wheat.^ Usually he hands his coupon to a miller and, after 
a payment to him for his services, receives his flour. 
The fee received by the millers is also government 
controlled. The miller's fee is set at Rls. 560/ton of 
wheat milled. This is indeed a very small amount, and it has 
remained unchanged since 1344 (56). 
Â ton of wheat, on the average, converts to 867 kilo-
2 grams of flour. The price of flour, paid by the bakers 
can be calculated as follows. 
1000 kg of wheat 7,510 Rls. 
+ Rls. 560 Millar's Fee 
+ Rls. 253 Other Expenses 
867 kg of flour 8.323 Rls. 
Thus the bakers with "permit", can buy flour at 9.6 Rls. per 
kg all year round.^ 
^The quota for each baker is determined, among other 
things, by his sales volume. The coupons given to the bakers 
by their unions, is at most equivalent to the wheat used by 
the baker in 10 days, 
2 
A ton of wheat also gives 100 kg of bran. 
^There are several types of bread in Iran, each using a 
particular type of flour. The wheat-flour, as well as the 
flour-bread conversion rates are different for each type of 
flour and bread. The above calculations are made for the 
"star" type of flour, a widely used type. 
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The bakers, on the average, make 1,375 kg of bread out 
of a ton of flour. The bread is sold at about 12.5 Rls./kg.^ 
The baker's margin, can thus be calculated as follows: 
Costs: 1,000 kg of flour Rls/kg) s,600 Rls. 
Revenue: 1,375 kg. of bread Rls./kg) 17^137.5 Rig. 
Thus the bakers receive about 7,587 Rls./tons of flour used 
for all their services. Figure 23 summarizes our findings 
thus far. The figure shows the "share" of various groups of 
2 the retail price of bread. 
The price of bread is government controlled and varies 
(though only slightly) for different kinds of bread. How­
ever, it is generally believed that the bakers violate the 
price guideline in many ways. They could sell bread by num­
ber, (that is price it by the piece), instead of weight 
and thus avoid the whole problem of "weight" per Rls. I 
have chosen the price of 12.5 Rls./kg of bread, based on 
my own observation. This is about the "average" price of 
all kinds of bread. 
^The figures are calculated as follows: 
1,000 kg of flour makes 1,375 kg of bread thus 1 kg of 
bread requires 1,000/1,375 = .73 kg of flour 
The cost of this flour is .73 x 9.6 = 7.01 Rls. 
1,000 kg of wheat makes 867 kg of flour. Thus .73 kg 
of flour requires 
867'^^^ ~ .84 kg of wheat. 
The cost of this wheat is .84 x 7.51 = 6.31 Rls. 
This is how the consumer price of 12.5 Rls. is distributed. 
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Before continuing our discussion, several points must be 
emphasized. 
a. The "wheat price" component of the retail price of 
bread is in reality more than what the figure indicates. 
The official selling price of 7.51 Rls,/kg may be far below 
the price paid by the "society" for that wheat. The govern­
ment sells wheat at that price, regardless of the price she 
paid to foreign producers. For instance, the real cost of 
wheat sold by the government in 1973 at the subsidized price 
of 7.5 Rls./kg was, in fact, more than 20 Rls./kg. This was 
the price of wheat purchased from the United States plus 
transportation costs, 
b. The millers' margin, which is 6% in this case is 
indeed low. The millers' fee of 560 Rls./ton of wheat 
milled, was agreed to by the Cereal Organization and the 
Bakers and the Millers Union in 1966. At that time, this 
amount represented a "break even" price for the millers, 
without any pure economic profit. Inflation has changed 
1 
all that now. A government sponsored study concludes that 
the "break even" price now would be around 860 Rls./ton of 
wheat milled: 
^This study is done by the Research Division of the 
Department of rural cooperatives. It is unpublished, and 
in Farsi. As of yet, it has no title1 
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There are, however, other factors involved in this 
pricing policy. All parties involved are aware, though 
no one admits it publicly, that the millers mix their "gov­
ernment" wheat with lower quality, and cheaper, domestic 
brands, and thereby increase their effective fee. The millers 
claim this mixing to be essential to their operation, as flour 
made exclusively of imported wheat lacks the specific quality 
needed for baking Iranian type bread. 
Nevertheless, one thing is for certain. The millers' 
margin is small. Any realistic plan for the future must in­
clude a revision of the old agreement and raise the millers' 
fee. This is, of course, not the same thing as saying 
that variation in price of wheat necessitates, or ensues, a 
change in the millers' fee. One has nothing to do with the 
other. Millers' fee in Tehran, and for the "permitted" bakers 
is government controlled, and only the government can in­
crease it. But left to itself, this fee would undoubtedly 
rise to a much higher level. 
c. The bakers with no "permit" have a much, more diffi­
cult time. They must buy flour in the open market and make 
the best of their situation. The "free" market price of 
flour varies from day to day and at times reaches quite high 
levels. As Figure 22 indicates, price index for 1352 varied 
from 105 in (Mordad) to 126 in (FarVardin). Since bread 
prices are government controlled, this variation in flour 
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prices represents a corresponding reduction in the already 
too low margin of the bakers without permit. 
d. Figure 23 does not show the share of the farmer in 
the price of bread because it is assumed that the wheat sup­
plied by the government is bought from other countries. This 
has been the case in recent years. When part of the wheat 
supplied to the "permitted" bakers by the government comes 
from government purchase of domestic wheat, the share of 
Iranian farmers in the price of bread is that shown by Figure 
24. This share ranges from 43% for those farmers who sell 
their crop at harvest time (usually large farmers) to about 
34% for the small farmers who sell their crop "green". 
Government Policy in Other Urban Centers 
The Cereal Organization's policy of intervention in the 
wheat and flour market extends to urban centers outside of 
Tehran as well. Bread prices are controlled in all cities, 
and to a lesser extent, so are flour prices. But the extent 
of government's intervention and its degree of control is 
much less for cities other than Tehran. For one thing most 
of these cities are nearly self-sufficient in wheat from 
the farms in the neighboring villages. There is, therefore, 
less need for imported wheat. Nevertheless, every state has 
a share of imported wheat (see Table 34). 
The shares of imported wheat apportioned to each state 
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is sent to be stored at the local silos, and are placed under 
the control of the governor of that state. This wheat does 
not enter the market for some time. The market forces are 
allowed to determine the market prices for wheat and flour. 
These prices are at their lowest during the harvest time and 
thereafter increase gradually. When the market price of wheat 
or flour reach a specific level, the government steps in and 
"dumps" the imported wheat into the market. Once again, this 
wheat is put at the disposal of the bakers' union, who in 
turn make it available to the "permitted" bakers. 
The basic difference between the government policy in 
Tehran and other urban centers is the fact that the "permitted" 
bakers in the latter areas receive imported wheat only about 
3 or 4 months of the year, during which time market price 
of flour has peaked, whereas in Tehran, the bakers with the 
"permit" can use the imported wheat at the uniform price 
all year round. 
Another point to be observed is that in many of these 
urban centers, bread prices are in fact lower than it is in 
Tehran, As it was mentioned before, bread prices are con­
trolled in all cities,- but what is important is what we called 
"de facto" bread prices. This price was 12.5 Rls./kg in 
Tehran, but 11 Rls./kg in Gorgan (a net exporter of wheat). 
The following description may be helpful in an understanding 
of the situation in another urban center (Gorgan). 
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The millers in this area buy a large quantity of wheat 
from the farmers at harvest time. Those with more capital 
buy enough wheat to last them all year. Most millers, how­
ever, can afford to purchase only a few months supply of 
wheat. These millers then, gradually convert the wheat into 
flour and sell it in the "free market", reaping a modest 
profit. 
As we said previously, a ton of wheat, on the average, 
converts to about 867 kg of flour and 100 kg of bran. At the 
harvest time, flour is sold at 9,400 Rls./ton and the bran at 
2,500 Rls./ton. The millers' fee, then, can be calculated 
as follows: 
Costs of wheat, 1 ton = 6,500 Rls. Rls. 6,500 
Gross Revenue: (9,400 Rls./ton) 
Flour: 867 kg Rls. 8,149,8 
Bran: 100 kg^ '^SOO Rls./ton) 250 
Total Revenue Rls. 8,399.8 
Thus the millers' margin is Rls. 1,899.8, for every ton 
of wheat milled at harvest time. This is of course, over 
three times the millers' margin in Tehran. 
The bakers in Gorgan buy their needed flour from these 
millers, or from middlemen whose job it is to buy and sell 
flour. During the harvest season flour is priced around 
Rls. 9,400/ton. The bread is sold at 11 Rls./kg. The baker's 
266 
situation can be summarized as follows. 
Cost; 1,000 kg of flour (9/400 Rls./ton) 9^ 400 Rls. 
Revenue: 1,375 kg of breadRls./kg) 15,125 Rls. 
Thus the bakers receive about 5,725 Rls. for each ton of flour 
used. This margin is quite small. The bakeries, as was men­
tioned before, are small. The average bakery bakes about 1/2 
ton of flour in a day. for this, the bakery must have 
four to five full time employees. Adding other costs of the 
bakeries (fuel, rent, etc.) to the labor cost, there is 
virtually no room for profit. 
Figure 25 summarizes the farmer-retailer spread for wheat 
in Gorgan at harvest time.^  This graph is essentially similar 
to the previous graph pertaining to Tehran. The only differ­
ence being a contraction in the bakers' share and an expansion 
in the millers' share. 
Thus far, we have not seen the government's policy in 
action. This is because our discussions have been limited 
to the situation at harvest season, where the market price of 
wheat is at its lowest, and there is no need for government 
O^nce again, the necessary calculations are made to deter­
mine the share of each group of the price of bread, 
1 kg of bread requires .73 kg of flour. Cost of this 
flour is .73 x 9.4 = 6.86 Rls. 
0.73 kg of flour requires =84 kg of wheat. Cost of this 
wheat is .84 x 6.5 = 5.46 Rls. 
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Figure 25. Wheat-bread spread in Gorgan at harvest time 
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intervention in the market. 
Gradually, the market prices of wheat and flour begin 
to increase. The main reasons for this price rise are 
storage costs, and the interest charge on the capital in­
vested in buying wheat at harvest time. The price of wheat 
increases to about Rls. 8,000/ton around October.^  Flour 
prices rise accordingly. The bakers are now caught in a 
squeeze between rising costs and constant bread prices. 
Their profit begins to shrink. By December flour sells at 
about Rls. 1,300/ton, a 40% increase since the harvest time," 
Obviously, the bakers are in a perilous situation. Their 
position can be summarized as follows: 
Cost; 1 ton of flour (13,000 Rls./ton) QOO Rls. 
Revenue: 1,375 kg of breadRls./kg) 15,125 Rls. 
Their "margin" shrinks to 2,125 Rls. per ton of flour used. 
The farmer-retailer spread now changes to that rsprsssnted 
by Figure 26. The bakers now receive a mere 14% of the retail 
"We are discussing the situation in Gorgan, a wheat pro­
ducing area. The prices are higher in the cities which im­
port wheat from other parts of the country, simply because 
there is a transportation cost. For example, during this 
October, wheat prices in Tehran was around 9,000 Rls./ton. 
2 The price of flour increases more than that of wheat. 
This is because the high quality wheat is purchased at 
harvest time by the millers and/or the merchants, who sell 
it as flour. Most of the wheat available in December is of 
the poorest quality, and thus fetches lower prices. 
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price of bread for their services. Of what they were re­
ceiving previously, a large part is accrued to the "middle­
men" as their fee for having purchased the wheat and storing 
it. Clearly the bakers' position is untenable. Something 
must be done. 
To prevent the bakers from going bankrupt, the govern­
ment steps in. The governor issues an order by which the 
imported wheat is put at the disposal of the bakers' union 
in the large cities of his state. The union, in turn, mills 
all this wheat and makes the flour available to the bakers 
at a low price of 10,250 Rls./ton. The union pays a fee to 
the millers, amounting to 800 Rls./ton of wheat milled. This 
is higher than the fee paid to Tehran's millers, but still 
lower than the fee charged by the millers for milling "pri­
vate" wheat. The bakers in Gorgan, now buying the subsi­
dized flour, reap a modest profit. Their situation now is 
summarized below: 
CostsÎ 1,000 kg of flourRls./ton) gSO Rls. 
Revenue: 1,375 kg of bread Rls./ton) 15,125 Rls. 
Their margin now is 4,875 Rls. Figure 27 shows the share of 
1 
each group in the retail price of bread,^  
1^ kg of bread requires .73 kg of flour. Cost of this 
flour is .73 x 10.25 = 7.48 Rls. 1 kg of flour requires .84 
kg of wheat. Cost of this wheat is 6.8 Rls. 
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Before ending this chapter, a few comments may be in 
order : 
1. Although the wheat "share" of the retail price of 
bread is very high in Iran, compared with that in other 
countries, still the price received by the wheat farmer is 
quite low. Wheat prices, as we saw before, was at the neigh­
borhood of 6,500 Rls./ton at harvest time. Considering the 
costs of production, this is a low price as it is. But in 
most cases, this is not the price received by farmers. We 
have seen before that the majority of small farmers, most of 
whom grow some wheat, sell their crops green, at a discounted 
price. The "price received by farmers" for this group of 
farmers is much lower than the one mentioned above, perhaps 
around 400 Rls./ton. 
But no matter when and how the wheat is sold, its price 
seems to be quite low, relative to other crops- The govern­
ment's purchase price of wheat has remained virtually constant 
during the past 10 years, while prices of other crops have in­
creased nearly every year, in some cases tripling since a 
decade ago. This explains the observation that growing wheat 
is the last choice of the commercial farmers in Iran, 
Even government officials admit that the present wheat 
price policy is untenable. They note that this year's im­
ported wheat cost the government more than 20,000 Rls./ton, 
more than three times the price paid for domestic wheat. 
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While this was an exceptional year for farm prices, future 
price trends are by no means certain. The prospect of a 
few more years of high wheat prices may force the government 
to revise its wheat pricing policy and adopt a more realistic 
approach. Already the government has announced a purchase 
price of 1,000 Rls./ton. Time will tell how effective this 
new incentive will be. 
2. The millers' fee, set by the government in 1966 and 
unchanged since then, is also quite low. The millers are 
presently avoiding substantial losses by a variety of schemes, 
as was referred to above. The study I referred to previously 
leaves no doubt that the present plight of the millers, those 
in Tehran, cannot continue for long. Not only is their fee 
small, they are operating at less than 60% capacity which 
aggravates the problem even more. 
But no matter how urgent the need for an increase in the 
millers' margin may be, it is safe to assume that an increase 
in the price of wheat will not have a significant effect on 
it. Had this been a "free" market, the millers' fee would 
surely have risen long ago. But whether or not this fee will 
rise or not has much less to do with the price of wheat, 
than with the government's policy at each particular time. 
If the government were to lift its control from the 
wheat-bread market completely, then of course, millers' fee 
would increase along with, but not because of, wheat prices. 
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But should the government raise the price of wheat with no 
change in its other policies, then there is no reason to as­
sume any change in the millers' margin. 
It should be added, however, that if the government has 
no plans for easing its controls on the market, as there 
is no indication that it has, then the millers margin must 
surely increase for the system to continue its operation 
even as it is today. The study referred to above maintains 
that many millers in Tehran are losing money each day, and are 
in operation only because they have invested millions of Rials, 
in their mills and have no way to recover their investment 
except by staying in and hoping for a more favorable situation. 
This hope, however, will not last for long. 
3. Though no uniform in all cities and at all times, 
the bakers' margin, by and large, is small also. During the 
harvest time when wheat prices are low, or in Tehran for the 
"permitted" bakers, the margin is not too small. Relatively 
speaking, a margin of 35% of the price of bread, is reason­
able. But at times, as we saw before, this margin gets as 
low as 14% of the bread price. The bakers I talked to 
insisted that they lost money during such times. Though I 
was told that the bakers raise their "effective" price by 
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various means on these occasions,^  it can hardly be imagined 
how a bakery with 4 or 5 workers, could be profitable on a 
2 
margin of 1,132 Rls. per day (about $17). 
The point that needs to be emphasized is, however, that 
the present method of baking bread in Iran has little room 
for improvement. Most types of bread cannot be stored for 
long and must therefore be baked only for the day's consump­
tion. Each neighborhood has its own bakery and thus the sales 
volume is low. Nearly all bakers I talked to, believed that 
they could handle twice as many customers as they were getting 
now. But that would surely create new problems. Iranians 
like to have their bread hot, and buy it at meal time. Even 
now there is a huge crowd around the bakeries at meal time. 
But the low sales volume means excess capacity and high 
average costs. Efficiency could be increased, and the bakers' 
margin reduced, only with a new method of bread baking. 
Another possible solution would be a system of distribution 
which would enable a bakery to serve several neighborhoods. 
In recent years there have been talks of "mechanizing" the 
"They could sell by number, rather than by weight and 
thus sell 1 kg of bread for a higher price. They could also 
sell bread which is less than perfectly cooked, thus passing 
on a bit of water to the customer. I cannot say whether this 
is indeed done or not. I can testify, however, to the ap­
pearances of the bakeries, as well as those who worked in it, 
which gave no indication of a prospering enterprise. 
2 Based on a sale of 750 kg of bread a day. 
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system of bread baking in Iran. This will reduce the average 
cost of baking bread but introduces other problems. Not only 
the bread baked in "factories" does not appeal to the Iranians' 
taste, but also this system aggravates the unemployment prob­
lem in Iran. The workers presently engaged in bakeries will 
be unemployed as job opportunities are scarce. 
To summarize, there is little room for a reduction in 
the bakers' margin under the present system of bakery. Fur­
thermore, variation in the price of wheat should have no ef­
fect on this margin. 
4. There are many who question the equity of the present 
form of government subsidy. Under the present policy, rich 
and poor are subsidized alike. As Table 24, p. 172, clearly 
indicates, however, the poor spend a large portion of their 
income on bread, while the middle and high income group's 
expenditure on bread is negligible. The rich can afford to 
pay a higher price for their bread, and the poor could well 
use a price reduction. 
Given the present conditions, subsidizing bread seems 
unavoidable. But the present policy of bread price support 
is very costly to the government, as well as being adverse 
to wheat farmers. To the extent that this helps the poorer 
section of the population, it is surely a praise-worthy 
effort. But as it is, this policy is also subsidizing a large 
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section of the population which could well do without it. 
The solution, then, seems to be a new scheme whereby bread 
could be cheaper for some, and more expensive for others. 
Obviously, such a policy measure will be much more difficult 
to implement, than the present one. The benefits of a more 
equitable subsidy, however, is so substantial as to merit 
further analysis on this subject. 
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APPENDIX B; ACTIVITIES, RESTRAINTS AND INPUT-OUTPUT 
COEFFICIENTS OF THE LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODEL 
The Activities 
PO^  Continuous cotton production and harvesting on Class 1 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
(unmechanized) 
Yield_ 4 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 10,970^  
P O  Continuous cotton production and harvesting on Class 2 
land. Unit is one hectare, (unmechanized) 
Yield 3 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 9,440 
PO Continuous cotton production and harvesting on Class 3 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare (unmechanized) 
Yield 2.2 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 8,070 
P O a  Continuous cotton production and harvesting on Class 4 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. (un­
mechanized) 
Yield 1.4 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 6,070 
POc Continuous cotton production and harvesting on Class 3 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare.(unmechanized) 
Yield__ 0.5 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 1,710 
P^  Continuous wheat production and harvesting on land 6. 
The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Yield 0. 8 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 3,000 
P,-, Continuous wheat production and harvesting on Class 1 land. 
The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Yield 5 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 9,860 
T^his is variable cost, not otherwise accounted for in 
the model. 
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P Continuous wheat production and harvesting on Class 2 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
yieId 4 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 8,560 
P,3 Continuous wheat production and harvesting on Class 3 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Yield^  3 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 7,560 
P . Continuous wheat production and harvesting on Class 4 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Y ie Id 21. tons 
Variable cost Rls. 5,990 
P^  c Continuous wheat production and harvesting on Class 3 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Y ield 1.1 ton 
Variable costs Rls. 3,lë0 
P g Cotton-wheat rotation, production and harvesting on 
Class 1 land. The unit of activity is two hectares. 
Yield cotton 4.4, wheat 5.5 
Variable costs Rls. 20,830 
P,n Cotton-wheat rotation, production and harvesting on 
'^ Class 2 land. The unit of activity is two hectares. 
Yield cotton 3.3, wheat 4.4 
Variable costs. Rls. 18,000" 
P,o Cotton-wheat rotation, production and harvesting on 
Class 3 land. The unit of activity is two hectares. 
Yield cotton 2.4/ wheat 3.3 
Variable cost Rls. 15,630 
p.q cotton-wheat rotation, production and harvesting on 
Class 4 land. The unit of activity is two hectares. 
Yield cotton 1.5, wheat 2.3 
Variable costs Rls. 12/060 
P^ q Cotton-wheat rotation, production and harvesting on 
Class 5 land. The unit of activity is two hectares. 
Yield cotton 0.6, wheat 1.2 
Variable costs Rls. 4,870 
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Continuous rice production and harvesting on Class 1 land. 
The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Yield 5.7 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 19,100 
1?22 Continuous rice production and harvesting on Class 2 land. 
The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Yield 4.5 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 17,200 
Pgg Continuous rice production and harvesting on Class 3 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Yield 2.9 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 15,100 
2^4 Continuous soybean production and harvesting on Class 2 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
YieId 2.5 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 6,550~ 
Pjc Continuous soybean production and harvesting on Class 3 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
YieId 1.8 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 6,550 
Pgg Continuous soybean production and harvesting on Class 4 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Yield 1.1 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 5,550 
P^ T Continuous sunflower production and harvesting on Class 
3 land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
YieId 2 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 1,900 
T?2q Continuous sunflower production and harvesting on Class 
4 land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Yield 1.3 tons 
Variable costs Rls^  1,400 
P^ q Continuous sunflower production and harvesting on Class 
3 land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Yield 0.8 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 3,900^  
P^ o Continuous barley production and harvesting on Class 4 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
YieId 2.2 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 4,000 ~ 
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p Continuous barley production and harvesting on Class 5 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Yield 1.3 tons 
Variable costs Rls. 2,470 
P_2 Continuous barley production and harvesting on Class 6 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Y ie Id 1.0 ton 
Variable cost Rls. 2,370 
P _ Continuous barley production and harvesting on Class 7 
land. The unit of activity is one hectare. 
Yield 0.7 ton 
Variable costs Rls. 1.870 
P^  ^ Cotton selling activity. The unit of activity is one ton. 
Pgg Wheat selling activity. The unit of activity is one ton. 
P^ g Rice selling activity. The unit of activity is one ton. 
P^ y Soybean selling activity. The unit of activity is one ton. 
P_p Sunflower selling activity. The unit of activity is one 
ton. 
P^ g Barley selling activity. The unit of activity is one ton. 
P.. Labor hiring activity in period one. The unit of activity 
is one day. 
P., Labor hiring activity in period two. The unit of activity 
is one day. 
P Labor hiring activity in period three. The unit of 
activity is one day. 
P^  ^ Labor hiring activity in period four. The unit of activ­
ity is one day. 
P^  ^ Labor hiring activity in period five. The unit of activ-
ity is one day. 
P.c Labor hiring activity in period six. The unit of 
activity is one day. 
P g Labor hiring activity in period seven. The unit of 
activity is one day. 
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P _ Labor hiring activity in period eight. The unit of 
activity is one day. 
P.g Labor hiring activity in period nine. The unit of 
activity is one day. 
P g Labor hiring activity in period ten. The unit of 
activity is one day. 
Restraints 
1 
RO^  Land type 1. The B column entry represents hectares. 
This is the highest quality land. Practically all crops 
included in this program can be grown on this type of 
land. However, this land is most suitable for cotton, 
rice, and wheat. 4,700 hectares of this type land is 
available in this area. 
ROg Land type 2. 33,460 hectares. This land is of lower 
quality than type 1. The yield of various crops grown 
on this land were given previously. 
RO^  Land type 3. 102,526 hectares. Again, the quality of 
 ^ this land is lower than that of the previous two types. 
The type of crops grown on this land are cotton, wheat, 
soybeans, sunflower, barley. 
RO^  Land type 4. 137,622 hectares. Again, the quality of 
" this land is lower than that of the previous three 
types. The crops grown are; cotton, wheat, soybeans, 
sunflowers, barley. 
RO. Land type 5. 184,610 hectares. Again, the quality of 
this land is lower than that of the previous four types. 
The crops grown are: cotton, wheat, sunflower, barley. 
ROg Land type 6. 76,130 hectares. Again, the quality of 
this land is lower than that of the previous five types. 
The crops grown are wheat and barley 
O^ne hectare is approximately 2.3 acres. 
T^he term "quality" is used in a general sense. In 
particular, the amount of water available is assumed to affect 
the "quality" of farm land. 
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Land type 7. 15,375 hectares. Again, the quality of 
this land is lower than that of the previous six 
types. The only crop grown on this land is barley. 
R._ through These are labor restraints. The unit is one 
"  ^ man-day. It is assumed that all required 
workers must be hired by the farm managers, 
so that no set number is put in the B column 
for these restraints. It is thus assumed 
that while no labor is available on the 
farms now, they can be hired, at given wage 
rates, up to some limit. 
Transfer rows 
Restriction on labor hiring. It has been esti­
mated that the number of workers available in the 
farm sector of this region is 124,885. Assuming 
that each worker works on the average of 28 days 
a month, it means that each month, about 3,496,807 
man-days of work are available for hire. R24 to 
Rgg limits labor hiring to no more than this 
amount. 
Finally, it must be mentioned that no fixed cost paying 
activity is included in the model. The main reason for this 
exclusion is the fact that no data is available on the amount 
of fixed cost involved. It would have been a very diffi­
cult and time-consuming task, to say the least, to try and 
calculate this figure. This, however, may not be necessary 
for our purposes. In the short run, the only affect of ex­
cluding fixed cost is reflected in the value of the programo 
Calculation of the value of the program, however, is not our 
main objective in this study. For this reason, exclusion 
of a fixed cost paying activity should not present a serious 
problem. 
^17 ^22 
^24 ^33 
Table 35. Costs of production 
POl P02 P03 ]?04 P05 PIO* Pll P12 P13 P14 PI 5 
Plowing 470 470 470 470 470 400 400 400 400 400 400 
Disc 400 400 400 400 370 300 300 300 300 300 300 
Water 3,200 2,670 2,200 1,500 - - 2,000 1,700 1,400 1,200 -
Seed 400' 400 400 400 400 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 
Fertilizer 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,300 - - 2,700 2,300 2,000 1,300 -
Insecticide 3,500 3,000 2,600 2,000 470 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Harvesting - - - - - 740 2,800 2,200 1,800 1,130 900 
Others 
— 
. *" 
- — 
- - 100 100 100 100 -
Total Cost -10,970 -9,440 -8,080 -6,070 -1,710 -3,000 -9,860 -8,560 -7,560 -5,990 -3,160 
(Nonlabor) 
P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 
Plowing 870 870 870 870 870 800 700 600 500 500 500 
Disc 700 700 700 700 670 2,300 1,800 1,500 300 300 300 
tiller 
Water 5,200 4,370 3,600 2,700 — 2,500 2,000 2,000 3,000 3,000 2,500 
Seed 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 4,000 4,000 4,000 250 250 250 
Fertilizer 5,700 4,800 4,000 2,600 " 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,000 
Insecticide 3,560 3,060 2,660 2,060 530 - - - - - -
Harvesting 2,800 2,200 1,800 1,130 900 6,000 5,700 4,500 - - -
Others 100 100 100 100 -- - -
Total Cost -20,830 -18,000 -15,630 -12,060 -4,870 -19,100 -17,200 -15,100 -6,550 6,550 -5,550 
(Nonlabor) 
^P06-P10 were mechanized cotton production, 
to have no effect upon the outcome of the runs. 
They were deleted in later runs, as they seemed 
Table 35 (Continued) 
P27 P28 P29 P30 P31 P32 P33 
Plowing 500 500 500 400 400 400 -
Disc 200 200 200 300 300 300 300 
Water 3,000 2,500 - 1,100 " - -
Seed 200 200 200 770 770 770 770 
Fertilizer 2,500 2,000 2,000 - - -
Insecticide —• - - 60 — - -
Harvesting 1,900 1,400 1,000 1,370 1,000 900 800 
Total 8,300 -6,800 -3,900 -4,000 -2,470 -2,370 -1,870 
P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 
Selling Activities 23,000b 17,000b 16,600 24,000 13,000 5,600 
Labor Hiring - - - - - - -100 -120 -150 -140 
activities 
P44 P45 P46 P47 P48 P49 
Labor Hiring -140 -150 -150 -140 -130 -90 
activities 
^These figures were changed for some runs (see the text). 
Table 36. Conversion of coefficients of the "goal" functions to "standard" forms 
POl P02 P03 P04 P05 PIO Pll PI 2 PI 3 
C value Rials 
C value standardized® 
-10,970 
-456.3 
-9,440 
-392.7 
-8,070 
-335.7 
-6,070 
-252.5 
-1,710 
-71.1 
-3,000 
-124.8 
-9,860 
-410.2 
-8,560 
-356.1 
-7,560 
-314.5 
Employment man-days 
Employment standardized 
123 
968.5 
104 
818.9 
79 
622 
58 
456.7 
29 
228.3 
2 
15.7 
4 
31.5 
4 
31.5 
4 
31.5 
Seasonal empl. man-days 
Seasonal standardized 
24 
987,6 
21 
864.2 
18 
740.7 
14 
576.1 
8.6 
353.9 
0.33 
13.6 
0.33 
13.6 
0.33 
13.6 
0.33 
13.6 
P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 
C value Rials 
C value standardized 
-5,990 
-249.2 
-3,160 
-131.4 
-20,830 
-866.5 
-18,000 
-74.8 
-15,630 
-650.2 
-12,060 
-501.7 
-4,870 
-202.6 
-19,000 
-794.6 
-17,200 
-715.5 
Employment man-deiys 
Employment stfmdtirdized 
3 
23.6 
2 
15.7 
127 
1000 
108 
850.4 
83 
653.5 
61 
480.3 
30.5 
240.2 
39 
307.1 
35 
275.6 
Seasonal empl. mam-days 
Seasonal standardized 
0.33 
13.6 
0.33 
13.6 
24.3 
1000 
21.3 
876.5 
18.3 
753.1 
14.3 
588.5 
9.0 
370.4 
8.6 
353.9 
7.7 
316.9 
P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 P31 
C value Rials 
C value standardized 
-15,100 
-628.2 
-6,550 
-272.5 
-6,550 
-272.5 
-5,550 
-230.9 
-8,300 
-345.3 
-6,800 
-282.9 
-3,900 
-162.2 
-4,000 
-166.4 
-2,470 
-102.7 
Employment man-days 
Employment standardized 
31 
244.1 
76 
598.4 
62 
488.2 
55 
433.1 
30 
236.2 
26 
204.7 
18 
141.7 
2 
15.7 
2 
15.7 
Seasonal empl. man-days 
Seasonal standardized 
6.7 
275.7 
17-3 
711.9 
14.7 
604.9 
13 
535 
1.7 
69.9 
1.3 
53.5 
0.33 
13.6 
0.33 
13.6 
0.33 
13.6 
^Standardization; A scale of 1 to 1,000 has been selected. For each goal, (row) the largest 
number (positive or negative) is set equal to 1,000. All other nuraljers in that row are according­
ly standardized, e.g. in (value row: 24,000 = 1,000. All other nuintjers are then divided by 24). 
Table 36 (Continued) 
P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 
C value Riais -2,370 -1,870 23,000 17,000 16,600 24,000 13,000 5,600 
C value standardized -98.6 -77.8 956.8 707.2 690.6 1,000 540.8 233 
Employment man-days 2 2 _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Employment standardized 15.7 15.7 - - - - - -
Seasonal empl• man-days 0.33 o
 
w
 
— 
— — 
— 
— — 
Seasonal standardized 13.6 13.6 - - - - - -
P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 P46 P47 P48 
C value Rials -100 -120 -150 -140 -140 -150 -150 -140 -130 
C value standardized —4.2 -!j -6.2 -5.8 -5.8 —6.2 -6.2 -5.8 -5.4 
P49 
C value Rials -90 
C value standardized -3.7 
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APPENDIX C; NOTE ON COMMERCIAL AND VILLAGE FARMERS 
Throughout this study distinction is made between two 
types of farmers: 
Commercial farmers: Those farmers who own more than 30 
hectares of land and usually live in the towns and cities 
close to their farms. They produce solely for the market. 
They hire farm workers and occasionally even managers. 
Many of these commercial farmers are engaged in nonfarm 
activities as well. 
Village farmers: Those farmers who own less than 10 
hectares of land (per family) and live in the villages where 
their farm is located. The village farmers with more than 
4 or 5 hectares of land also hire transient farm workers (or 
land less villagers) during the peak months. Those village 
farmers with 1 or 2 hectares of land, on the other hand, may 
work on other villagers' farms to supplement their income. 
Nearly all village farmers in this area produce some wheat 
for their family's consumption and market only what is in 
excess of this level. 
